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Generally, people enjoy better lives today than who did one hundred years ago. One
among many reasons behind this fact is the high quality services and products, which
we now have access to, could only exist in scientific fictions at the beginning of the
last century. At least two things make this change happened. One is the constantly
emerging scientific innovations. The other is the importance of quality emphasized
through markets. As a matter of fact, numerous episodes in the history of economics
theory have suggested the positive effect of innovations on economic growth and of
quality on welfare of human beings. Regulators continuously attempted to design public
policies to encourage innovations and improve quality provision in a vertical structure.
On the downstream, where the technologies are taken as granted, regulators seek for
efficiency through governance mechanisms which incentivize the supply of high quality
goods or services in various markets. But no one can be certain that these policies have
served their purposes, without looking into the detailed information about the regulated
markets. Different mechanisms may lead to diverse outcomes. Regulators have also to
determine the approaches by which they can maximize the positive effect of quality on
efficiency. Chapter two and three of this dissertation will discuss the policies concerning
the quality of health and food markets, as the picked examples from the downstream.
On the upstream, where the update of technologies should be induced to an efficient
level, granting the patent rights to innovators is now considered as the main policy to
promote innovations. Regulators have ameliorated the patent systems gradually along
with their efforts. However, Heller and Eisenberg (1998) suggested a tragedy of anti-
commons that the whole patent systems are flawed, because the veto power of original
patent holders is able to delay and decline the sequential findings. Should we end the
patent systems once for all according to anti-commons? Note that this tragedy has been
challenged by recent studies which suggested its impact to be limited. Chapter four will
try to give a new explanation about why the debate is inconclusive.
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Introduction 2
The second chapter is a joint work with Lijun Zhao, a former PhD candidate of
Toulouse School of Economics. We investigate what happens when high quality providers
(physicians, hospitals) are allowed to patronize multiple health plans (multi-homing) and
compare it to single-homing in a two-sided framework. As put by Bardey and Rochet
(2010), health plans’ competition has two-sided nature. By this they mean that ”health
insurance markets are characterized by indirect network externality between providers
and policyholders.” Specifically, health plans limit their enrollees’ access to only their
contracted providers (physicians, clinics and hospitals) and policyholders (potential pa-
tients) prefer access to a large number of providers to increase their chances of getting
proper treatment. Similarly, providers may prefer to have access to a large pool of po-
tential patients depending on the incentive of providers embodied in payment scheme
(fixed salary or fee for service (FFS)).
In 1990s, single-homing staff-mode HMOs (Health Maintenance Organizations) faded
away in the U.S.. With the staff model, physicians may only see HMO patients. Now
a captive group model replaces the staff-model. Providers multi-home and continue to
treat non-HMO patients. It is said that a driven force of this change would be the market
demand for the broad choices of high quality providers. The non-HMO policyholders
might be willing to accept relatively high premiums, when they can select high quality
providers outside of the list of providers affiliated to HMOs. More recently, China’s
government also began to encourage high quality providers to treat the patients, who
used to fully pay for the care by themselves, through enforcing the health plans of those
patients to cover some of the expenses. The multi-homing of high quality providers is
supposed to promote fairness and policyholders’ welfare. However, there is not much
formal analysis of this issue with two-sided settings.
Regarding the multi-homing in two-sided markets, the model of ”competitive bottleneck”
(Armstrong and Wright (2007) and Armstrong (2006)) is famous. In that model, the
whole provider side view platforms as homogenous and joins in all of them when multi-
homing is allowed. As the authors suggested, the platforms do not compete directly on
the multi-homing side, instead competing indirectly by subsidizing the single-homing
side to join in. In equilibrium, the single-homing (consumer or policyholder) side is
treated favorably (indeed, its price is necessarily no higher than its cost), while the
multi-homing (provider or seller) side has its entire surplus extracted by the platforms.
This result reflects the reality under some circumstances, but may not for high quality
goods and services. In fact, the ”competitive bottleneck” is also a warning from plat-
forms to providers: showing disloyalty by multi-homing will cost them. The suppliers
with high quality should be expected to incur costs when joining in any platform, thus
are not as easily captured as assumed by the ”competitive bottleneck”. For instance,
one should never anticipate that the luxury brands, such as Louis Vuitton and Hermes,
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will humiliate themselves by giving a discount in Auchan or Carrefour, because patron-
izing the supermarkets together with low quality products will demean their fashionably
leading status. Therefore, it is more appropriate to extend the framework of Bardey and
Rochet (2010) to discuss the multi-homing and single-homing of high quality providers,
in which the providers are different in their preferences of participating in health plans.
We consider two types of providers, H (high quality) and L (low quality), exerting
different quality externality to policyholders. And we define the health plan’s quality
level as the percentage of H providers in this plan. The health plans under investigation
are asymmetric that one plan is always with strictly larger provider size than the other.
The first result in this chapter is that multi-homing of H providers yields less competitive
intensity between health plans than single-homing does, thus both plans prefer multi-
homing than single-homing. Second, allowing H providers working for multiple plans
increases the size and quality of both plans. Third, contradicting to the ”competitive
bottleneck”, the policyholders, who always single-home, may not be benefited by multi-
homing of H providers, due to that the premiums paid by policyholders may be relatively
high in average compared to the increase in externality of multi-homing. Forth, the
efficiency of multi-homing depends on the payment scheme providers receiving. Multi-
homing increases both size and quality externality enjoyed by all policyholders if they
stay in their original plan. Under fixed salary scheme, providers do not worry about
the number of patient they treat. There is no network externality on provider side, so
this side should be internalized. The plans optimally adjust the prices for policyholders,
according to the change on provider side, so that policyholders will stay in their original
choice of health plan. As a result, multi-homing under a fixed salary scheme improves
efficiency through increasing the quality and size externalities for every policyholder.
However, under the scheme of FFS, provides are incentivized by the number of their
potential patients, thus network externality also appears on the provider side. The plan
with strictly larger size and quality externality is less motivated by multi-homing to offer
a large patient pool to its enrolled providers than single-homing, because multi-homing
lowers the competition intensity. Therefore, this plan subscribes fewer policyholders with
multi-homing than single-homing. Some policyholders who would choose this larger
health plan with single-homing, turn to the smaller one with multi-homing. These
policyholders’ loss of the size and quality externality may exceed the benefit from more
quality and size externalities. Social welfare may be worse off by multi-homing under
an FFS scheme.
In the third chapter, we are interested in optimal structure of regulations on food
quality. Particular attentions are paid to two regulatory approaches: the traditional
product inspection (PI ) and the new process certification (PC ). PI involves the sam-
pling and testing of products and signals the quality accurately to the consumers. PC
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focuses on verifiable production process control and provides relatively noisy signals. As
Auriol and Schilizzi (2003) pointed out, the regulatory costs affects the public certifi-
cation structure for food quality. Due to the relatively low monitoring cost of PC, this
new method are gradually becoming more common. There is a noticeable amount of
literature, which demonstrated that PC is more cost-effective than PI in numerous cases
(see for instance, Unnevehr and Jensen (1996), Crutchfield et al., (1997) and Roberts et
al., (1996)).
It is common to categorize quality into search, experience and credence attributes in
economic literature. The quality of search goods, such as color and size, is easily detected
before consumption. For experience goods, like taste and suitability, consumers are able
to discern its intrinsic quality after consumption. Finally, for credence (or trust) goods,
quality can never be known by consumers with certainty (see Nelson (1970)). And the
last one is usually affiliated with fraud and quality problems, which can lead to socially
costly inefficiencies (see Darby and Karni (1973)). The credence feature of food safety
and nutrition is main focus in this paper, which follows the understanding of Caswell
and Mojduszka (1996). A question that should be asked is whether new method PC
may only substitute for, or be supplemented by PI in optimal regulation, as suggested
by some surveys (see for instance, Unnevehr and Jensen (1998)). To date as I know,
there is not much effort exerted to provide some formal answers to this question.
Similar to Auriol and Schilizzi (2003), we consider a symmetric Cournot-oligopoly struc-
ture. The difference is that the total supply of high quality food and number of firms
with the high quality are random. In practice, there is no manufacture procedure could
completely prohibit the low quality food to be produced. One should expect the inci-
dents leading to low quality outputs to happen with positive probabilities. The result
suggests that PI should never be combined with PC to be adopted by the regulator. PI
impacts the outcome on three aspects. First, adopting PI with high frequency, the reg-
ulator can induce firms to using the production process, which prevents the incidents as
much as possible. If this incentive effect on firms’ strategy of PI is established, then PC,
which monitors the safety (or quality) of firms’ production processes, becomes unneces-
sary. Second, PI is pro-competitive. Knowing PI being adopted, all firms should expect
that some of their rivals may recall their products due to their bad quality. They should
also increase quantities and prepare to take over their competitors’ market shares. With
quantity competition of Cournot model, the total supply will be distorted to less than
efficient levels. Thus, enhancing quantity is a positive factor for social welfare. Third,
PI directly prevents some low quality food from achieving consumers’ table. Therefore,
it increases the credibility of public regulation. Because of its relatively large monitoring
cost, one may expect that adopting PI by some small frequency along with PC would
be optimal. However, the second and third effect of PI timing together may cause the
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social benefit from PI is convex in its frequency. That is, if the expenditure on PI is
worthy for improving efficiency, it should be conducted as frequent as possible; oth-
erwise, it should be stopped. Therefore, if PI ’s cost is small enough (less than some
threshold), it prevails in the optimal regulatory scheme, where PC is not needed. On
the contrary, if PI ’s cost exceeds that threshold, PI should be excluded from the public
policies. Moreover, the threshold decreases with competitiveness in the food market.
The reason behind this result is that the quantity distortion, which leads to the prof-
itability of the firms, becomes insignificant when the competition in the food market
is intensified. The pro-competitive effect of PI is then diluted. The advantage of PC
becomes most apparent in a complete competitive situation.
In chapter four, we try to provide a novel justification for the anti-commons hypothesis
of Heller and Eisenberg (1998), which is suggested to be over-stated by some recent
studies. Specifically, anti-commons highlights the patent protection as a two-edged
sword: it spurs scientific research by securing scientists the fruits of their labors, but it
also gives patent holders potential power to restrict how others conduct research based
on the protected knowledge. It clearly implies that new innovations and investments in
research and development (R&D) activities could be hindered by patent rights. However,
some empirical studies, such as Mowery and Ziedonis (2002), Sampat et al. (2003) and
Murray and Stern (2007), suggested oppositely. They used the citation data of patented
innovations within relatively long period and showed that the average citation rate for a
scientific publication did not fall dramatically after the formal patent rights associated
with that publication had been granted. Furthermore, evidence for patent rights lowering
the R&D activities has not been convincing enough (see Refferty (2008)).
Many theoretical contributions like Scotchmer (1991), Green and Scotchmer (1995),
Chang (1995), Scotchmer (1996), focus on sequential innovation, where the patentee and
licensee work on sequential and different projects. With such a setting, anti-commons
rarely appears because the patentee should sell his or her technology out before the
patent rights expire. Bessen and Maskin (2009) consider the case when both paten-
t holder and licensee research for the subsequent innovation based on the originally
patented knowledge. The patent holder may be better off by exterminate the compe-
tition in a future market of new innovation than issuing license and allowing a rival to
research. In this sense, anti-commons may take place. The negative effect of patent
protection is enlarged when the patent holder blocked others’ R&D program and then
failed in his or her own program. The further studies is delayed, since patent holder
him or herself has no new knowledge as the necessary input. But their support for anti-
commons cannot explain why its effect is suggested to be insignificant by the studies
mentioned above.
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Keeping the assumption of two scientists (or innovators) competing in a common new
innovation of Bessen and Maskin (2009), here a common value situation is introduced:
the scientists’ valuation of the new innovation relies on each others’ perspectives. More-
over, the patent holder can signal his perspective, which is private information, through
the investment in his own R&D program. Auriol and Laffont (1992) pointed out that
full informational disclosure usually requires positive social cost in a common value mod-
el. As in the Spence (1974) education model, a highly productive worker may invest
in wasteful education to avoid being considered as a less capable one. Following these
ideas, this chapter presents an outcome with over-investment in R&D: the patentee tries
to fool the licensee by concealing his relatively bad perspective and signaling the good
news through over-investment in his R&D. It is profitable for the patentee when his high
expectation of the new innovation can largely enhance the licensee’s valuation, thus a
high license fee can be expected. The over-investment is the positive social cost, even
though the information has not been disclosed. And it is eventually paid by the licensee
through a license contract.
Anti-commons may also take place, because the patentee would like to screen licensee’s
private information. Specifically, the license fee would be larger when the licensee expects
a fruitful future than a barren one. A blockade might be introduced in the license
menu proposed by the patentee. It incentivizes the licensee to claim a good expectation
by blocking him if he reports the bad news. As the result, anti-commons and over-
investment in R&D can ex ante co-exist when each scientist’s perspective can change
the common valuation substantially. Under this circumstance, the patentee is eager
to disclose licensee’s information and the licensee is easily confused by over-investment
of the patentee. The result suggests that anti-commons may be hardly observable by
using citation and R&D investment data of patents, because it could be masked by the
co-existed another form of inefficiency: the over-investment in R&D.
Chapter 2
Multi-homing of High Quality
Providers in Two-sided Health
Market
2.1 Introduction
1The theory of two-sided markets has been developed to study market structures in which
two groups of agents interact via platforms. The importance of network externality,
which occurs when the benefit enjoyed by a member of one group depends on the size
of the other group with whom they connect, has been stressed. Platform members may
also care about the quality of the other side agents they are going to meet.2 When
agents of any side present different qualities, platforms not only differ in relative size
but also in the mixture of agents, resulting in quality externality.
The health plan market3 is two-sided, because health plans limit enrolled policyholders’
(potential patients) access to only their contracted providers (physicians, clinics and
hospitals, etc.).4 To increase their chances of getting proper treatment, policyholders
prefer access to a large number of medical care providers. Similarly, providers may prefer
to have access to a large pool of potential patients. The health markets are sensitive
1It is a joint work with Lijun Zhao
2Internet dating sites and night clubs (Damiano and Li (2005)) are two examples. Users of dating
sites care about their potential dates’ looks and backgrounds and the wealthy go to night clubs which
serve expensive drinks.
3The health plan market is prevailing. Gaynor (1999) indicates that in the U.S., 83 percent of
physicians had a contract with at least one health plan in 1995, up from 61 percent in 1990 (Emmons
and Simon, 1996).
4For example, in China, the public health plans limit their policyholders to seeking care in hospitals,
which are on the lists of their chosen providers.
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to providers’ quality.5 The providers’ quality may be heterogeneous in several aspects:
general practitioners and specialists, experienced physicians and recent graduates, mul-
tilingual providers and one language providers, etc.. These characteristics can be known
ex ante by health plans with little cost and providers can be reimbursed accordingly. In
seeking treatment, policyholders care not only about the size of the network but also
the concentration of high quality providers.6
As Evans (2003) notes, ”most two-sided markets we observe in the real world appear to
have several competing two-sided firms and at least one side appears to multi-home.”
Evidence of physicians holding multiple contracts with different health plans can be
found all over the world.7 Compared to the low quality providers, those of high quality
are more easily to get multiple offers from health plans.8 With the new reform of medical
care system (2009 - 2011), China’s government officially encourages the multi-homing in
health plans of high quality providers. In China, the national public health care system
was decentralized in 1990s. The local health plans are mainly built on mandatory
contributions (premiums) from policyholders. They regulated their health services such
that policyholders got treatments and they covered the expenses, only if the treatments
are conducted by some providers within their administrative localizations. Therefore, the
high quality providers had to single-home in the health plans of their districts. And they
only treated patients from distant locations, who could afford their medical care without
using the health plans. The new reform relaxed this previous regulation. It allows
the patients to seek for high quality providers with reimbursements from their local
plans, regardless the difference in localizations between the providers and themselves.
Consequently, the high quality providers are now more flexible in choosing health plans
to join in. The government believes that the new reform will increase policyholders’
welfare by allowing policyholders a broader choice of high quality providers, especially
when high quality providers are scarce and other available providers are with relatively
low quality. Thus, multi-homing of high quality providers is supposed to promote fairness
and efficiency. However, there is no formal analysis of this issue.
5See for instance, Ma and Burgess (1993)
6The quality of medical care is usually regarded as credence attributes in economics literature (see
Emons (1997)). It is hard to be verified by policyholders on individual levels. Policyholders need
quality signals from health plans. Or they may rely on information disclosed by other institutions, such
as Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Study (CAHPS), which signal the quality of health plans.
The health plans and the institutions can identify the quality of medical providers through verifying
physicians’ diplomas and carefully recording doctors’ and hospitals’ previous performances, etc..
7In France, almost all clinics accept all kinds of health insurances. In the U.S., single-homing staff-
model HMOs (Health Maintenance Organizations) became inactive in the 1990s. Multi-homing group
model HMOs took their place.
8For example, the experienced specialists often have multiple jobs in different clinics and hospitals.
The hospitals, identified as high quality ones, usually have more contracts with different health insurances
than those of low quality.
Chapter 2. Multi-homing of High Quality Providers in Two-sided Health Market 9
In this paper, we extend Bardey & Rochet’s framework (2010) by introducing quality
differentiation among providers that policyholders value. Specifically, there are two
types of providers, H (high quality) and L (low quality), each exerting different levels of
quality externality on policyholders. The two health plans, which are for profit platforms,
compete in price on two sides: the provider side (side 1) and the policyholder side (side
2). Another characteristic of the health market is that policyholders are heterogenous
and have private information about their propensity to use services. Therefore, they
are assumed different in their likelihood of getting a disease, which will determine their
choice for network size and quality.
Health plans may influence each provider through administrative controls. For a provider,
joining a health plan is often associated with the cost of administrative controls and cor-
responding paperwork. Geographic localizations may also matter. As in staff-mode
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), the contracted doctors should only treat
patients inside the HMOs’ buildings. Moreover, the health plans are often seen as sep-
arate goods by physicians even without cost differences. When physicians make one
period contract decision, staying in the same health plan may be more attractive than
switching to other plans because of the relationships they have developed with their
current patients. Therefore, providers are expected to have different preferences for
participating in health plans, which also explains the existence of independent practice
providers not affiliated with any health plans or affiliated with only one plan when multi-
homing is possible. The model of this chapter also includes this feature: providers are
assumed to locate on a Hotelling line with two health plans at each extreme and must
incur transportation costs to join in any plan.
We focus on the situation when only some of H providers will multi-home, if multi-
homing is allowed. We compare the multi-homing equilibrium to when single-homing
of providers is mandatory. For the purposes of this study, we use the percentage of
H providers in one plan to indicate this plan’s quality level. We show that multi-
homing leads to higher quality and larger size of both health plan than single-homing.
Multi-homing also yields less competitive intensity between health plans than single-
homing does, thus both plans prefer multi-homing than single-homing. If single-homing
prevents some H providers from multi-homing, allowing them working for multiple plans
broadens their choices of actions and thus, increases the surplus of their side. However,
the policyholders’ welfare may be undermined by multi-homing, because the premium
would be very high. Furthermore, we define the relative quality of the low quality as
the substitution rate of one L provider to one H in each policyholder’s expected utility.
Contrary to the intention of China’s government of encouraging multi-homing of H
providers, we show that the effect of multi-homing on policyholders’ welfare will be
limited by the low relative quality and few high quality providers available in average.
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Thus, increasing health plans’ quality level through multi-homing may not significantly
improve the policyholders’ welfare, if there is some improvement. It suggests that to
improve fairness and efficiency (of policyholders), more efforts should be exerted to
enhance the quality of L providers, which could eventually increase the population of H
providers.
In this paper, two commonly used schemes of the payment on the provider side are
considered: fixed salary, and fee-for-service (FFS). Under a fixed salary scheme, a physi-
cian is paid independently of the number of treatments he performs; while under FFS,
physicians are reimbursed on a per-service basis.9 We show that compared to single-
homing, multi-homing under a fixed salary scheme improves efficiency. It is because
multi-homing increases both size and quality externality enjoyed by policyholders if
they stay in their original plan. And they will stay when providers receive fixed salaries.
Under this payment scheme, providers do not worry about the number of patient they
treat: there is no network externality on provider side. The plans internalize this side
through adjusting the premiums for policyholders, so none of policyholders will change
their original choice of health plan. Therefore, multi-homing increases the externality
enjoyed by every policyholder.
However, when providers are compensated with FFS, they care about the number of their
potential patients: network externality also appears on the provider side. Additionally,
the equilibrium allows the coexistence of two asymmetric health plans. The plan serving
high risk policyholders is always a plan with strictly larger aggregate externality than
the other one. With the network effect on provider side, the better plan with strictly
larger aggregate externality is less motivated by multi-homing to offer a large patient
pool to its providers than single-homing, because multi-homing lowers the competition
intensity. The subscribed number of policyholders of this better plan is less with multi-
homing than single-homing. Some policyholders who would choose the better plan with
single-homing, turn to the lower quality one with multi-homing. These policyholders’
loss may exceed the benefit of having more H providers in both plans. So social welfare
may be worse off by multi-homing under an FFS scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 is the literature review.
In Section 2.3, we introduce our model. We determine the single-homing and multi-
homing equilibrium when providers are remunerated via salaries in Section 2.4, followed
9There are some other payment schemes on provider side. For example, capitation is another com-
monly used payment rule, where a physician receives a fixed predetermined payment based on each
policyholder assigned to him, whether or not that policyholder seeks care. When there is no hetero-
geneity among policyholders’ demand for treatment, FFS and capitation are basically same since the
only concern is the number of policyholders. When policyholders are heterogenous in their treatment
demand, the physicians must share the risks with the health plans with capitation. however, in this
paper, all providers and health plans are risk neutral.
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by the comparison between these two. We then continue to the case in which providers
are remunerated through a FFS in Section 2.5. Finally, we conclude in Section 2.6.
2.2 Related Literature
As stressed in Rochet and Tirole (2006), whenever price structures (from which side a
platform generates most its profit) matter, the markets are two-sided. A large part of
two-sided market literature focuses on price structures. For instance, Armstrong and
Wright (2007) and Armstrong (2006) provide a model of “competitive bottlenecks” in
which the whole provider side joins all platforms in equilibrium when multi-homing is
allowed, because there is no transportation costs for providers to join in platforms. They
show that in equilibrium, the single-homing (consumer) side is treated favorably (indeed,
its price is necessarily no higher than its cost), while the multi-homing (provider) side
has its entire surplus extracted. Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003)
also provide similar results: multi-homing on one side intensifies price competition on
the other side as platforms use low prices in an attempt to steer end users on the
latter side toward an exclusive relationship. However, this competitive bottleneck is
contestable: platforms neither necessarily generate most revenues on the multi-homing
side as Rasch (2007) shows, nor strengthen the competition on the other side as in
this paper. Especially when the provider side presents horizontal differentiation over
platforms, providers are no longer captive and some of them choose to single-home
if they are allowed to multi-home. In this case, platforms cannot extract the whole
providers’ surplus with multi-homing. Instead, they may weaken the competition on the
policyholder side to generate more profit.
To date, the discussion of platforms’ favor over multi-homing or single-homing is not
conclusive either. For instance, Armstrong and Wright(2007) suggests that when agents
on one side of the market multi-home, platforms might offer exclusive contracts to them
to prevent them from multi-homing. Such exclusive contracts can be inexpensive to offer
since by tying up one side of the market, the platform attracts the other side, which
reinforces the decision of that side to sign up exclusively. However, Caillaud and Jullien
(2003) show that platforms have incentives to propose non-exclusive services, because
with single-homing, the incumbent platform needs to set the prices very low to deter
any competition. We follow the latter’s comprehension.
Finally, as for welfare concerns, Rochet and Tirole (2003) demonstrate that without
detailed information about the platforms’ demand, one cannot not expect clear com-
parisons across governance mechanisms. Nevertheless, Caillaud and Jullien (2003) show
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that multi-homing may improve the efficiency through enhancing the aggregate exter-
nality, but may lead to inefficiency in market structure since some platform may not
attract enough agents on the single-homing side. Following their steps, we derive clear
results about the impact of multi-homing on efficiency conditional on the adopted pay-
ment scheme in a more complex environment, where agents may have heterogenous taste
for platforms and present different qualities.
There is not much attention paid to quality levels of platforms. Viecens (2006) is an
exception.10 This paper allows for the two types of externality, the standard indirect
network effect and the externality due to quality concerns, as we do. The author argues
that the quality level of a platform as a reputation affect may keep providers of high
quality from multi-homing. In our paper, this reputation impact of quality appears when
providers are paid by FFS: health plans may undercut their enrollments of low quality
physicians to provide those of high quality to a large patient pool. Moreover, this paper
assumes that the two platforms are (ex ante) identical, i.e., there are no transportation
costs on the provider side. It concludes that the equilibrium, where all high quality
providers multi-home and others single-home, yields the highest quality externality and
thus, the highest welfare. In contrast, we assume that the provider side presents hori-
zontal differentiation over platforms. When there are only a few providers with incentive
to multi-home and others prefer single-homing because of the transportation costs, the
little increment of quality externality from multi-homing can be offset by the inefficient
allocation of policyholders. Thus multi-homing may undermine welfare.
Our paper is close to Bardey and Rochet (2010), which characterizes the indirect network
externality between the provider and policyholders sides. In practice, a health plan
allowing access to a large number of providers attracts policyholders characterized by a
higher risk than the average population. In a one-sided analysis, this risk segmentation
would only be a disadvantage for this health plan because of the higher number of
reimbursements generated. However, in their two-sided framework, such a health plan
may realize the highest profit in equilibrium. The reason behind this result is that
the indirect network externality allows this health plan to charge a higher premium to
policyholders and negotiate a lower FFS rate with providers. However, this paper does
not discuss the case of providers choosing to multi-home. We extend their model by
adding a quality heterogeneity on providers. Our goal is to understand how quality
and efficiency change with the shift of providers’ constraint on participating in multiple
health plans.
10Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004) and Damiano and Li (2005) also consider the two-sided platforms
with endogenous quality differentiation. However, the former defines the quality in one market as the
size of the network in the other market, thus there is no quality externality. On the other hand, the
latter excludes the indirect network externality.
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2.3 The Model
We consider a health care market delivering treatment for any illness any policyholder
could possibly get.
The model is based on Bardey and Rochet (2010). There are two health plans i = {A,B}
competing for two groups of agents: policyholders and providers. Policyholders are
heterogeneous in the probability of needing medical care and are fully covered by health
plans. Each policyholder could only get treatment from providers in the same health
plan.11 Additionally, we assume that there are two types of providers who exert different
quality externality on policyholders. One type is high quality and labeled H and the
other is low quality and labeled L. Providers choose whether to join one or two (if
multi-homing is allowed) or none of the health plans. They get paid by the health plans,
not directly from patients. We assume that health plans can obtain the information of
a provider’s type (H or L) without cost.12
2.3.1 Provider Side
Providers are uniformly located on the Hotelling line and providers’ location is private
information. Plan A is located at 0 and plan B at 1. The total number of H type is q,
the remaining 1−q are L type. To be simple, the distribution of quality is independent of
location on Hotelling line.13 Providers are assumed to be risk neutral. Their reservation
utility is normalized to zero. Because providers’ qualities can be costlessly verified by
plans, type dependent payment from health plans to providers can then be used.
Let T ji denote the expected payment from health plan i to a j provider, where j = H,L,
i = A,B.14 The utility of a j provider located at x and joining health plan A (or
B respectively) is T jA − tx (or T
j
B − t(1 − x) respectively). Here t is the marginal
transportation cost.For simplicity, we adopt the linear transportation cost.
We define x̃ji as the location of marginal j (j = H,L) provider who is indifferent between
joining in health plan i (i = A,B) and one of the other two strategies: 1) joining in none
of plans and getting utility 0, 2) only joining in the other plan. The first being weakly
11To make things simple, we keep this restriction in the study of our model.
12For example, managed care plans have explicit standards for selecting providers.
13That is Pr(H|x) = q for any location x on the Hotelling line. Under some circumstances, it may be
more appropriate to assume that providers choose their locations strategically. For example, high quality
providers are more possible to work in the big cities with the large population and high average income,
such as Beijing, Paris and London, than in small cities. However, besides the geographic localizations,
health plans also differ in other aspects, which are valued by providers as suggested in the introduction.
The interdependence between providers’ tastes of health plans and their quality may not be strong.
14The payments can be stochastic when fee-for-service is adopted.
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dominated by joining in plan i (i = A,B)for providers x̃ji implies that the following









B − t(1− x̃
j
B) ≥ 0. (2.1)
If multi-homing is allowed, the second strategy does not matter. (IRji ), j = H,L,
i = A,B are sufficient for all j providers with x ≤ x̃jA joining in plan A and those
with x ≥ x̃jB joining in plan B. 15 However, if single-homing is mandatory, the second





















Otherwise, plan i’s marginal j provider may obtain a strictly higher utility by patronizing
only the plan −i. In this single-homing case, all j providers with x < x̃jA join in plan A
and those with x ≥ x̃jB join in plan B.16
We refer x̃jA (or 1− x̃
j
B) as the j providers’ configuration of plan A (or B). The equilib-
rium sizes of plan A and B are
nA = (1− q)x̃LA + qx̃HA and nB = (1− q)(1− x̃LB) + q(1− x̃HB ).
We define the quality level of health plan i (i = A,B) as a percentage of H providers in









B = q(1− x̃HB ) are the sizes of H providers in the health plan A
and B respectively.
To study multi-homing of H providers, we focus on the equilibrium where L providers
always single-home when multi-homing is allowed. Note that an L provider with location
x prefers multi-homing, if and only if TLA − tx ≥ 0 and TLB − t(1− x) ≥ 0. Our focus on
multi-homing equilibrium satisfies
TLB − t(1− x̃LA) < 0. (2.4)
15It is because plans cannot discriminate against providers’ location, i.e., T ji is independent to x. All
j providers on the left of x̃jA patronize plan A and those on the right of x̃
j
B patronize plan B.
16Without loss of any generality, we assume that the marginal j provider of plan A only patronize
plan B if single-homing is mandatory.
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So L providers in plan A never multi-home when multi-homing is allowed, since (2.4)
implies that for all x ≤ x̃LA, we have TLB − t(1 − x) < 0. Moreover, there are only two
plans. Holding of (2.4) implies that L providers always single-home if they choose any
plan as home.
To be consistent, we also restrict our single-homing analysis with (2.4). In the single-
homing case, (IRLA) : T
L
A−tx̃LA ≥ 0 must hold. Thus (2.4) also implies that (ICLA) : TLA−
tx̃LA > T
L
B − t(1− x̃LA) holds strictly. Similarly, we have (ICLB) holds strictly. Therefore,
both (ICLA) and (IC
L
B) will be slack in plans’ single-homing problems. Moreover, taking
(2.4) into the single-homing case does not require any more technic assumptions than
the multi-homing do.
2.3.2 Policyholder Side
As in Bardey and Rochet (2010), there is a continuum of policyholders, indexed by θ,
independently drawn from (0, 1] according to a cumulative distribution function F , which
is continuously differentiable and satisfies the monotone hazard rate property, i.e., 1−F (θ)f(θ)
decreases with θ. Here θ represents the policyholder’s probability of becoming ill and
is private information, but the distribution is common knowledge. Every policyholder
chooses only one plan and pays a fixed premium Pi (i = A,B) to it.
17
The driving force behind health plans is the ”thick market” effect; a large network pro-
vides better chances for finding a trading partner. The expected utility of a policyholder
with θ patronizing plan i (i = A,B) takes the following separable form:
Eui(θ) = ω − Pi + θni [λ+ qi] ,
where ω is a fixed utility gain from policyholders participating in one plan and is as-
sumed to be high enough that premium Pi charged by health plan i can be strictly
positive.18 Moreover, this fixed utility gain cannot be doubled by joining two plans.19
λ ≥ 0 is policyholders’ marginal preference over a plan’s size compared to its quality.
Thus ni [λ+ qi] is plan i’s aggregate externality for policyholders. Moreover, from the
17According to Bardey and Rochet (2010), the fixed premium (the imperfect risk adjustment) is
justified by preventing health plans from setting premiums on an individual risk adjustment fashion to
achieve fairness. As long as the out-of-pocket payment is only a premium, every policyholder will choose
the only one health plan which gives him the highest utility level.
18The policyholders’ reserve utility is also normalized at 0.
19Here is another reason why policyholders usually choose to single-home in health plan markets.
Governments sometimes compensate policyholders financially when they join in a health plan program,
but do not compensate multiple times. If the health plan program is mandatory, ω can be also regarded
as the common financial budget of policyholders.
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definition of qi (formula (2.3)), we have









where i = A,B and nLi = ni − nHi is the size of plan i’s L providers. The right side
of (2.5) implies that the externality exerted by a H provider is strictly higher than a
L provider, the quality difference arises. When λ is small, compared to H providers,
L providers’ relative quality λ1+λ (which is the substitutability of a L provider to a H
provider) is negligible.20
Policyholders care about having access to high quality providers. One can consider L
providers as general practitioners and H providers as specialists. All physicians can
identify and treat a specific illness if it is detected early, but only specialists can deliver
proper treatment at a later stage. Another example is that an experienced doctor
can obtain a definite diagnosis quickly and easily from a patient’s description of the
symptoms and regular checkups, while a novice physician may take a longer time to
reach the same conclusion or make more mistakes. Moreover, θni [λ+ qi] also can be
considered as a reduced form of a policyholder’s utility resulting from a sub-game where
all policyholders prefer to be treated by an H physician, but could not observe their
types.21
Risk segmentation: We focus on asymmetric health plans which lead to adverse selection.
Without loss of any generality, we assume that plan B always provides better services
with a higher premium than plan A, that is nA [λ+ qA] < nB [λ+ qB] and PB−PA > 0.22
A policyholder with risk θ chooses plan A over plan B if
θnA [λ+ qA]− PA > θnB [λ+ qB]− PB




λ(1− q)(1− x̃LB − x̃LA) + (λ+ 1)q(1− x̃HB − x̃HA )
(2.6)
This θ̃ represents the marginal policyholder who is indifferent with either plan. The
equilibrium demand of plan A (or B) on the policyholder side is F (θ̃) (or 1− F (θ̃)).
20Please do not confuse relative quality with the quality level introduced above. They both indicate
providers’ quality and can be introduced as one index. However, for simplicity, we sperate them from
each other. Quality level refers to percentage of H providers in one plan and relative quality refers to
the impact of providers’ qualities on policyholders’ utility.
21The problem is withheld information. Policyholders can’t verify each physician’s claim of being
more competent. Although the health plan here acts as agent of all policyholders and could endorse
each doctor, it is not at his interest to tell the policyholder all the information. The detail of the
sub-game can be found in Appendix.
22If nA [λ+ qA] = nB [λ+ qB ], the private information θ is useless for any policyholder.
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2.3.3 Two Competing Health Plans
We assume that total treatment costs are in proportion to the total number of treat-
ments. c is the fixed cost per treatment. Since all costs related to treatment are even-
tually paid by the plans, the expected profits of plan A and B are given as follows:
















i , θ̃) for all j = H,L ,i = A,B, where θ̃ is deter-
mined by (Pi, x̃
j









πB to satisfy their respective constraints.
23
As described in subsection 2.3.1, in the multi-homing case, plan i only faces the indi-
vidually rationality constraints (IRji ) in formula (2.1); while in the single-homing case,
besides (IRji ), plan i also faces incentive constraints (IC
j
i ) in formula (2.2). Moreover,
we focus on cases with slack (ICLi ) (see subsection 2.3.1). Plan i’s single-homing problem
is constrained by (IRLi ), (IR
H
i ) and (IC
H
i ).
2.4 Equilibrium under Fixed Salary Scheme
When providers receive a fixed salary, each of them gets a constant payment which is
unrelated to the actual number of treatment he or she offers.24 Let W ji denote a type
j provider’s salary if he chooses plan i, where j = H,L, i = A,B. Then j provider’s
payment from health plan i is T ji = W
j
i . The profits of plans can be written as following:

















B − t(1− x̃
j
B) ≥ 0. (2.7)
23We assume that these are both concave problems.
24Staff-model HMOs usually select this kind of payment scheme.
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Here (IRji ) and (IC
j
i ) are independent with the risk segmentation θ̃. This implies that
the fixed salaries do not introduce any network externality on provider side. Participat-
ing in one plan or both is motivated by whether or not the providers’ transportation cost
is covered by the salary. If the changing environment on the provider side causes any
variation in shares on the provider side, both plans will optimally adjust their premiums
accordingly, such that equilibrium risk segmentation θ̃ does not change. More precisely,
with (2.6), the first order conditions for the premiums can be written as
∂πA
∂PA
= F (θ̃)− ( PA − cθ̃
PB − PA
f(θ̃)θ̃) = 0, (2.9)
∂πB
∂PB
= 1− F (θ̃)− ( PB − cθ̃
PB − PA
f(θ̃)θ̃) = 0. (2.10)
Combining (2.9) and (2.10), we have 1−2F (θ̃) ≡ f(θ̃)θ̃, for all t, q, λ and for both multi-
homing and single-homing cases. Moreover, by offering better services (i.e., nA [λ+ qA] <
nB [λ+ qB]), plan B secures a higher market share (i.e., 1−F (θ̃) > F (θ̃)). Let θ̂ be the
only θ satisfying θ̂ = 1−2F (θ̂)
f(θ̂)
.25 We make the following assumption:






With t > λ2 θ̂, L providers never multi-home in all cases and (IC
L
i ) (i = A,B) will be
slack. With t > 1+λ2 θ̂(1−F (θ̂)), we can focus on interior solutions, i.e., 0 < x̃
j
i < 1 , for
j = H,L ,i = A,B. 26
We first determine the equilibrium with single-homing and then with multi-homing.
After that we make a comparison between the two.
25Because F satisfies the monotone hazard rate property, θ̂ is uniquely defined. For example, consider
a iso-elastic distribution F (θ) = θε with ε > 0, θ̂ = (2 + ε)−
1
ε ; if ε = 1, F is uniform distribution
function, θ̂ = 1
3
.
26We exclude the workload limitations of providers and we can relax this assumption. If we assume













, and E(θ|θ ≤ θ̂) + E(θ|θ > θ̂) ≤ 1+λ
λ
.With
these assumptions, health plans will ensure that every policyholder gets the treatment they need, i.e.,
the total number of physicians in each plan should be more than the expected number of treatments
(1− y)x̃LA + yx̃HA ≥
∫ θ̃
0
θf(θ)dθ, (1− y)(1− x̃LB) + y(1− x̃HB ) ≥
∫ 1
θ̃
θf(θ)dθ. And every physician holding
















≤ 1. These two
additional assumptions will not change our conclusions.
.
Chapter 2. Multi-homing of High Quality Providers in Two-sided Health Market 19
2.4.1 Single-homing Equilibrium under Fixed Salary Scheme
Now, let us find the equilibrium providers’ configurations when a provider can only sign
with one plan. In this case, besides meeting individual rationality constraints (IRji ) in
(2.7), both plans also need to make their incentive constraints (ICHi ) in (2.8) hold, for
all j = H,L, i = A,B.
We claim in the above subsection that under A2.1, (ICLi ) (i = A,B) is slack because
formula (2.4) holds. If that is true, (IRLi ) (i = A,B) must be binding in equilibrium,
because the salary WLi , which is considered a cost of plan i, should be as low as possible.




B = t(1− x̃LB). Then formula (2.4) is equivalent to
1− x̃LB + x̃LA < 1. (2.11)
The first order conditions with respect to x̃LA and 1− x̃LB are
∂πA
∂x̃LA
= (1− q)λθ̃( PA − cθ̃
PB − PA
f(θ̃)θ̃)− 2t(1− q)x̃LA = 0,
∂πB
∂(1− x̃LB)
= (1− q)λθ̃( PB − cθ̃
PB − PA
f(θ̃)θ̃)− 2t(1− q)(1− x̃LB) = 0.
Combing these 2 first order conditions with (IRLi ), (2.9), (2.10) and θ̃ ≡ θ̂, we have L















So formula (2.11) holds under assumption A2.1, because of 1− x̃LB + x̃LA =
λ
2t θ̂ < 1 with
t > λ2 θ̂. Holding of (2.11) suggests that L providers are not fully covered, i.e., there is
some L provider excluded by these two plans. This implies that each health plan has
local monopoly power when hiring L providers.
Similarly, when (ICHi ) (i = A,B) is slack, (IR
H
i ) must be binding in equilibrium and
the following inequality holds:
1− x̃HB + x̃HA < 1. (2.12)
Therefore health plans are local monopolies on the provider side because both (2.11)
and (2.12) hold. Moreover, the quality is independent with location. The equilibrium H
providers’ configurations are x̃HA = (
λ
1+λ)






is L providers’ relative quality, which is also the ability to substitute an L provider for an






B = t(1− x̃HB ).
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However, as (2.12) requires that H provider market is not fully covered, 1 − x̃HB +
x̃HA =
1+λ
2t θ̂ < 1 must hold. This requires t >
1+λ
2 θ̂.
When t ∈ (t, 1+λ2 θ̂],
27 H providers will be fully covered, since (13) does not hold any
more. Note that in single-homing case, 1− x̃HB + x̃HA ≤ 1 must hold, since for i = A,B,
any provider enrolled by plan i cannot join in plan −i. Then we must have x̃HA = x̃HB ,
the marginal H provider of plan A is also that of plan B, because of 1− x̃HB + x̃HA = 1.
Now incentive constraints will affect the strategies of both plans. Furthermore, when
t is very small, the competition can be strengthened enough such that the marginal H
provider will be left with strictly positive utility, i.e., (IRHi ) is slack and
(ICHi ) : W
H
A − tx̃HA = WHB − t(1− x̃HA ) > 0. (2.13)




A − t and WHB = WHA + 2t(1− x̃HB )− t. The first order conditions
with respect to x̃HA and 1− x̃HB are
∂πA
∂x̃HA
= q(1 + λ)θ̃(
PA − cθ̃
PB − PA
f(θ̃)θ̃)− q(WHB + 4tx̃HA − t)= 0,
∂πA
∂x̃HA
= q(1 + λ)θ̃(
PB − cθ̃
PB − PA
f(θ̃)θ̃)− q(WHA + 4t(1− x̃HB )− t)= 0.
Combing these 2 first order conditions with (2.9), (2.10) and θ̃ ≡ θ̂, H providers’ con-




− 1 + λ
6t
θ̂(1− 2F (θ̂)) and WHA =
1 + λ
3







θ̂(1− 2F (θ̂)) and WHB =
1 + λ
3
θ̂(2− F (θ̂))− t.
Moreover, only t < 1+λ3 θ̂ ensures (13) holds. This equilibrium only appears when t =
max{λ2 θ̂,
1+λ
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If t ∈ [1+λ3 θ̃,
1+λ
2 θ̃], multiple equilibria exist. In the following proposition, we use sub-
script S to indicate single-homing and present a continuous equilibrium where 1−x̃HB−x̃HA
decreases with t.
Proposition 2.1. Under A2.1 and fixed salary scheme, for all t ∈ (t,∞), the single-
homing equilibrium risk segmentation is θ̂ = 1−2F (θ̂)
f(θ̂)
. On the provider side, the single-
homing equilibrium configuration of L is,
• for all t ∈ (t,∞), x̃LA =
λ




2t θ̂(1− F (θ̂)).
And that of H providers is,








2t θ̂(1− F (θ̂));




A = F (θ̂) and 1− x̃
H,S
B = 1− F (θ̂);













The Hotelling’s framework is well known to be unsuitable for passing from uncovered to
covered markets, where multiple equilibria arise.
Illustration example of multiple equilibria(λ = 0): Consider F (θ) = θ, i.e., poli-
cyholders’ risks are uniformly distributed. When λ = 0, there is only quality externality.
The risk segmentation is reduced from (6) to
θ̃ =
PB − PA
q(1− x̃HB − x̃HA )
.
1−x̃HB−x̃HA > 0 must hold in equilibrium because of PB > PA. Moreover, the equilibrium
risk segmentation θ̃ ≡ θ̂ = 1−2F (θ̂)
f(θ̂)
for all λ ≥ 0. Thus θ̂ = 13 and F (θ̂) =
1
3 . When
t ∈ [1+λ3 θ̂,
1+λ













B − t(1− x̃HB ) = WHA − tx̃HA = 0










2t θ̂F (θ̂) when
A is a local monopoly on the provider side and 1 − x̃HB =
1+λ
2t θ̂(1 − F (θ̂)) when B is a





1− x̃HB − x̃HA > 0); 2) x̃HA ≤
1+λ
2t θ̂F (θ̂) =
1




2t θ̂(1−F (θ̂)) =
1
9t . Thus all




6 ] are in the shadow area of Figure 2.1. Note that in
the above example WHB = t(1 − x̃HB ) > WHA = tx̃HA . To be close to its local monopoly
status 1 − x̃H,SB =
1+λ
2t θ̂(1 − F (θ̂)), plan B feasibly offers a higher salary to steal H
providers from plan A and charge a higher premium to remian profitability. Moreover,
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Figure 2.1: The equilibrium value of x̃HA with single-homing.
plan B’s ability to steal H providers should increase as salary becomes cheaper, or
as t decreases. Thus we should expect 1 − x̃HB − x̃HA to (may not strictly) decrease
with t. The equilibrium in proposition 2.1 is selected according to this intuition: for






3t θ̂(1 − 2F (θ̂)) decreases with t and strictly
larger than 1 − 2F (θ̂), which the value of 1 − x̃H,SB − x̃
H,S





t ∈ (1+λ2 θ̂,∞), 1 − x̃
H
B − x̃HA =
1+λ
2t θ̂(1 − 2F (θ̂)) decreases with t and strictly less than
1− 2F (θ̂). Then we have the following remark.
Remark 2.1 The single-homing equilibrium selected in proposition 2.1 is the only con-
tinuous equilibrium characterized by 1− x̃HB − x̃HA decreasing with t.
2.4.2 Multi-homing Equilibrium under Fixed Salary Scheme
Here multi-homing is allowed. Plans will maximize their profits subject to the providers’
individual rational constraints (IRji ) in (2.7). In this case the equilibrium takes the same
form as the single-homing case when incentive constraints (ICHi ) (i = A,B) is slack.
We use subscript M to indicate multi-homing and present the result as follows:
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Figure 2.2: Single-homing and Multi-homing of H providers when t ∈ (t , 1+λ2 θ̂].
Proposition 2.2. Under A2.1 and the fixed salary scheme, for all t ∈ (t,∞), the


















Moreover, L providers will never have incentive to multi-home; multi-homing of H
provider appears only when t ∈ (t , 1+λ2 θ̂].




2t θ̂ < 1 with t >
λ
2 θ̂. Furthermore, since t > t ≥
1+λ
2 θ̂(1−F (θ̂)), for all j = L,H and
i = A,B, we have 0 < x̃j,Mi < 1. Thus, the equilibrium given by proposition 2.2 is an




A and only H providers with
x ∈ [x̃H,MB , x̃
H,M
A ] multi-home. Figure 2.2 demonstrates single-homing and multi-homing
H providers’ configuration when t ∈ (t , 1+λ2 θ̂].
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2.4.3 Comparison between Multi-homing and Single-homing under Fixed
Salary Scheme
In this subsection, we compare the multi-homing outcome with that of single-homing,
when some H type providers have incentive to multi-home, i.e., t ∈ (t, 1+λ2 θ̂] (see propo-
sition 2.2). First, L providers’ configurations remain the same, i.e., x̃L,Mi = x̃
L,S
i for
i = A,B (see proposition 2.1 and 2.2). Intuitively, when a fixed salary scheme is adopt-
ed, providers are lack of (ex post) incentive to compete over the policyholders in the
same health plan.29 As a result, the only determinant of L type’s involvement is the
risk segmentation, which stays constant when the environment shifts from single-homing
to multi-homing. Second, for any t ∈ (t, 1+λ2 θ̂], both health plans involve more of H
providers with multi-homing than with single-homing, i.e., x̃H,MA ≥ x̃
H,S
A and 1− x̃
H,M
B ≥
1 − x̃H,SB . As defined in formula (2.3), a health plan’s quality level is the percentage of
H type providers in it. Thus, multi-homing of H providers results in the highest quality
health plans among all outcomes. We present this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. Under A2.1 and fixed salary scheme, both health plans’ quality levels
are (1+λ)qλ+q with multi-homing, which is higher than q, the average quality level in the
whole provider population and health plans’ quality levels with single-homing.
When multi-homing is allowed, quality levels of both health plan are higher than q,
the average quality of the physician market. This explains why managed care, due
to its ability to identify a physician’s competence, offers a higher quality of care than
traditional indemnity insurance.
The fact that multi-homing leads to higher quality levels than single-homing may suggest
why single-homing staff-mode HMOs (Health Maintenance Organizations) faded away
in the U.S.. In the staff model, physicians have offices in HMO buildings and may only
see HMO patients. Two rules have hit staff-model HMOs particularly hard: market de-
mands for high quality (broad choice of high quality providers) and greater geographic
accessibility. Now a captive group model has replaced the staff-model. Providers contin-
ue to treat non-HMO patients and physicians can travel from one hospital to another.
However, there are criticisms. The problem is congestion caused by providers’ multi-
homing. One cannot assume a provider’s quality to be consistent when some providers
treat many patients in a short period. Moreover, we may find other negative impact of
multi-homing than ”congestion”.
Note that with multi-homing, both health plans choose the same quality. The reason is
that by allowing multi-homing, health plans do not directly impact their rivals’ strategies
29In contrast, this interdependency among providers becomes stronger when FFS is adopted,
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) equal to λ1+λ , the policyholders’ substitution rate of a L provider to
a H provider.30 It also implies that plans’ competitive intensity is decreased by giving
providers the permission to multi-home. This increases both plans’ profits.31
Corollary 2.1 Under A2.1 and the fixed salary scheme, both health plans prefer multi-
homing than single-homing.
With multi-homing), salaries ofH providers areWH,MA =
1+λ





With single-homing, if t ∈ [1+λ3 θ̂,
1+λ
2 θ̂], the salaries are W
H,S
A = tF (θ̂), W
H,S
B =









Remember that F (θ̂) < 12 and t >
1+λ
2 θ̂(1− F (θ̂)). Thus, for any t ∈ (t,
1+λ
2 θ̂], we have
WH,Mi ≥ W
H,S




i . Let us define the surplus on the







(W jA − tx)dx+
∫ 1
x̃jB
(W jB − t(1− x))dx),
where qH = q, qL = 1 − q. Because x̃L,Mi = x̃
L,S





1− x̃H,MB ≥ 1− x̃
H,S
B , multi-homing equilibrium leads to a larger provider surplus than
the single-homing does.32
Corollary 2.2 Under A2.1 and the fixed salary scheme, the provider side receives a
higher total surplus with multi-homing than with single-homing.
Now, we turn to welfare comparison. The utilitarian form of the social welfare function
is chosen. Thus, social welfare is simply the sum of the policyholders’ benefit minus the
social cost of providing health care service.
SW = (nA(λ+ qA))
∫ θ̃
0













x̃H2A + (1− x̃HB )2
]}
(2.14)
Remember that change in exclusivity on the provider side does not change the equilib-








30Our assumption that the distribution of quality level is independent with that of location is crucial.
31Mathematically, when allowing multi-homing, both plans’ optimization problems are on less con-
strained spaces than the case of prohibiting multi-homing.
32Remember that providers’ individually rational constraints are W jA − tx̃
j
A ≥ 0
and W jB −t(1− x̃
j
B) ≥ 0, thus policies shifting towards allowing multi-homing on the provider side leads
to a Pareto improvement on this side.
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increases with multi-homing, because it increases both the size and quality level of both
plans. As long as t is relatively small (t ∈ (t, 1+λ2 θ̂]), the (transportation) cost of enrolling
more physicians will be covered by the increase in social benefit. We get the following
result. A detailed proof is in appendix.
Proposition 2.4. Under A2.1 and the fixed salary scheme, multi-homing of H providers
leads to higher welfare than single-homing.
Unlike the competitive-bottleneck scenario (see Armstrong (2006)), here an improvement
in efficiency (social welfare) does not necessarily lead to an improvement of policyholders’
welfare. In a competitive-bottleneck scenario, which assumes transportation cost is 0
on the provider side, all providers will multi-home if multi-homing is allowed. Once
the policyholders are attracted by the plans, both plans have local monopoly power to
connect the providers to policyholders (theoretically, plans can use 0 salary to employ
all physicians). As a result, the provider side is left with no surplus. Consequently, the
competitive intensity over policyholders is increased, and they can benefit from multi-
homing on the other side. In contrast, here we assume t > 0 to be realistic. Some H
providers do not multi-home because of the transportation cost. This means that these
H providers are no longer captive thus reducing the health plans’ market power. As
we see in corollary 2.2, instead of leaving zero surplus to providers, the providers prefer
multi-homing to single-homing. Moreover, corollary 2.1 suggests that multi-homing of H
providers increases both plans’ profits. There might be cases where the total increase in
plans’ profits and providers’ surplus from multi-homing exceeds that in the total social
welfare, thus cause losses on the policyholder side.
Specifically, we define the welfare of the policyholder side (side 2) as the average utility




(ω − P kA + θ
[






(ω − P kB + θ
[





where k = S,M indicating single-homing or multi-homing respectively. The policyholder
side’s net benefit of multi-homing is
CS2,M − CS2,S =
∫ θ̂
0




A ))f(θ)dθ +∫ 1
θ̂
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From the first order conditions (2.9) and (2.10), equilibrium premiums are
PA = cθ̂ +
F (θ̂)
f(θ̂)
(λ(1− q)(1− x̃LB − x̃LA) + (λ+ 1)q(1− x̃HB − x̃HA )),
PB = cθ̂ +
1− F (θ̂)
f(θ̂)
(λ(1− q)(1− x̃LB − x̃LA) + (λ+ 1)q(1− x̃HB − x̃HA )).
When t ∈ [1+λ3 θ̂,
1+λ
















PSA − PMA = (λ+ 1)qF (θ̂)θ̂(1−
1 + λ
2t
θ̂) < 0 and




Here policyholders face higher premiums with multi-homing than with single-homing.
Intuitively, multi-homing of providers leads to larger costs that health plans must incur,
but better services (higher quality and larger size) that policyholders can obtain. This
increase in price on the policyholder side is not surprising. However, for policyholders,
it is questionable whether the enhancement of the premiums is worth the improvement
in service. The problem is that multi-homing of some physicians does not result in a
Pareto improvement on the policyholder side. Policyholders with lowest risk may pay
much more for the service improvement than that they can benefit from it, because their
marginal benefits from it are their very low risks. Especially when t ∈ [1+λ3 θ̂,
1+λ
2 θ̂], all of
plan A’s policyholders prefer single-homing over multi-homing. In detail, a policyholder
in plan A can get an expected utility
EukA(θ) = ω − P kA + θ
[





where k = S,M indicating single-homing or multi-homing respectively. From the above




2t θ̂ − 1)F (θ̂), thus a plan A’s policyholder
with probability θ strictly prefers multi-homing of H providers if and only if
EuMA (θ)− EuSA(θ) = (θ − θ̂)(λ+ 1)qF (θ̂)(
1 + λ
2t
θ̂ − 1) > 0.
Because only when θ < θ̂, a policyholder will take part in plan A, we must have EuMA (θ)−
EuSA(θ) ≤ 0 as long as t ≤
1+λ
2 θ̂. This means that multi-homing of H providers impacts
every policyholder in plan A negatively. Moreover, we have the following result.
Proposition 2.5. Under A2.1 and the fixed salary scheme, the policyholders’ wel-
fare may be higher with single-homing than with multi-homing, if t ∈ [1+λ3 θ̂,
1+λ
2 θ̂] and
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F (θ̂)2[θ̂ − E(θ|θ ≤ θ̂)] > [1− F (θ̂)]2[E(θ|θ ≥ θ̂)− θ̂].
Proof. When t ∈ [1+λ3 θ̂,
1+λ
2 θ̂], from the equilibrium selected by proposition 2.1, we have
CS2,M − CS2,S = (λ+ 1)q(1 + λ
2t
θ̂ − 1)[F (θ̂)
∫ θ̂
0




(θ − θ̂)f(θ)dθ]. (2.16)
So CS2,M − CS2,S ≥ 0, only when
F (θ̂)2[θ̂ − E(θ|θ < θ̂)] ≤ [1− F (θ̂)]2[E(θ|θ ≥ θ̂)− θ̂].
This proposition suggests that if policies that allow H providers to multi-home does,
in fact, benefit policyholders, then this benefit may be dependent upon the distribution
of policyholders’ risks. In the appendix, we provide an example of the distribution.33
Moreover, formula (2.16) suggests that even if the policyholders’ welfare is increased by
multi-homing, the benefit will be very small when q (the total population of H providers)
and λ1+λ (the relative quality of L providers) is very low.
corollary 2.3 If the policyholder’s welfare can be improved by multi-homing of H
providers under A2.1 and the fixed salary scheme, that improvement cannot be signifi-
cant unless the total population of H providers is relatively large and L providers are of
relatively high quality.
In many developing countries, high quality health care services are considered scarce
resources, i.e., q is small. Additionally, when compared to high quality ones, other
health care services may be very poor. i.e., λ1+λ is low.
34 For these countries, corollary
2.3 suggests that even if there is some increase of policyholders’ welfare from H providers
multi-homing, such an increase is diluted by the countries’ low average qualities and low
substitution rate of L providers to H providers. If one considers any additional patient
costs incurred by changing the market environment,35 such small increment can be offset
easily. In all, proposition 2.5 and corollary 2.3 suggest that for developing countries,
33The example may imply that multi-homing of H providers cannot improve the ex ante policyholders’
welfare, if the disease under investigation is very common or highly contagious, i.e., there are 2
3
in whole
population are with the higher than 8
9
risk of being ill.
34This relative quality effect can be measured by the fixed wage ratio of a L provider to a H provider






35Such as additional transportation and waiting cost when a patient decides to see a H provider
instead of a nearby L provider. Remember that a policyholder must choose one health plan and pay
the premium before becoming a patient. Here the decision of see a doctor is sometimes made after that.
CS2,M − CS2,S in formula (2.16) is ex ante, but the additional cost is ex post.
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policies using health plans to allocate health care resources and allowing multi-homing
of H providers may not work to benefit policyholders.
Nevertheless, Proposition 2.4 suggests that policies allowing multi-homing of high quality
providers are still justified because they lead to more efficient outcomes than those
prohibiting it. This, however, depends on a fixed salary payment scheme for the provider.
In the next section, another payment scheme, fee-for-service (FFS) is investigated and
we find that multi-homing may no longer be more efficient than single-homing.
2.5 Fee-for-service Scheme and Efficiency of Single-homing
We now consider the same market structure as before except that providers receive a fee-
for-service (FFS).36 Using FFS reimbursement, each provider first pays the treatment
cost, then is compensated by the health plan. As in Bardey & Rochet (2010), we denote
the FFS rate as Rji , if the provider is j type and is affiliated with network i (i = A,B
and j = H,L). The providers’ expected payment equals the product of the profit margin
offered by the network (FFS Rji minus unit cost of treatment c) by the level of activity
that the physician expects to have if he joins the plan. This expected activity level is
equal to the expected number of treatments in the network, divided by the number of
providers in the network, as we assume that the policyholders are randomly assigned to









(1− q)(1− x̃LB) + q(1− x̃HB )
,
where θ̃ is the risk segmentation. The expected payment to a j provider if he join in




Here FFS introduces an inter-group competition on provider side. With more providers
in the network, the expected activity level Φi will be less. These formulas also reveal
the second indirect externality in our model, this time from policyholders to providers:
Φi depends on the number and risk of policyholders who join plan i.
The plans’ profits can be rewritten as follows:
36There is a large amount of literature that focus on the comparison of the payment schemes with the
concern of how these schemes affect the quantity of medical care services. A flat scheme such as salary is
believed to reduce more unnecessary service than FFS. In our model, the quantity is 1 for each patient
(policyholder when he or she is ill) and a provider has no power to determine the amount of treatments,
so there is no such incentive problem.
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πA = PAF (θ̃)− c
∫ θ̃
0
θf(θ)dθ − [(1− q)(RLA − c)x̃LA+q(RHA − c) x̃HA ]ΦA
πB = PB(1− F (θ̃))− c
∫ 1
θ̃
θf(θ)dθ − [(1− q)(RLB − c)(1− x̃LB) + q(RLB − c)(1− x̃HB )]ΦB.




i ) to maximize its profit.
When multi-homing is allowed, health plans only need to meet providers’ individually
rationality constraints, for all j = H,L:
(IRjA) : (R
j
A − c)ΦA − tx̃
j




B − c)ΦB − t(1− x̃
j
B) ≥ 0.




B = t(1− x̃
j
B). Remember that
under fixed salary scheme with multi-homing (and single-homing when t > 1+λ2 θ̂), we










B). This implies that the multi-homing
equilibrium under the FFS scheme is the same as that under fixed salary scheme.37 We
present this result in proposition 2.6.
Proposition 2.6. Under A2.1 and FFS scheme, multi-homing equilibrium is equivalent
to that under fixed salary.
Now we turn to the single-homing case. Let θ̃(t) be the single-homing equilibrium risk
segmentation. Consider t is slightly less than 1+λ2 θ̂,
38 The constraints ICLi (i = A,B)
remain their slackness because of the continuity of the system.39 In this case, plans need
to deal with marginal H provider’s incentive constraints:
(ICHA ) : (R
H
A − c)ΦA − tx̃HA ≥ (RHB − c)ΦB − t(1− x̃HA ),
(ICHB ) : (R
H
B − c)ΦB − t(1− x̃HB ) ≥ (RHA − c)ΦA − tx̃HB .
The equilibrium risk segmentation θ̃ = θ̂ may no longer hold.
Intuitively, single-homing risk segmentation under an FFS scheme should shift towards
the left as transportation cost t decreases. That is, plan B expands on the policy-
holder side with t deceasing. As in the previous section, with smaller t, plan B has
incentive to hire more H providers to be close to its local monopoly status, 1 − x̃HB =
1+λ
2t θ̃(t)(1−F (θ̃(t))). To encourage more H providers to join in plan B, this plan can
37Each plan faces the same problem with the same constraint.
38As in previous section, only when t ≤ 1+λ
2
θ̂, does single-homing equilibrium will take a different
form than multi-homing.
39Note that when t = 1+λ
2
θ̂, we have 1− x̃LB + x̃LA = λ2t θ̂ < 1. Because of the continuity of the system,
when t is slightly smaller than 1+λ
2
θ̂, formula (2.11): 1− x̃LB + x̃LA < 1 holds.
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1) increase its fee-for-service rate of a H provider RHB , 2) downsize its enrollment of L
provider 1− x̃LB, 3) expand its share on policyholder side (1−F (θ̃)), or do a combination
of them. Here, method 2 and 3 increase the expected activity level ΦB. The method
of 1) increasing RHA and 2) downsizing x̃
L
A can be easily adopted by plan A. However,
plan B always offers better service than A (nA [λ+ qA] < nB [λ+ qB]). This gives plan
B relative advantage in the competition on the policyholder side. Using method 3 of
increasing F (θ̃) is difficult for plan A and plan B will increase (1−F (θ̃)) as the most
effective way to recruit H providers. On the other hand, plan B increases its number
of H provider while also increasing its advantage to the policyholder, which will in turn
makes itself more attractive for H providers. Generally, we should expect that with
single-homing, the better plan B will expand on policyholder side (i.e., θ̃ < θ̂) when
transportation cost t is smaller than 1+λ2 θ̂.
There are multiple equilibria (for H provider configuration) when t is slightly less than
1+λ
2 θ̂. We present one in the following proposition which leads to the largest social
aggregate externality among all equilibria. The detailed proof of the proposition can be
found in appendix.
Proposition 2.7. Under A2.1 and FFS scheme, if t is slightly less than 1+λ2 θ̂, there
exists a single-homing equilibrium where
a. risk segmentation θ̃S(t) < θ̂ = 1−2F (θ̂)
f(θ̂)
;
b. L providers’ configuration is x̃L,SA =
λ





c. H providers’ configuration is x̃H,SA = 1 −
1+λ





In proposition 2.7, plan B is a local monopoly for providers with the largest enrollment
of H providers among all possible equilibria. Thus this equilibrium is with the largest














0 θf(θ)dθ. Then this








for any θ̃S , because the marginal increase of aggregate externality with nB and qB is
higher than that with nA and qA.
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Note that both x̃LA =
λ




2t θ̃(1−F (θ̃)) increase with θ̃ and θ̃
S < θ̂.
Under FFS scheme, single-homing of H providers leads to less L provider enrollment in
both plans than multi-homing. Nevertheless, compared to L providers, multi-homing




−1 > 1. So
multi-homing leads to higher quality than single-homing.
Corollary 2.4 Under A2.1 and FFS scheme, the plans’ quality is higher with multi-
homing than single-homing. However, when compared to single-homing, multi-homing
leads to more L provider enrollment in both plans, thus none offer a higher than (1+λ)yλ+y
quality level to policyholders.
As stated above, if single-homing is mandatory, health plans may attempt to take more
H providers on board by promising them more potential treatments, which may lead to
a reduction in the number of L providers in each plan. If H providers multi-home, it
directly weakens the plans’ competition over them, thus the plans may then increase the
number of L providers to lower H providers’ payment. Furthermore, only contracting
more H providers may not be as profitable for each plan as enrolling more L and H
providers, due to the transportation cost. However, with a fixed salary, such a nega-
tive intergroup effect among providers vanishes because providers are swayed by their
expected activity. So multi-homing of H providers will not change the L providers’
configuration. In all, even though services from H providers and that from L providers
are substitutable for policyholders, health plans will not exclude any of their L provider-
s to give policyholders a very high quality level with multi-homing which increases H
providers’ enrollment.
Now let us see why the single-homing equilibrium given by proposition 7 may be more
efficient than the multi-homing equilibrium. Here we continue to adopt the utilitarian
social welfare function (see formula (2.14)). From proposition 2.7, when t is slightly less
than 1+λ2 θ̂, equilibrium risk segmentation with single-homing θ̃
S(t) is strictly less than
that with multi-homing θ̂. Single-homing may lead to a more efficient market structure
than multi-homing on policyholder side, because policyholders with θ ∈ [θ̃S(t),θ̂) who
would choose plan A if multi-homing is allowed, now turn to plan B when providers
single-home. When the environment shifts from single-homing to multi-homing, the loss
of externality enjoyed by these policyholders is
θ
[











2 + (1 + λ)2
2t
θ̂(1− 2F (θ̂)).
The average policyholders’ loss is not negligible if θ̂ and 1− 2F (θ̂) is relatively large.
Moreover, we have the following proposition with a detailed proof in the Appendix.
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Proposition 2.8. Under A2.1 and FFS scheme, for some t less than 1+λ2 θ̂, multi-
homing of H providers yields strictly lower social welfare than the single-homing equi-
librium given in proposition 2.7, if
θ̂ ≥ max{2E(θ|θ ≤ θ̂), (1− F (θ̂))F (θ̂)
(1− 2F (θ̂))2
E(θ|θ ≥ θ̂)}.
Note that θ̂ < E(θ|θ ≥ θ̂), therefore, according to proposition 2.8, (1−F (θ̂))F (θ̂)
(1−2F (θ̂))2
< 1 must
hold, or F (θ̂) <
√
37−5
6 ≈ 0.1805. This proposition suggests that when providers are
remunerated by FFS, the single-homing outcome given by proposition 2.7 may be more
efficient than the multi-homing equilibrium, if plan A only gets a relatively small share
on the policyholder side (with single-homing or multi-homing). Under this circumstance,
plan A offers relatively small externality to policyholders, i.e.,
nA [λ+ qA] =
λ2
2t




λ2 + (1 + λ)2
2t
θ̂F (θ̂) < 0.1805
λ2 + (1 + λ)2
2t
θ̂.
For a policy maker, this plan should be designed as a complementary health plan to
plan B and is only suitable for a few low-risk policyholders (θ < θ̃(t) and F (θ̃(t)) is
small) who are unlikely to get sick. However, by allowing multi-homing, this plan can
subscribe more high quality providers to increase its quality level qA and providers’ size
nA, then attract high-risk policyholders (θ ∈ [θ̃S(t),θ̂)) to join in. Thus, to achieve the
maximum social welfare, policies using an FFS scheme on provider side and prohibiting
providers to multi-home might be the solution.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the multi-homing of high quality providers (physicians) in a two-
sided health market in this paper. We modify the Bardey and Rochet (2010) framework
by introducing a quality differentiation among providers: H as high quality and L as
low. The policyholders are potential patients who differ in their risk of being sick θ. We
focus on the equilibrium where the risk segmentation θ̃ exists such that all policyholders
with θ < θ̃ go to one plan (plan A) and those with θ ≥ θ̃ go to the other (plan B).
Besides the quality differentiation, providers also have different strategies for choosing
plans and are assumed to locate on a Hotelling line with two plans at the endpoints. A
provider prefers to single-home in one plan only if he locates too far from the second, i.e.,
his location is close to either endpoint of the Hotelling line. A provider has incentive to
multi-home only when his additional transportation costs of joining in a second health
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plan can be covered by the payment given by that plan (he locates in the middle part
of the Hotelling line).
We define the quality level of a health plan as the percentage of H providers in that plan.
We find that when providers are allowed to multi-home, both plans are more profitable
than when providers are constrained to single-home, because multi-homing leads to less
competition between these two plans. Allowing multi-homing also works in line with
providers’ interests, since it gives them more freedom. Because more H providers enroll
in both plans under multi-homing, it increases the quality externality of each plan.
However, proposition 2.5 suggests that multi-homing of providers does not guarantee an
increase in policyholder’s surplus. In fact, there is an outcome where all policyholders in
one health plan are harmed by multi-homing. Corollary 2.3 further suggests that if the
high quality providers are scarce resources or the performance of low quality providers
are relatively poor, multi-homing cannot improve policyholders’ welfare significantly.
These two results imply that multi-homing of high quality providers in health markets
may not benefit the consumers.
The efficiency of multi-homing relies on the payment scheme on the provider side. Un-
der a fixed salary scheme, multi-homing under a fixed salary scheme improves efficiency
compared to single-homing, because it increases the externality enjoyed by every policy-
holder. However, when providers are compensated with fee-for-service (FFS), the social
welfare may be decreased by multi-homing under FFS.
Another interesting question is how multi-homing of H providers impacts L providers.
First, we assume that services from L providers can be substituted by those from H
providers. Second, multi-homing leads to a larger amount of H providers in each health
plan. Therefore, one may expect that multi-homing of H providers limits the subscrib-
ing number of L providers compared to single-homing. On the contrary, compared to
single-homing, multi-homing of H providers never decreases L provider enrollment in all
outcomes of this paper. This is due to transportation costs. For each plan, the strategy
of subscribing an L provider locating close to the plan may take precedence over the
hiring an H provider who locates further. As multi-homing leads to less competition
intensity than single-homing, plans’ incentive to cut the cost of hiring L providers and
enhancing the payment of H providers is weaker with multi-homing than single-homing.
Chapter 3
Regulation on Food Quality:
Process Certification or Product
Inspection
3.1 Introduction
Effective and credible food quality regulatory systems are critically important in public
policies. Consumers focus on public signals related to the intrinsic quality of food,
such as safety and nutrition attributes.1 Food safety has been increasingly suspected
in recent years after outbreaks of food-borne diseases (e.g., E. Salmonella in the US
and Japan) and human transmissions of zoonotic diseases (e.g., the mad cow disease in
the UK). Developing countries also face this issue: in China, the Sanlu Scandal (2008)
erupted when thousands of Chinese infants died because of poisoned milk. These events
suggest a remarkable informational asymmetry between producers and consumers: food
companies often know more about what they are selling than consumers. Regulations
may serve to address this problem and provide consumers with quality signals they can
trust.
The old-fashioned approaches to food quality regulation is product inspection (PI ). Gov-
ernment regulators sample and test foods before they are sold. Findings of low quality
foods are often followed by product recalls, which directly prevent the buyers from con-
suming low quality food. Nowadays, many governments are taking a new approach to
ensure the quality of the food supply: process certification (PC ). Through PC, regulato-
ry systems focus on verifiable control of the manufacturing process. Only when the food
1In developed countries, extrinsic food quality, including animal welfare and environmental preserva-
tion is also a concern.
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companies’ production processes fulfill certain standards, are they allowed to sell their
products in specific markets. For instance, food process control can be based on the label
of Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP), which is widely recognized as a
regulatory approach in many developed countries (see Grijspaardt & Vink (1995), Morris
(1997) and Peters (1997)).2 The enthusiasm for PC also spread to developing countries
where food safety requirements have been progressively put into place. Between 2001
and 2008, a label called National Inspection Exemption was granted by China’s authori-
ty. Food companies, whose processes were certified by HACCP or ISO9000,3 could easily
be labeled and exempted from any final product testing.
This paper attempts to formally analyze the rationale for the above change in food
quality regulations. Monitoring costs are the main reason that PC took the place of
PI. First, PI s are often conducted in advanced and expensive laboratories to ensure
the accurate testing results. PC does not incur this cost. Consider checking the safety
of soup. Given other conditions are equal, PI may require counting bacteria under a
microscope while PC may only require monitoring if the chef wears face mask covering
his/her nose and mouth. Thus PC is less expensive.4 Secondly, the detection of low
quality products often fail to provide evidence of business fraud.5 So it may not be
strong enough to support the implementation of serious punishments. To provide incen-
tive for food companies to improve quality, governments have to constantly inspect the
products.6 The cost for the old-fashion approach to be effective could be even larger.
Third, PC standardizes the way firms organize their manufacturing, thus these firms are
responsible for most of the costs. PI, however is usually a burden for governments, who
use public funds and generate a welfare distortion. Forth, it is the production process
that mainly determines the quality of products. PI cannot directly enhance the quality
provision. Expenditures for sampling and testing may be superfluous. In fact, a number
2The European Union Directive 93/43, effective in December 1995, requires food companies to im-
plement HACCP. In the United States, HACCP was mandated through regulation for seafood in 1994,
for meat and poultry in 1996, and proposed for fresh fruit juice in 1998, with regulations for other food
industries in the beginning of 21st century. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada also have mandatory
(or voluntary) public programmes to encourage adoption of HACCP.
3ISO 9000 certification is issued by International Organization for Standardization, which ensures a
consistent production process related to quality provision.
4For instance, HACCP, as one kind of PC, is widely recognized in the food industry as an effective
approach to establish good manufacturing practices for the production of safe food. It is achieved
through the identification of points in the production process that are most critical to monitor and
control. It also establishes effective approaches to keep production records. With HACCP-based process
certification, once it has been verified that effective food safety systems are in place, monitoring will rely
largely on audits of production records. Hence, the cost of monitoring is more than likely to be lower
than product inspection.
5In Unnevehr and Jensen (1999), the authors pointed that the producers may not know what they
are selling. For example, bacteria, which are living organisms, may not be detectable when the foods are
just produced. In cases, the food companies claimed that there were inevitable delays between initial
occurrence of incidents and the detection of incidents.
6According to a report of the first US National Conference on Food Protection (CFP) in 1995, there
was no indication of any decline in the incidence of food borne diseases by adopting modest product
inspection.
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of analysis has demonstrated that PC is more cost-effective than testing products and
then destroying or reworking on them in numerous cases (see for instance, Unnevehr
and Jensen (1996), Crutchfield et al., (1997) and Roberts et al., (1996)). Following this
idea, the issue is evaluated based on that PI is a more costly regulatory approach than
PC.
A variation of the Cournot model is considered, to which I introduce contingent valua-
tions measuring consumers’ willingness to pay for a specific quality attribute. Conven-
tionally, two kinds of food (L and H) are presented to consumers, where L is low quality
and H is high. The credence feature of food quality is main focus of this paper. Most
foods can be categorized as credence goods (see Caswell and Mojduszka (1996)): buyers
cannot possibly know the food quality even after consumption. Thus, food quality (H
or L) is defined by performance standards and ascertained only through PI. However, it
is food production methods that determine the quality provision: the probability that
products are H (L). Through PC, a regulator standardizes the manufacturing process
to enhance the percentage of H foods in average. It is assumed that there exists the
safest process with minimum probability of products being L (but not zero). This safest
process should be chosen as the process standard whenever PC being adopted. Intu-
itively, the efficiency of credence goods markets largely relies on the credibility of quality
signal. Regulations may be optimal if the public policy mandates the adoption of the
safest process. Food quality is crucial, so is the quantity. The shortage of food could be
regarded as a more serious issue than unsafe food. Moreover, besides providing effective
signals of quality, a regulator should also avoid strict and inflexible mechanisms with
little marginal benefit for consumers. Therefore, the quantity in the Cournot setting is
also important as a measurement of competitiveness.
Whether or not to stop PI is a current area of controversy surrounding changes to
the regulatory system. Note that the safest process cannot guarantee high quality, so
using PI after the monitoring process further decreases the probability of low quality
products arriving consumers’ tables. Accompanied with PC, PI still benefits consumers
through increasing the credibility of the market. For example, the HACCP systems in
the American meat industry also include testing for food-borne pathogens. After Sanlu
scandal, China is trying to establish new regulations for the diary industry that combine
PC and PI.
However, this paper suggests that PC may only substitute for, but not be supplemented
by PI in optimal regulation. The reason behind this result is PI impacts the outcomes
not only on market credibility, but also on firms’ quantities. Knowing PI is being adopt-
ed, all firm expect that some of their rivals may recall their products, leading firms to
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increase quantities as they prepare to take over their competitors’ market share.7 With
imperfect quantity competition, the total supply is distorted to less than efficient levels.
Thus, enhancing quantity is also a positive factor for social welfare. The influence on
market credibility and firms’ quantities timing together causes a social benefit of PI that
is convex in its frequency: the marginal benefit increases as PI becomes more frequent.
That is, if the expenditure on PI is worthy for improving efficiency, it should be con-
ducted as frequent as possible. Depending on PI ’s cost, it is optimal to adopt PI or
to never implement it at all. Obviously, ”never” implies the case where PI is optimally
stopped due to its relatively large cost. But if the cost is small, PI should be optimally
conducted so often that firms voluntarily adopt the safest process, regardless of any
process standard. In such cases, PC becomes unnecessary. Consequently, combining
PC and PI may not generate more cost-effective mechanisms. Moreover, the advantage
of PC may become apparent when the competition is intensive and the quantity dis-
tortion is insignificant. Since consumers cannot prominently benefit from total supply
enhancement by PI, PI may become less and less desirable when quantity competition
is strengthened.
Despite the relatively small monitoring cost, PC requires set-up costs for adding tech-
nologies to make process control verifiable. These costs are usually borne by the food
companies. Again consider the example of checking safety of soup. It is almost costless
to monitor whether the chef wears face mask if the cooking process is perfectly record-
ed. But effective recording systems may require cameras and storage devices for digital
film which are expensive. The scale of set-up costs also depends on whether or not firms
must modify their processes to meet the process standard.8 High set-up cost may exclude
some companies from business (see MacDonald & Crutchfield (1996)). As mentioned
above, PC is likely a better option for governments than PI with strong competition.
However, set-up costs for PC may not be overcome by some firms. Then mandating
process standards may downsize market competitiveness, as well as PC ’s advantage as
a regulatory approach. Then a paradox may arise: PC is a more cost-effective approach
than PI before PC ’s implementation; but after that, it is not.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 is the literature review
and section 3.3 is the model set-up. Section 3.4 studies a benchmark case, where the
informational asymmetry between consumers and food companies can be solved without
7The effect of PI on firms’ quantities also depends on the correlation between firms’ qualities. In
this chapter, I assume that the quality is independent among firms. When the quality is positively
correlated, firms may decrease their quantities in responding to the PI. It will be briefly discussed later
in this chapter.
8Specifically, Colatore (1998) investigated the actual costs of HACCP adoption among breaded fish
producers in the state of Massachusetts. The total first-year costs of adoption averaged $116000 per firm
and the cost of meeting minimum requirements averaged $34000. These two figures are set-up costs.
The monitoring and certifying expenditure is considerably less than $34000.
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any regulation. In section 3.5, results for credence goods is presented. Section 3.6 is the
conclusion and further developments.
3.2 Literature Review
In the economic literature, it is common to distinguish qualities according to the extent
to which they can be identified by the consumers. The quality of search attributes, such
as color and size, is easily detected before consumption. For experience attributes, like
taste and suitability, consumers are able to discern its intrinsic quality after consumption.
Finally, for credence (or trust) goods, quality can never be known by consumers with
certainty (see Nelson (1970)). Markets can provide quality assurance for search and
experience goods, which is relatively effective and robust enough. In the case of credence
goods, however, the informational asymmetry between consumers and sellers is not easily
remedied by markets. Thus, suboptimal equilibria exist and are more common (see
Darby and Karni (1973)). Theoretical contributions on credence goods have emerged
where they have discussed whether or not market mechanisms can prohibit business
fraud and solve the informational asymmetry. The markets for experts (e.g., lawyers,
medical doctors, auto mechanics service-persons) got a lot of attention. For instance,
Wolinsky (1993 and 1995) showed that to discipline experts, customers may intentionally
search for multiple opinions and that an expert’s reputation is also essential for the
customers’ decision. Then Emons (1997 and 2001) showed that if consumers have enough
information about market data, they are able to infer the expert’s incentives. The market
equilibrium resulting in non-fraudulent behavior does exist. In other cases, however,
there is no trade because consumers anticipate fraudulent behavior. While many other
papers assumed fraud is costless, Alger & Salanee (2006) allowed for fraud costs, which
aggravate the inefficiency of fraudulent behavior. They suggested that when the cost is
small relative to the economies of scope, the experts may always fraud: they pool the
information and price the diagnosis high enough, in order to deter consumers seeking
for second opinions. Reputation may also provide a solution. These important papers
highlight the difficulties in achieving an efficient market for credence goods. Thus,
certification signals might be a good thing in this area.
The credibility of certification is also a common topic discussed in the literature, such
as Biglaiser (1993), Albano & Lizzeri (1997) and Lizzeri (1999). Because certification
requires the involvement of an independent third party, they treate certification agents
as intermediaries between producers and consumers in the process of quality provision.
These papers investigate whether or not the certification intermediaries may strategi-
cally manipulate the accuracy of their provided signals. When competition among the
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intermediaries is intense, they may specify each producers’ quality and thus lead to full
information revelation. But a monopoly intermediary might not fully disclose the in-
formation about producers’ quality. In order to certify producers with relatively low
quality, they would rather provide noisy signals. These noisy signals still increase effi-
ciency compared to situations without signals. On the contrary, when the reputations
of certification intermediaries are considered, as suggested by Strausz (2005), credibility
is easier to sustain when there is only one certifier. Such reputation models hinge on a
trade–off between the short-run gain from concealing information and the long-run gain
for honesty. When the monopoly certifier expects a larger future demand, the long-run
gain rises and noisy signal becomes less attractive. In this sense, the governments are
more reliable than private certifiers in providing credible quality signals.
Many papers are inspired by food quality policies and focus on their welfare impacts.
For example, Zago & Pick (2002) considered the intervention of the European Union in
agricultural products with specific qualities related to a production area or technology.
They concluded that the impact may be detrimental. Producers specializing in low
quality food may be worse-off, due to their geographical and technological conditions.
The impact on consumers’ welfare is also ambiguous and depends on the market power.
However, their results are limited by only considering organoleptic characteristics and are
not very constructive for food regulations with safety concerns. Auriol & Schilizzi (2003)
pointed out the importance of certification costs for market structure. They compared
welfare levels resulting from public and private certification programs and found that
the higher the cost of certification, the higher the need for public intervention. Their
analysis was restricted to the assumption of perfect signals transforming credence goods
to search ones, and therefore does not consider inaccurate process certification which is
now a widespread regulatory approach. The degree of credibility in the public signal
has also inspired studies, such as Annania & Nistico (2004). Their results suggested
that high quality producers may be forced to accept regulations with imperfect signals
and share the market with low quality producers. There are other papers on similar
topics, such as Caswell & Mojduszka (2000), Giannakas (2002), Giannakas & Fulton
(2002), etc.. However, none of these papers have studied the controversy of stopping
the traditional regulatory approach (product inspection), or discussed the effectiveness
of process certification with respect to the competitiveness. The present paper aims to
complement this literature through formally analyzing this issue.
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3.3 The Model
I consider a variation of Cournot competition in one specific food market, where prod-
ucts’ quality may be differentiated. The quality is either H (high quality) or L (low
quality). And the ex ante probability of H depends on the production processes of firms
(or producers, sellers). In practice, one unit of food is H if it fulfills some performance
standards;9 it is L if otherwise.
There are N (N ≥ 2) identical firms and mass 1 of consumers; all are assumed to be
risk neutral. Consumers can be introduced as being risk averse in a food quality context
(see, for instance, Spence (1977)). With risk aversion, there are two potential distortions,
one from risk reduction (the incentive for firms to produce more H commodities) and
the other from risk allocation (the possibility that L products will be consumed). To
achieve efficiency, policy instruments are needed to create the correct incentive for risk
reduction and to ensure efficient risk allocation. However, consumers’ awareness of
quality (through quality signals lack thereof) may provide efficient risk allocation. The
incentive for risk reduction can be modeled as through parties are risk neutral (see Miceli
& Segerson (1995)).
Consumers may not observe the quality and public signals may be needed. Two ap-
proaches for signaling, product inspection (PI ) and process certification (PC ), is avail-
able for the regulator (she), who maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function. By PI,
she samples and checks whether the quality meets the requirements of the performance
standards. Through PC, she does not only monitor firms’ production processes, but
also sets some process standard that the firms’ production has to achieve. Since the
standards should be announced before firms choose their processes, the regulator is the
first one to move in this model and firms are the second, then market price equalizes the
consumers’ demand and the supply. The rest of this section details the model setting.
3.3.1 Quality and Process
The most common quarantine rule in food business is: if one unit of food is proved to
be unsafe or unqualified, then all other food produced in the same factory (or farm)
and during the same production period, should be assumed unsafe or unqualified and
be recalled or disposed of immediately. The contamination of food, by either chemicals
or bacterium, is likely to be spread among all products sharing the same manufacture
(or delivery) process. To address the concerns behind the quarantine rule, I assume that
9The performance standards are assumed as granted in this paper. Therefore H and L are well
defined.
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one firm’s whole production shares the same quality,10 which is assumption 1:
A3.1. If some products are H (L), the other products from the same firm are also H (L).
Additionally, quality is assumed to be independent among firms, because commodities
from different firms do not share the same manufacturing procedures.
The probability of food quality being H solely depends on the process.11 As a result,
processes can be characterized by the probability of being high quality, which is denoted
as x = Pr(H) (and 1 − x = Pr(L)). I determine that a process x is safer (or better
qualified) than x′, if x > x′. The production cost increases with safety. Provided with
process x, a firm must incur cx (the marginal cost) to produce one additional unit of
food. The quality is random, there is no process that can make H quality certain. Let
x be the maximum probability of H products provision among all production processes
and assume that
A3.2. For any process x, its marginal cost is cx and it satisfies x ≤ x < 1.
Under assumption 3.2, x can be referred to as the safest process (or best qualified
process). Note that the cost for quality is linear on the process under A3.2. This
assumption will prove useful for the adoption of safest process in any equilibrium. It
seems quite restrictive when compared to a general setting allowing for strictly convex
technology. However, strict convexity would add distortions into the analysis; it is
possible that firms may overproduce the quality with respect to the social optimal level.12
In the context of food quality (especially safety), policies clearly reducing quality should
not exist: ”the safer the better” is common sense for consumers. In this sense, the linear
cost for the processes could be more realistic.
To adopt some specific production processes, firms should also pay for the start-up
costs. In the long-run, however, only the marginal costs matter. Nevertheless, the effect
of set-up costs for processes (and for PC ) will be also considered in this paper.
10I only consider a one-period game, that is all food from one firm being produced at the same time.
11Sometimes, process standards also define production capacities. Production that exceeds capacity is
considered to lower the quality provision. For simplicity, quality is assumed independent with quantity
in this paper.
12Consider the case of quality being observable. The consumers will not be interested by the safety level
of firms’ processes. The only thing mattering to them is the quantity, as Cournot quantity competition
is assumed. Since I assume that the quality is either H or L, the firms emphasize their processes to
increase their chances to sell their products and recover their costs. Then the optimal process choice
regarding the social welfare and the firms’ profit may not be the same. The firms may overly invest in
process comparing to that required by the social optimality.
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3.3.2 Public Signals
To simplify the discussion, public interventions on the quality provision are focused:
there is not any quantity or price regulation. Particular attention is paid to PC and PI :
Process Certification:
Adopting PC, the regulator first sets a process standard x̃. Then she monitors the firms
during their production and is informed about their exact processes. Only the firms
choosing processes safer than x̃ are qualified to enter the H market. Under A3.2, the
standard x̃ ≤ x < 1 is an imperfect signal of quality: the proportion of H products in
the whole production is equal to or larger than x̃, but never exceeds x. In the case of
PC being abandoned by the regulator, the process standard is x̃ = 0.
As stressed in the introduction, monitoring firms’ processes incurs much lower costs than
sampling and inspecting their products for the regulator. Here the cost of PC is assumed
to be small enough, thus can be ignored; while the cost of PI is larger.13 Moreover, PC
is free for the firms, since it is a mandatory public policy.14
Product Inspection:
PI can accurately identify the quality of each sampled product. The unit cost of PI
is K > 0, which is the cost for sampling a negligible amount of food and testing the
quality. Under A3.1, PI provides sufficient evidence to determine the quality of the
inspected firm. Assume that before the firms’ move, the regulator announces a common
probability 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 with commitment that each firm’s products will be inspected.
Then the expected cost of PI is rNK, which is assumed to be paid by the regulator.15
If PI is not adopted, the regulator sets r = 0.
PI can be a public signal because it prevents some L products from being purchased as
H products. Note that it is impossible to sample and test foods after they are consumed.
It is also not optimal to conduct PI before firms put L products into the H market.
So in this setting, there is a specific stage for PI intervention, which follows the firms’
move and is followed by consumption. When PI finds L products in the H market, the
regulator forces the inspected firms to call back and dispose their foods with 0 cost.16
Moreover, I assume that PI occurs independently among firms. Consider that there
are firms who are not inspected, i.e., r < 1. Since passing PI perfectly signals the
13The monitoring cost of PC is normalized almost to 0 in this paper for simplicity. In fact, the main
result in this paper remains true, as long as PI is much more costly than PC.
14Sometimes, the firms are charged by a fixed fee or per unit fee (see Auriol & Schilizzi (2003) and
Crespi and Marrete (2001)). Because marginal PC costs almost nothing, there is no need to collect a
fee from firms.
15If one considers the public funding cost, this cost is (1+λ)rNK, where λ is Laffont-Tirole parameter.
16If the disposing cost is not zero, it can be accounted into the inspection cost.
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high quality, releasing such information may cause the market pricing differently. To
circumvent this problem, I also assume that neither the consumers nor the firms can
know about whose products have passed PI.
3.3.3 Fraud and Liability
The N (N ≥ 2) identical firms simultaneously decide their processes and quantities
before production. Let xi and qi (i = 1, .., N) denote firm i’s process and quantity,
where xi ≤ x. If firm i wants to enter the H market, its process must be safer than the
process standard set by the regulator, i.e., xi ≥ x̃. Remember that cxi is the marginal
cost for process xi under A3.2. Firm i’s total cost is cxiqi. Meanwhile, each firm also
decides whether it will commit business fraud.
Fraud
After production, firms are able to detect their own quality, and they have already
decided whether or not to commit fraud if their quality is L. There are two strategies
for dealing with L products: honesty Ih, i.e., a firm will dispose of them, and fraud If ,
i.e., a firm attempts to sell them as H products.
Liability
In many cases, such as bacterial contamination, firms may not be sure of the quality.17
Thus, the strategy of If may not be applicable. To encompass these circumstances, I
assume that all the firms are protected by an endogenous limited liability : punishment
cannot exceed the benefit a firm’s gain from fraud. Consider that firm i decides to fraud
(i.e., Ii = If (i = 1, .., N)):
i) PI caught the fraud. Remember that PI is conducted before consumers purchase the
food. Even if the maximum punishment is imposed, the penalty is 0 for this attempted
fraud, since there has been no benefit to firm i from using If . This creates an equivalent
situation, where firms are exempted from any liability due to their inaccurate knowledge
of their own quality.
Sometimes, shirking (Ii = If ) detected by PI is affiliated with exogenous punishments.
Theoretically, as long as the exogenous punishments are relatively small with respect
to the consumers’ benefit from purchasing H products and the PI cost K, a utilitarian
regulator has no intention of collecting the punishment. She will only use them to reduce
the PI ’s frequency which induces firms’ non fraudulent behavior, i.e., Ii = Ih (see Baron
17It is difficult to prove the existence of fraudulent behavior.
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and Myerson (1982)). Such small punishments cannot change the main result of this
paper quantitatively.
ii) When fraud is caught after purchasing, firm i faces a penalty amounting to pqi, where
p is the price in the H market. Each consumer, who buys a L product from firm i, will
get full reimbursement.
In countries like China, deliberately and successfully distributing L products (e.g., unsafe
food) is punishable by death, i.e., there is no limited liability. However, both PC and PI
are not instruments regulating the quality ex post the consumption. Hardly any large
or extreme punitive rules for fraud could be enforced to strengthen their effectiveness.
Because these two approaches are only preventive, the detection of bad performance
through them cannot be used to punish the firms based on hypothesis, what if L products
were consumed. Moreover, when the food is search goods, fraud does not happen because
of the consumers’ awareness of L products. When it is credence goods, fraud cannot
be detectable after consumption, since consumers can never know its quality. Only in
the scenario of experience goods may fraud exist and can be revealed. And the full
reimbursement, like a customer product warranty, can make Ii = If disappear in any
equilibrium of experience goods: since there is no positive gain from fraud, firms do not
commit it.
3.3.4 The Demand
Consumers acquire 0 or 1 unit of food. Consuming L products results in a 0 utility for
all consumers, so they only purchase in the H market.18 Consumers’ utility for one unit
of H product is represented by a parameter θ ∈ [0, θ], which is uniformly distributed
over the population of consumers.19 Moreover, θ > c (the unit cost of H product) is
assumed, since there should be consumers willing to pay for high quality.
If consumers can detect the quality before the consumption (e.g., the search goods
case), only H products will be purchased. For any given price p in the H market, only





In the case where consumers cannot know the quality before consumption, (e.g., the
experience and credence goods cases), the demand relies on the proportion of H product
18Conventionally, consumers who do not purchase food in the H market can find substitution products
in other markets. Or the L market’s price is 0.
19The lowest value of θ is 0, because there is some consumer indifferent between L and H. It is
standard in modeling food quality. The distribution of θ is assumed to be uniform for simplicity.
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in the market. Let b denote the expected percentage of quality H, which depends on the
firms’ fraud strategies, processes and quantities, as well as public intervention. In this
paper, I will focus on the symmetric equilibrium where all firms choose the same strategy
(q, x, Ij) (j = h, f). So b can be denoted as b(r, x̃, x, Ij), i.e., b does not change with q.
20
However, consumers cannot observe firms’ strategies. Their belief of b, represented by
b̃, fully relies on the signal, i.e., b̃ = b̃(r, x̃). b̃ reflects the credibility of the H market
and its equilibrium value b̃∗ equals to the ”true” credibility b, i.e., firms’ strategies are
predictably provided with the public signal.
For any given price p in the H market, the risk neutral consumers who purchase are











Let Q denote the supply (the total quantity in the H market). The inverse demand
function is p(Q, b̃) = θb̃(1 − Q). Thus for given (Q, b, b̃), the consumers’ surplus is
defined as














dθ is the ”true” aggregate utility of
consumers and p(Q, b̃)Q is their total expenditure.
3.3.5 Timing
This game has 4 stages. The timing is summarized as follows:
The 1st stage (policy stage): regulator chooses (r, x̃), where x̃ ≤ x. She commits to
monitor each firm’s process at the 2nd stage and inspects their quality at the 3rd stage
with probability r.







(1i,hxi + (1− 1i,h)(1− r + rxi)qi)),
where 1i,h = 0 if Ii = If and 1i,h = 1 if Ii = Ih. If qi = q for all i = 1, .., N , then b only depends on
xi = x and Ii = Ij (j = h, f). Moreover, xi and Ii may be affected by the public intervention x̃ and r,
hence b = b(r, x̃, x, Ij)
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The 2nd stage (production stage): firms choose (qi, xi) (i = 1, .., N) based on their
strategy of Ii = Ij , where j = h, f ; the regulator monitors the process and observes xi.
She only certifies the firms with xi ≥ x̃.
The 3rd stage (inspection stage): the regulator inspects each firm’s products with prob-
ability r. If one firm’s quality is inspected and proved to be L, then the firm is forced
to recall all its products. At this stage, the punishment is 0.
The 4th stage (consumption stage): the price p equalizes the demand and the supply.
Moreover, at the end of this stage, if a consumer detects that the purchased product is
L (only in the experience goods case), he or she reports to the regulator and the firm
pays the punishment p.
3.3.6 Definition of Equilibrium
The conception of equilibrium is the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). I focus
on symmetric equilibrium, where all firms choose the same strategy (q, x, Ij) (j = h, f)
at stage 2.
Consumers’ Surplus Suppose that at the end of stage 3, k (k ≤ N) firms can sell their
food in H market. Then the supply Q = kq. Rewriting formula (3.1), the consumer
surplus in equilibrium is
CS(kq, x̃) = θkq[b(1− kq
2
)− b̃∗(1− kq)] = θ
2
b(kq)2,
because of b̃∗ = b in equilibrium. Then the expected consumer surplus is





b(kq)2Pr(Q = kq|Ij , r, x, x̃). (3.2)
Note that if x < x̃, for any Ij ∈ {Ih, If} and r ≥ 0, the conditional probability of Q = kq
is
Pr(Q = kq|Ij , r, x, x̃) = 1 if k = 0, or 0 if k > 0.
The reason is that x ≥ x̃ is required by the regulator as one condition of entering H
market. No matter how honest the firms intend to be or how frequent the PI is, the H
market cannot exist given x < x̃.
Now consider that the firms’ processes are certified (i.e., x ≥ x̃) and all of them reveal
their quality truthfully (i.e., Ij = Ih). Ij = Ih implies that there are exactly k firms’
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products are H, given Q = kq. Remember that the quality is independent between any
two firms and the probability of H is the process x. Then the conditional probability is




where N !(N−k)!k! is the combination number.
There is another interesting situation: x ≥ x̃ and Ij = If . In this case, Q = kq implies
that there are k firms, whose products are either H (with prob. x), or are L (with prob.
(1 − x)) but not inspected (with prob. (1 − r)). Given x and r, a firm’s products are
sold in H market with ex ante probability
s(r, x) = x+ (1− x)(1− r) = 1− r + rx ≥ x. (3.3)
s(r, x) equals x only when r = 1; otherwise, it is strictly larger than x. Consequently,
the conditional probability is
Pr(Q = kq|Ij , r, x, x̃) =
N !
(N − k)!k!




(1− r + rx)k(r − rx)N−k.
Firms’ Strategy (r, x̃) is decided by the regulator at stage 1. Now consider that at stage
2, all firms other than i (i = 1, .., N) choose (q, x, Ij) (j = h, f) as their common strategy.
Denote y = (q, x, Ij , r, x̃) and m ∈ {j,−j}. Firm i’s expected profit is E(πi(qi, xi, Im, y)),
when its strategy is (qi, xi, Im). If (q, x, Ij) maximizes firm i’s expected profit, i.e.,
(q, x) ∈ arg max
qi,xi≥x̃
E(πi(qi, xi, Ij , y)) and
E(πi(q, x, Ij , y)) ≥ max
qi,xi≥x̃
E(πi(qi, xi, I−j , y)),
then (q, x, Ij) is a symmetric sub-game equilibrium. To simplify the expression, I denote
E(π(q, x, Ij , r, x̃)) as the firms’ common expected profit in this equilibrium.
Policy Let the best symmetric response of firms be q∗i (r, x̃), x
∗(r, x̃), I∗j (r, x̃) (j = h, f).
Given (r, x̃), the expected social welfare is defined as
E(SW (r, x̃)) = E(CS(r, x̃, q∗, x∗, I∗j )) +NE(π(q
∗, x∗, I∗j , r, x̃))− rNK, (3.4)
where rNK is the expected cost of PI and the expected consumers’ surplus E(CS) is
given by formula (3.2). The policy (r, x̃) is chosen by the regulator to maximize this
expected social welfare.
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Definition 3.1 A symmetric equilibrium consists of r∗, x̃∗, q∗(r, x̃), x∗(r, x̃), I∗j (r, x̃)
(j = h, f) and b̃∗(r, x̃), such that for any r and x̃,
1. b̃∗(r, x̃) = b(r, x̃, x∗(r, x̃), I∗j (r, x̃));
2. (q∗(r, x̃), x∗(r, x̃)) ∈ arg maxqi,xi≥x̃E(πi(qi, xi, I∗j (r, x̃), y∗(r, x̃));
3. E(π(q∗(r, x̃), x∗(r, x̃), I∗j (r, x̃), r, x̃)) ≥ maxqi,xi≥x̃E(πi(qi, xi, I∗−j(r, x̃), y∗(r, x̃));
and 4. (r∗, x̃∗) ∈ arg maxr,x̃E(SW (r, x̃)),
where y denotes (q, x, Ij , r, x̃) and E(SW (r, x̃)) is given in formula (3.4).
3.4 The Benchmark Result: Search and Experience Goods
Search Goods
Consider first the case of a search attribute, where consumers detect product quality
before purchase. There is no quality signaling problem, since consumers do not acquire
any L product. Specifically, firms can only sell H products at stage 4 (i.e., I∗j (r, x̃) = Ih).
Therefore, the regulator does not need PI to prevent L products from consumption, i.e.,
the optimal PI rate is r∗ = 0. The credibility of H market and consumers’ belief are
b = b̃∗ = 1, for any process standard x̃ ∈ [0, x].
If all firms choose to produce q units in stage 2 and only k sellers’ quality is H, then
the supply is Q = kq. Moreover, if all firms choose x as their process, the expected
consumer surplus (formula (3.2)) is




Nx((N − 1)x+ 1)q2. (3.5)
Now suppose that at stage 2, all firms other than i choose (q, x). Without loss of any
generality, I focus on x ≥ x̃ (the regulatory standard). If there are k−1 (≤ N −1) firms
other than i whose products are H at stage 4, the supply in the market is
Q = kq if i’s products are L or Q = kq + qi if i’s products are H,
where qi is i’s quantity. Firm i can recover its cost cxiqi and thus is mindful of the market
price, only when its quality is H. Note that the equilibrium price is p = θb̃∗(1−Q) (see
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subsection 3.3.4) and here b̃∗ = 1. Thus, i’s expected price with qi is
E(p(qi, q, x)) = θ
N−1∑
k=0




(1− kq − qi)
(N − 1)!
k!(N − 1− k)!
xk(1− x)N−1−k
= θ(1− qi − x(N − 1)q).
Firm i’s challenge is to maximize its expected profit, which is
max
qi,xi≥x̃
qixi(Ep((qi, q, x))− c) = qixi(θ(1− qi − x(N − 1)q)− c),
where xi ≥ x̃ is required by the regulator. Note that to achieve a positive expected
profit, (θ(1 − qi − x(N − 1)q) − c) has to be positive in equilibrium. Otherwise, firm i
is better off by simply choosing qi = 0 and staying out of the market. So i’s expected
profit increases with xi. The only symmetric equilibrium process is
x∗i (r, x̃) = x
∗(r, x̃) = x,
for any r and x̃. In other words, the process with the maximum provision of quality
is adopted by all firms in equilibrium. Here motivated by consumers’ demand and
awareness of quality, firms voluntarily improve their production processes to provide
more H foods. The assumption of a linear cost function cqixi makes it endogenous that
safest process x would be used. However, with other conventional assumptions, one can
also expect a relatively high production of H quality due to the firms’ voluntary process
choices.21
Furthermore, using the first order condition for qi, the only symmetric equilibrium quan-
tity is
q∗i (r, x̃) = q
∗(r, x̃) =
θ − c
θ(2 + (N − 1)x)
, (3.6)
for any r and x̃.
The above analysis demonstrates that for search goods, regulation on food quality is not
necessary. On one hand, PI is wasteful because consumers themselves can detect the
quality. On the other hand, PC is also unnecessary since firms choose the safest process
regardless of the regulatory standard.
Experience Goods
21For instance, Segerson (1999) uses cost function c(x, q), where cx > 0 and cxx ≥ 0. It suggests that
the search goods assumption may lead to social optimal quality provision level without any regulation.
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For experience goods, quality is an experience attribute, i.e., if it is observable only after
purchase. There is a potential quality signaling problem; since the firms may shirk,
the consumers are not ready to pay a high price for quality. The most common and
cheapest signal consists in offering a warranty along with the products, which could
be an endogenous punishment rule. Specifically, if a consumer detects the purchased
product is L, he or she reports to the regulator. The regulator then withdraws the
firm’s ability to sell it. I assume that if a seller is indifferent between selling L products
or not, he will choose I∗j = Ih. As a result, all firms only sell H products at equilibrium.
Because consumers know the exact quality before consumption: the endogenous limited
liability turns the experience goods to search ones. Hence, the symmetric equilibrium
with experience goods is the same as that with search goods.
Proposition 3.1. Under search and experience goods assumptions and A3.1, A3.2,
neither PI nor PC is necessary, i.e., r∗ = 0 and x̃∗ = 0 consists of the optimal regulation.
Firms chooses the safest process x and quantity θ−c
θ(2+(N−1)x) in symmetric equilibrium.
Similar to Darby & Karni (1973), markets for search and experience goods easily remedy
themselves from market failure caused by informational asymmetry between consumers
and firms. In fact, the informational asymmetry does not exist with search goods because
consumers can observe the quality before purchasing. In the case of search goods,
liabilities can supply consumers with the signal that food actually does conform to the
quality description given by firms, and then solve the problem. However without any
regulation, the market for credence goods cannot avoid the market failure. This case
will be discussed in the next section.
3.5 Credence Goods
In this section, I assume that consumers never observe the quality level of the products
whether prior to or after they purchase credence goods. Both nutritional contends and
safety level of foods are considered as quality attributes of this type: an extreme case
of experience goods, where the lag between consumption and quality detection tends
towards infinity. The firms are assumed unable to signal their process on their own.
Only public regulation can get that job done.
If there is no regulation at all, i.e., r = 0, x̃ = 0, the market would be closed. To see this
point, consider all firms other than i (i = 1, .., N) choose q > 0, x > 0 and Ij (j = h, f)
as strategy. Since there is no product inspection, firms’ L products can be sold in H
market. Moreover, firms do not worry about the ex post punishment due to quality
being credence attributes. Therefore, it is optimal for firm i to choose If to fraud. The
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This expected profit function is strictly decreasing on xi, thus in equilibrium i chooses
the process xi = 0. Consequently, the only symmetric equilibrium is characterized by
x∗ = 0, i.e., there is no H food produced and the market’s credibility is b = 0. In
equilibrium, consumers’ belief is b̃∗ = b = 0. Thus, consumers know that every unit
of food sold in H market is actually L. They do not purchase any products in such a
market.
Proposition 3.2. Under credence goods assumption and A3.1, A3.2, regulation is nec-
essary; no regulation (i.e., r = 0, x̃ = 0) leads to a market closure.
With credence goods, consumers cannot discriminate between L and H products before
or after purchase. Thus, a firm that would think of improving quality anticipates that
it will not be able to recover its cost, due to the absence of quality signals. It then
supplies the minimal level of H products: 0. On the other hand, consumers anticipate
that since firms’ profits decrease with higher probability of H, they are going to only
offer L products, no matter what the prices are or which quality is claimed. Then the
H market collapses. Consequently, regulation of the food quality is needed in this case.
The Regulation with Perfect Signaling of Quality:
Now consider the extreme case where regulation leads to a perfect signal of quality, i.e.,
b̃∗ = b = 1. If so, it is necessary that in equilibrium, all firms honestly deal with L
products and choose I∗j = Ih. To achieve that goal, the regulator needs to make the
strategy If not profitable for any firm. Since the consumers can never detect the quality,
PI is required.
Lemma 3.1 In equilibrium, firms choose Ih if and only if r = 1.
Proof. Suppose one firm’s products are L at the end of production. If r < 1, the
firm can sell them with probability 1 − r > 0 at positive price. Moreover, even if the
inspection revealed the fraud, there is no positive punishment due to the endogenous
limited liability. Thus, the expected profit at the end of stage 2 is strictly positive when
the firm chooses If . However, if the firm chooses Ih, they expect a 0 profit. As the
result, for any r < 1, the best response for any firm is I∗j = If .
Lemma 3.2 If the regulation leads to the perfect signal of quality, then the rate of PI is
r = 1. The symmetric sub-game equilibrium is the same as that of the benchmark case,
where q∗(r, x̃) = θ−c
θ(2+(N−1)x) and x
∗(r, x̃) = x, for any x̃ ∈ [0, x].
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The proof of lemma 3.2 is straightforward. Perfect signal of quality turns credence goods
into a search good. The sub-game outcome is the same as the case with search goods.
Proposition 3.2 suggests that if there is no PI (or PC ), firms do not provide quality
voluntarily. Lemma 3.2 suggests that when PI is most intensive (i.e., r = 1), firms
improve their process to x, regardless of the policy standard x̃. Thus, PI is effective for
provision of high quality with credence goods. Because sampling and testing requires
a social cost up to rNK (see formula (3.4)), the inspection cost may lead to relatively
low social welfare if r is relatively large (e.g., r = 1). In lemma 3.2, the outcome is
a sub-game equilibrium, but may not be an equilibrium. The regulation with perfect
signaling of quality may not be optimal.
The Regulation with Imperfect Signaling of Quality:
Consider that the regulation does not generate a perfect signal of quality. Lemma 3.1
implies that here the PI rate satisfies r < 1. All firms commit fraud if their products
are L, i.e., I∗j = If . Suppose all firms choose process x. With I
∗
j = If , one firm’s ex ante
probability that his products can be sold in H market is s(r, x) = 1 − r + rx (formula
(3.3)). But their ex ante probability of the products being H is still x. The credibility
of the market is the expected percentage of H products in the market, which is
b(r, x̃, x, If ) =
Pr(products are H)
Pr(products can be sold in H market)
=
x
1− r + rx
< 1.
It is strictly less than 1 due to r < 1. If x is the equilibrium process, then consumers’
belief
E(̃b∗(r, x̃)) = b(r, x̃, x, If ) =
x
1− r + rx
. (3.7)
The PI cost is also absorbed by the regulator. She has another approach to enhance
the quality with little cost: PC. When it is not optimal for her to inspect the products
very often, she could set a high process standard x̃ to increase the expected proportion
of H products in the production. A dominant strategy of hers is x̃ = x. With the safest
process x being mandatory, the consumers’ belief is the highest, because E(̃b∗(r, x̃))
(formula (3.7)) increases with firms’ process x. And the demand D(p) = 1 − p/(̃bθ)
increases with b̃, for any price p. Thus, setting x̃ = x leads to the largest demand and
then may generate the highest social welfare. More precisely, consider all firms choose x
as their process. Firms other than i choose q as their quantity. Given i being approved
to enter the H market, the expected price is
E(p(qi, r, x̃, q, x)) = θE(̃b(r, x̃))
N−1∑
k=0
(1− kq − qi)Pr(Q− qi = kq), (3.8)
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where E(̃b(r, x̃))(1 − kq − qi) is the expected price conditional on Q = kq + qi for any
k ≤ N − 1. Firms independently enter the market with probability s(r, x). And they
expect an equilibrium consumer’s belief. So the expected price in (3.8) is
E(p(qi, r, x̃, q, x)) = E(̃b
∗(r, x̃))(1− qi − s(r, x)(N − 1)q)
=
x
1− r + rx
θ(1− qi − (1− r + rx)(N − 1)q).
Consequently, firm i’s expected profit given its quantity qi is
E(πi) = qi[s(r, x)E(p(qi, r, x̃, q, x))− cx]
= qix(θ(1− qi − (1− r + rx)(N − 1)q)− c).
If qi = q maximizes this expected profit, the symmetric quantity choice is
q =
θ − c
θ[2 + (1− r + rx)(N − 1)]
. (3.9)




xN{[(1− r + rx)(N − 1) + 3]
[
θ − c
θ[2 + (1− r + rx)(N − 1)]
]2} − rNK. (3.10)
This expected social welfare is increasing with x. If the regulator picks the safest process
as the standard, the only sub-game equilibrium process is x∗(r, x̃) = x̃ = x. Then the
expected social welfare is maximized for any given r. Lemma 3.3 summarizes the above
analysis.
Lemma 3.3 For any given r < 1, x̃ = x (weakly) dominates any x̃ ∈ [0, x], i.e., x̃ = x
generates symmetric sub-game equilibrium leading to higher or at least equal expected
social welfare than any x̃ ∈ [0, x] does.
Lemma 3.3 suggests that the regulator should set x as the process standard when the
public signal is imperfect. The linear cost for the process is critical for this result. In the
real world, regulatory standards may not provide maximum quality. As new technolo-
gies for food production, stocking and delivery are invented, the conception of the safest
processes evolves. However, set-up costs for new technologies are usually enormous.
Forcing food companies to constantly update their process may not be efficient. Nev-
ertheless, lemma 3.3 fits the conventional wisdom about food safety issues: i) policies
with the clear intention for reducing safety should not exist; and ii) the safest process
should be always recommended by authorities. Moreover, in this paper, consumers are
risk neutral. When modeling food quality, they can be introduced as risk averse, and
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they would like to pay more for higher credibility in H markets. Remember that the
credibility (formula (3.7)) is maximized when x = x̃ = x for any PI rate. The public
signal using x̃ = x may lead to largest demand and social welfare.
The Optimal Regulation:
As implied by lemma 3.3, all firms adopt process x in equilibrium if r < 1. Because
x̃ = x is a dominant strategy of the regulator, if any firm deviates from x, the regulator




θ[2 + (1− r + rx)(N − 1)]
. (3.11)
Furthermore, take r = 1 into formula (3.11). q∗(r, x̃) equals to (θ− c)/[θ(2 + (N − 1)x)],
which is, according to lemma 3.2, the sub-game quantity outcome when the public signal
is perfect. Remember that all firms also choose x = x in this case. Therefore, in any
symmetric equilibrium, firms adopt the safest process and their quantity is given by
formula (3.11).
Lemma 3.4 In symmetric equilibrium, each firm’s process is x∗(r∗, x̃∗) = x and quantity
is q∗(r∗, x̃∗) = θ−c
θ[2+(1−r+rx)(N−1)] , where (r
∗, x̃∗) is the optimal policy.
In the following, the optimal policy (r∗, x̃∗) is investigated. Note that setting x̃ = x
is not the only way of making firms to provide maximum quality. Lemma 3.2 implies
that PC may not be necessary, i.e., x̃∗ = 0. Intensive product inspection (e.g., r = 1)
is the only incentive for firms to dispose of their L products honestly, i.e., I∗ = Ih, and
they adopt the safest process x to minimize their probability of producing L food. In
fact, certifying process may not be necessary either with some r < 1, where according
to lemma 3.1, firms try to fraud (i.e., I∗ = If ). Specifically, suppose that the regulator
optimally sets x̃∗ = 0. As implied by lemma 3.4, the firms’ symmetric best response
to the policy satisfies q∗(r, x̃) = (θ − c)/[θ(2 + (1 − r + rx)(N − 1))] and x∗(r, x̃) = x
in equilibrium. And the equilibrium belief (formula (3.7)) is x/(1 − r∗ + r∗x). Then a
single firm i’s (i = 1, .., N) expected price with quantity qi = q
∗ is
E(̃b∗(r∗, x̃∗))θ(1− q∗ − (1− r∗ + r∗x)(N − 1)q∗)
=
x
1− r∗ + r∗x
(c+ q∗).




1− r∗ + r∗x
(c+ q∗)− cxi]
= q∗[x
1− r∗ + r∗xi
1− r∗ + r∗x
(c+ q∗)− cxi],
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where xi is firm i’s process. Since x̃
∗ = 0, this single firm does not deviate from the
symmetric equilibrium xi = x, if and only if
r∗x
1− r∗ + r∗x
(c+ q∗) ≥ c or r∗ ≥ r̃ = c
c+ xq∗
< 1.
In other words, high inspection rates r∗ ≥ r̃ encourage firms to adopt x voluntarily, even
if they attempt to fraud with L products.
However, r̃ ≤ r∗ < 1 cannot be included in the optimal policy in this setting. PI
is an approach of quality signaling by preventing some L products from consumption.
Intuitively, higher PI rate r generates high credibility of H market b and consumers’
belief b̃. The former enhances the consumer surplus (see formula (3.1)), because high
b suggests a large probability that consumers can get high quality food. The latter
increases the firms’ expected price (see formula (3.8)), because consumers are willing to
pay more if they have more faith in the quality signal. Thus, it also increases the firms’
expected profits. This is only one factor of social gain (sum of consumer surplus and
firms’ profits) from PI. Another factor is the quantity. Note that q∗ = (θ − c)/[θ(2 +
(1− r + rx)(N − 1))] increases with r. The reason behind this relationship between q∗
and r is straightforward. With high rate r, each firm expects a high possibility that his
competitors are prevented from selling. Therefore all firms prepare to take others’ share
in market by enhancing their own quantities. And in a Cournot setting, a larger total
quantity usually leads to a larger social welfare. These two factors timing each other
causes the social welfare function is convex in r. Thus, r∗ equals to 0 or 1 in equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3. Under credence goods assumption and A3.1, A3.2, the optimal regu-
lation adopts
1. only PI, i.e., r∗ = 1 and x̃∗ = 0, if K < K̃,






x(N − 1) + 3
(x(N − 1) + 2)2











3 + (1− r + rx)(N − 1)
[2 + (1− r + rx)(N − 1)]2
− rNK.
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[(θ − c)q∗ + q∗2]− q
∗(N + 1)− (1− c/θ)
q∗(N − 1)(1− x)
NK,
where q∗ = (θ − c)/[θ(2 + (1− r + rx)(N − 1))] is firms’ best response to (r, x̃). It is a
convex problem in q∗ due to
∂E(SW/N)2
∂2q∗
= xq∗ + 2
(1− c/θ)K
(N − 1)(1− x)q∗3
> 0.
So the solution is q∗ = (1− c/θ)/(2 + (N − 1)x) and r∗ = 1, if




x(N − 1) + 3
(x(N − 1) + 2)2
− N + 2
(N + 1)2
];
otherwise, the solution is q∗ = (1− c/θ)/(N + 1) and r∗ = 0. From the above analysis,
r∗ ≥ cc+xq∗ (< 1) encourages firms to adopt the safest process. Since there is a slight cost
for monitoring the process, setting x̃∗ = 0 and abandoning PC is the best policy for the
regulator in this case. If r∗ = 0 < cc+xq∗ , the safest process is required in the optimal
regulation. Then the equilibrium policy satisfies
x̃∗ = x, if r∗ = 0or 0, if r∗ = 1.
Proposition 3.3 suggests that PC may not be compatible with PI. When the optimal
policy includes PI, it should provide a perfect signal. With high frequency r∗ = 1, PI
solely incentivizes firms to adopt the safest process x. Then PC is unnecessary, but PI
requires sampling and testing costs. The regulator may provide a noisy quality signal
through monitoring and certifying firms’ processes, when PI cost is relatively large.
Note that the credibility of the H market is concave in PI rate, i.e.,




1− r + rx
)/∂r2 < 0.
It seems that PI is a convex signaling technology, which introduces concavity in the
expected social welfare given in formula (3.4). It could be optimal to combine these
two convex technologies, PC and PI, under some circumstances. But PI also changes
the firms’ quantity choices in equilibrium, which distorts the concave property. Conse-
quently, an additional signal through PI cannot be efficient when the final signal is still
noisy.
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Moreover, r∗ = 1 is optimal if PI consists of the optimal policy. This result relies on the
assumption of endogenous limited liability, which exempts firms from any punishment if
their fraudulent behavior is caught by PI. Suppose that the regulator introduces some
exogenous penalty rule, which specifies a relatively small punishment with respect to
consumers’ benefit of purchasing H product and the PI cost K. The regulator will not
commit to any relatively low PI frequency that would induce firms to choose fraud if PI
is implemented. It is because that the income from punishments can neither exceed the
consumers’ loss from fraud, nor cover the PI cost. Consequently, when PI is included in
the policy, it provides a perfect signal. Using the same logic of above analysis, PI should
be abandoned whenever PC is optimally adopted. The main result of proposition 3.3
cannot be changed.22
Note that the threshold K̃ in proposition 3.3 increases with θ/2, which is the consumers’
average benefit from eating H products when compared to L products. When the quality
is serious safety concern and low quality leads to deadly diseases, consuming safe food
matters substantially, i.e., θ/2 is sufficiently large. Then K̃ is likely to exceed the PI
cost, which makes PI the optimal choice of food quality signaling.
Corollary 3.1 For any K and x > 0, there exists large enough θ for every N ≥ 2, such
that optimal regulation only signals quality perfectly through PI.
When China’s Sanlu incident was caused by deadly additives, more strict regulations on
the Chinese diary industry became imperative. PI, which was abandoned by the label of
National Inspection Exemption, is now re-activated. It seems that the government has
not found a cheap method for testing the deadly additives. To date, China’s PI frequency
is believed to be incapable of eliminating fraud. However, Chinese have realized that in
dealing with food safety, the old-fashioned approach PI is more desirable for consumers
than PC.
Furthermore, K̃ in proposition 3.3 tends to 0 when N tends to infinity. It implies that
when competition is perfect (i.e., N = ∞), the advantage of PC is most obvious. In
this case, any inspection cost K > 0 = K̃ leads to r∗ = 0 and x̃∗ = x.
Corollary 3.2 With perfect competition, optimal regulation only signals quality imper-
fectly through process certification.
As mentioned above, firms increase their quantities with hope that PI can drive some
competitors out of the market. They expect their market share will be extended after
22When the punishment is relatively large, policies combining PI and PC may be optimal. Specifically,
the regulator conducts PI with relatively low frequency. By doing that, firms commit fraud with quality
L. Then the regulator expects to collect punishments covering the PI cost or more. This low PI rate
may not induce firms to adopt the safest process x. So the regulator also sets x as the process standard.
However, the enforcement of heavy punishment may be a problem, because profit from fraud has not
been generated.
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the inspection. But in equilibrium, the marginal affect of PI over the quantity can be







(1− x) 2− (1− r + rx)(N − 1)
[2 + (1− r + rx)(N − 1)]3
< 0.
In words, PI cannot affect firms’ decision over quantity significantly. Then its impact on
the social gain from quality signaling is diminutive. Another reason that PI cannot be
involved in optimal regulation is that if N is large, then its expected cost is rNK. Note
that the social benefit from PI is bounded. If too many sampling and testing should be
done due to the large N , the expenditure will be an unlimited burden for the regulator.
Therefore PC is more favorable in this situation.
Nevertheless, corollary 3.2 also suggests a paradox of PC : PC is more effective than its
alternative before it becomes the policy, but after that it is not. The reason is that PC,
which is more efficient with intensive competitiveness, may undermine the competition
due to its relatively large set-up cost. Some companies may not be able to afford that
cost and will then leave the market. To see this paradox, consider the following example.
Illustration Example:
Let K = 0.04× 0.4× (θ − c)
2
θ
, x = 0.8 and N = 4.
The regulator optimally stops PI and starts to monitor these 4 firms’ processes, since




Now consider one firm cannot pay for the set-up cost for PC. And there is only N ′ = 3
firms left in the market due to the implementation of PC. Then the optimal policy
changes to PI, since




The above example suggests that policy makers should estimate and adopt PC with
discretion. To overcome this paradox, governments may need to subsidize firms whose
budgets are exceeded by the set-up cost, or they may support these firms with financial
plans. After all, an effective and credible food quality regulatory system should be con-
sistent without hampering the competitiveness of the industry or leaving little marginal
benefit to the consumers.
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3.6 Conclusion and Further Developments
Food quality is a widespread concern in today’s public policies. In developed countries, as
incomes rise, consumers are prepared to pay for a regulatory regime that provides higher
quality and minimizes risk. Public regulation might not be the only approach. The
others include economic incentives, voluntary practice, private standards and labeling,
etc. However, according to Strauz (2005), a certification agency without any competition
should be needed to provide a consistent and credible signal for credence goods in a long
period. And the food quality is highly related to public health and safety. Therefore,
governments are usually considered as the best candidates to monitor and control the
food quality provision. In developing countries, where average incomes are relatively low,
food companies are less likely to recover the costs of quality provision from marketing.23
Governments have to respond by setting strict regulations to ensure food quality.
This chapter investigates the efficiency of food quality regulatory regimes. Particular
attention is paid to two approaches: the newer process certification and the more tradi-
tional product inspection. Using PI, regulations can provide a perfect signal of quality
but relatively large monitoring costs must be incurred. On the contrary, PC is a less
expensive method but leads to imperfect quality signals. Although most foods are cre-
dence goods, the case of search and experience goods are also studied, which suggests
that neither PC nor PI is needed for signaling the quality, because the informational
asymmetry between firms and consumers is solved by the market mechanism. In the
case of credence goods, market failure may be inevitable without any regulation. If
using PC, the regulator should set the safest process as the standard to mandate the
maximum quality provision in production. If using PI, the regulator should inspect the
products as frequently as possible, such that no business fraud exists in equilibrium.
Moreover, proposition 3.3 suggests that combining PC and PI may not generate more
cost-effective regulatory approaches. If the cost of PI is larger than some threshold,
it should be stopped in optimal regulations. However, the threshold is relatively large
when the quality is some serious safety attribute. Under this circumstance, PI is more
efficient than PC. The threshold also depends on the competitiveness of the market.
With perfect competition, PC is always a better choice for policy makers. But when the
set-up costs for monitoring PC must be paid by firms themselves, small market powers
imply little chances of firms recovering the set-up costs. Then some firms may withdraw
from the market which may causes a paradox: PC is a more cost-effective approach
than PI before PC ’s implementation; but after that, it is not.
23For example, Wanga et al. (2008) investigated the price premium for Chinese milk products with
safety labels. The premium in Beijing supermarkets is only about 5% over products without a label.
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However, the pro-competitive effect of PI may be overestimated, because I assume the
quality being independent among different firms.24 Food contamination could sometimes
drive from the utilization of common inputs, such as polluted river used for irrigation
and feeding animals. The outbreaks of zoonotic diseases, such as bird flu, also can easily
be transmitted in between farms. If the common hazard has been introduced, firms may
not increase their quantity with the expectation that their rivals will withdraw their
products due to PI. Considering the extreme case where the quality of firms is perfectly
correlated. The detection of one firm’s unsafe products suggests all products in the
whole industry should be disposed. Instead of increasing their quantities, the firms may
downsize their scales of production. Consequently, the social welfare can be concave
in PI ’s frequency and achieve its maximized value when PC and PI are combined.
Moreover, the optimal regulatory approach (only using PI, or PC, or both of them) will
depend not only on the the cost of PI, but also the correlation between firms’ quality. It
obviously deserves more discussions, which will provide more complete and meaningful
practical implications.
24Thanks to Sara Biancini for sharing this perspective in her report on this thesis.
Chapter 4
Patents and Common Values:
Over-investment in Research and
Development
4.1 Introduction
Scientists are continuously searching for the new innovations. However, the new innova-
tions build on the current facts and theories. Without the dissemination of the previous
findings, no subsequent results could be easily produced. Nowadays, much of the ex-
isting technical and industrial knowledge is protected by patent rights. On one hand,
patent rights reveal the knowledge, and the whole scientific community can learn from
it. On the other hand, patent rights protect benefits of previous knowledge’s finders
through legitimizing their position as innovation sellers. Like the production of other
goods, the routine of innovation manufacture (known as research and development, or
R&D) is affiliated with large scale investments. Patent protection provides scientists
an opportunity to recover their R&D investments by allowing only the patent holder
to profit from the discovery. In this sense, patent rights may have successfully promot-
ed more research (see for instance, Arora et al. (2004)). Recent policies, such as the
U.S. Bayh-Dole Patent and Trademark Amendments Act (known as Bayh-Dole Act),1
encourage scientists to apply for patent protection over their innovations.
Heller and Eisenberg (1998), however, treat patent protection as a two-edged sword:
it spurs scientific research by securing scientists the fruits of their labors, but it also
gives patent holders potential power to restrict how others conduct research based on
1The U.S. Bayh–Dole Patent and Trademark Amendments Act of 1980 allowed universities to receive
patents and grant licenses resulting from their researches. See more in the section of literature review.
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the protected knowledge. When patent holders enforce these veto power, only they can
search for the future subsequent innovation (or downstream products).2 In practice,
research cannot guarantee successful findings. Blocking other scientists from conducting
R&D may delay new discoveries and reduce innovation manufacture in general. Heller
and Eisenberg dubbed the veto rights “tragedy of the anticommons”: patent holders
may block others’ research and restrict the usage of their owned innovations to a less
than efficient level. Anticommons is rising in biomedical and other industries (see for
instance, Lessig (2002); David (2004); Murray and Stern (2007); Huang and Murray
(2009)).
Nevertheless, the extent of anticommons is highly debatable according to other scholars.
They have two main reasons. First, some theoretical studies, such as Green and Scotch-
mer (1995), suggest that anticommons may be avoidable through licensing activities: it
may be profitable for a patent holder to offer a license at a fee with respect to the li-
censee’s R&D cost. Second, the number (and quality) of new patent-protected scientific
innovations has continued to move upward in recent years (Mowery and Ziedonis (2002);
Sampat et al. (2003)). This implies that the new patent holders are not simply motivat-
ed by their ability to block new innovations by others. Moreover, if new findings have
decreased as Eisenberg and Heller suppose, then one would expect a decline in R&D
investment. Yet there is little evidence to suggest that this has taken place (Refferty
(2008); Noel and Schankerman (2006)). Therefore, the impact of anticommons appears
limited.
This paper aims to analyze the controversy over patent rights. It considers a simple
model with two scientists: one patentee and one potential licensee. Endowed with same
insight, they are both capable of research based on the previous knowledge. The value of
the improvement (new innovation) is random, but both scientists have prior knowledge
about it. At best, a scientist is uncertain about the contribution his research will make
to the world. However they can somehow predict the value using their advanced knowl-
edge. For simplicity, there are two pieces of private information that scientists may have:
the bad news τ1 and the good news τ2. The good news τ2 leads to a higher expected
value than τ1. Moreover, a common-value situation is assumed: each scientist’s private
information is an augment of the other scientist’s expectation of the value. If both scien-
tists have τ2, their common expectation is the highest; it is the lowest if they both have
τ1. Due to the scientists’ distinguished personalities and backgrounds, they may have
2Anticommons may also take place when there are multiple patent holders who stop research. Any
dispute among the patentees may delay the licensee’s research. Such disputes may happen when a high
license fee required by one patentee decreases anothers’ profits. If the licensee has already reached an
agreement with a patentee and paid his fees, the other patentees may take advantage of the licensee
being anxious to recover his costs and therefore require very high payments. This probably creates a
negative profit for the licensee, thus he would not bargain license contracts in the first place. See for
instance, Llanes and Trento (2009).
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ex ante different perspectives on the value of any given project. For instance, a scientist
with an optimistic personality is inclined to focus on the positive aspects; while one with
a pessimistic personality is more likely to see the negative ones. Through sharing their
perspectives, scientists may know more about the issue, thus the efficiency of the patent
rights mechanism may depend on its ability to disclose the private information.
One key feature of the mechanism of patent rights is that the potential licensee can
only conduct his R&D if he and patentee achieve a license agreement.3 To capture the
veto rights of the patentee over the other’s R&D, I assume that he proposes any license
contract on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to the licensee. The proposed price of licensing
should be increased with the patentee’s expected value of the improvement, which might
be enhanced significantly after the good news of the licensee is disclosed. Thus, the
patentee may screen the licensee’s information using a license menu. Furthermore, a
blockade could be introduced in the menu: the patentee incentivizes the licensee to
report good news by blocking him if he reports bad news. Then anticommons (e.g.,
fewer new innovations than is efficient) may arise as a ”tragedy”. Statistically speaking,
a single R&D activity leads to fewer findings than multiple ones.
I also assume that an R&D programme requires sunk investment and that, on average,
a higher investment leads to more innovations.4 This assumption immediately combines
the observations of ”many innovations” and ”many R&D investments” into one. Sci-
entists balance their R&D costs with the expected income from their innovations. The
patentee may signal his information through his R&D investment in the proposed con-
tract as observable and verifiable actions.5 Now neither ”consecutively increasing new
innovations” nor ”increasing R&D investments” can prove the efficiency of patent rights.
The patentee may conceal his bad news through signaling: he invests heavily to pretend
that he has the good news. By doing that, he increases the total chance of finding the
new innovation. He may also enhance the licensee’s valuation of the improvement, who
is then willing to pay for higher license fee. The patentee may not expect to recover
the heavy investment from the future income. He may recover it through licensing,
when the patentee’s good news significantly enhances the licensee’s valuation. Such a
heavy investment in the patentee’s R&D may lead to an over-investment situation: the
equilibrium total investment level is strictly larger than the socially optimal one. Hence
3For pronominal clarity, I take these two scientists as men. Moreover, because of patent protection,
licensing incomes matter substantially to patentees. Patents themselves are expensive to acquire due
to R&D investments. To recover the investments, patent holders only make money from licensing
the protected innovation, or developing and selling (or licensing) some new downstream innovation, or
both. In fact, 71% respondents to Thursby et al. (2003)’s survey claimed that licensing fees generated by
patents were extremely important in determining the success of their scientific institutions’ management.
4For example, compared to a low-tech laboratory, a high-tech one facilitates scientific researches but
increases their sunk costs.
5See Myerson (1983): when a party designing a contract has private information, the contract may
reveal his information to other parties.
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the controversy over patent rights may be generated: anticommons and over-investment
(and more innovations than efficiency) may ex ante co-exist, when some good news leads
to a large increase in the common valuation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 is the literature review. I
build the model in section 4.3, then solve the equilibrium and present the main results
in section 4.4. And section 4.5 is the conclusion.
4.2 Literature Review
After the passage of 1980 Bayh–Dole Act, the extent of anticommons has been empiri-
cally studied. That Act created a U.S. federal patent policy that allows universities to
retain rights to any patents resulting from government funded research and to license
these patents on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis. Although universities continue
to publish their findings in peer-reviewed journals, their patent rights may block sub-
sequent research. From an anticommons perspective, the citation rate for a scientific
publication should fall after the formal patent rights associated with that publication
are granted. However, by using a long stream of patent citations data, Mowery and
Ziedonis (2002) and Sampat et al. (2003) suggest that citations did not decline dramat-
ically. Additionally, patents are often granted years after the knowledge is introduced
in a paper. Murray and Stern (2007) focus on the changes in the citation rate before
and after the patent rights have established. They support anticommons by only finding
a modest effect. To identify the Bayh–Dole effect on incentives of R&D investments,
Refferty (2008) categorizes universities’ R&D expenditure data into three groups: basic
research, applied research and developmental research. Research in the first group is
less patentable than the other two. One might expect that in order to generate more
licensing revenue, universities would shifte funding from basic research to applied and
developmental research. Alternately, one could anticipate the opposite as an implication
of anticommons: universities de-emphasizing application and development but investing
heavily in basic research. According to Refferty (2008), however, no change has taken
place saliently: R&D investments in all three groups have generally continued to in-
crease. In all, the negative effect of patent rights (anticommons) on scientific researches
does not seem to be significant. The contradiction here is too apparent to be overlooked.
This paper attempts to give an explanation.
The mechanism of patent rights has been studied extensively, including theoretical liter-
ature on sequential innovation (Scotchmer (1991), Green and Scotchmer (1995), Chang
(1995), Scotchmer (1996)). In these models, there are two scientists who research se-
quentially (the licensee cannot do research until the patentee stops). The goal is to find
Chapter 4. Patents and Common Values: Over-investment in Research and
Development 66
the patent policy that maximizes the incentives to invest in both scientists’ R&D pro-
gramme. However, the above papers exclude the possibility that the two scientists are
competing in their search for new innovation. Note that any patent that creats a block-
ade may only benefit the patentee, who also pursues new innovations. Otherwise, the
revenue from licensing would be preferred over waiting for patent expiration. So in the
above papers, any blockade is rare. An exception is Bessen and Maskin (2009). In their
setting, both patentee and licensee can conduct R&D based on previous and patented
knowledge. Then, a blockade can exterminate the competition in a future market of new
innovation. As a result, anticommons may arise: R&D may be under-invested and the
new innovation production may be downsized.6 Furthermore, the patentee also needs
the new innovations to develop even newer innovations from which he can make a profit
in the distant future. In the long-run, scientists may prefer an environment without
patent rights, where the expected number of new innovations is large. So patent rights
may not protect the patentee at all and the ”tragedy” may become even worse. But
neither Bessen and Maskin (2009) nor others, as far as I know, have considered the case
where the patentee’s information directly affects the licensee’s valuation. In this paper,
I extend their ideas by introducing the common-value assumption. The results suggest
that anticommons (under-investment in R&D) is not the only negative impact of patent
rights; the effect of over-investment must also be considered.
From the common-value case of Cremer and Mclean (1985), we know that if the join-
t distribution of parties’ information satisfies some appropriate rank conditions, some
mechanism discloses all information with zero cost (the socially optimal outcome). It
is the ex ante correlation between information of parties that pulls the trigger: given
the correlation and the assumption that others reveal their information truthfully, it
is optimal for any individual to reveal his information under the provided mechanism.
However, Auriol and Laffont (1992) point out that Cremer and Mclean’s rank conditions
can easily be evaded: it is more than a conventional setting to simplify computation or
ensure a solution. Without that condition, full informational disclosure requires positive
social cost. Thus, the first best results in a common-value model may not be equilibri-
um. For example, in the Spence (1974) education model, the productivity of a worker
affects the employer’s payoff, thus has the common-value property. The result is that a
highly productive worker may invest in wasteful education to avoid being considered less
capable. Note that the over-investment in Spence (1974) is different from that which is
studied in this paper, which can be expressed as a low productive worker over-investing
in education to be mistaken as a more capable one. Moreover, Maskin and Tirole (1992)
6They assume that, to manufacture the same amount of innovation, an efficient licensee invests less in
R&D than an inefficient one does. The licensee holds private information about his own efficiency. Thus,
a blockade may incentivize an efficient licensee to reveal his type: a patentee may block the inefficient
licensee in order to get higher license payment from him if he was efficient.
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extend the principal-agent theory with an informed principal under common-value as-
sumption. They focus on the set of equilibrium contracts where the principal truthfully
reveals his information. Like Spence (1974), the informational disclosure relies on the as-
sumption of infinite signaling choices of the principal, which belong to some compact and
convex set. Then, under some conventional hypothesis, there exists an equilibrium sat-
isfying the assumption that the principal reveals his information and the agent believes
he does. In this paper, the principal (patentee) only has limited choices for signaling:
finite levels of R&D’s fixed investments. Thus, the incentive compatible condition may
not be applicable for the principal. Consequently, I also focus on the equilibrium where
the patentee may successfully conceal his information. The lack of efficiency contrasts
with the positive recognitions of patent rights.
4.3 The Model
I consider two risk-neutral scientists: A and B, whose reservation utilities are normalized
to 0. One of them is the patent holder (denoted as h = A or B), who owns exclusive
rights over the previous knowledge. The other scientist is a potential licensee (denoted
as −h), who also understands the knowledge because patent rights have disclosed. At
the start of the game, the same insight upon the protected knowledge occurs to both
A and B. The improvement, referred as ”new innovation”, could be one of any new
scientific findings, one of downstream applications, or both.
h’s veto power over −h’s R&D is established by patent protection. First, I assume that it
is long enough: waiting for the expiration of the patent is not an option for −h. Second,
it is wide enough. There exists no substitution of the previous knowledge that −h can
use to develop new innovation without infringing h’s patent rights. Consequently, h can
propose any licensing contract on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to the licensee −h.
Furthermore, the social value of the new innovation (denoted as v) remains uncertain
until it is manufactured. The game under investigation takes place in two periods: one
present period and one future period. Licensing activity and research is in the present.
The realization of new innovation and its social value v occurs in the future.
4.3.1 The Previous Knowledge: R&D Technology
New innovation and its social value v can be found in any scientist’s R&D programme,
if it is successful. The previous knowledge is necessary for producing new innovation.
It specifies two R&D technologies: an advanced one and a laggard one. Both of them
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require fixed costs being invested before research can start. Let ci ∈ {0, c} (c > 0) be
scientist i’s (i ∈ {A,B}) fixed investment in his R&D. If ci = 0, i adopts the laggard
technology; if ci = c > 0, the advanced one is used.
7 This ci is publicly observable when
it is sunk and i’s R&D’s successful rate is
pi = p if ci = 0 or pi = p = p+ ∆p if ci = c.
Clearly, if scientist i ∈ {A.B} performs no research, his probability of finding v is
pi = 0. The fixed cost of the laggard technology is normalized to 0. Compared to the
laggard one, the advanced technology improves the success rate of R&D, but at a higher
fixed cost. This setting captures the fact that more R&D costs usually lead to more
discoveries. Note that it is more than just assuming that the success rates of R&D will
increase along (and marginal decrease) with continued investment. In other literature, a
patentee’s decision on whether or not to sell his technology has been generally considered.
In this setting, the patentee can also decide which technology to sell. Note that many
patent policies only ask for some minimum disclosure requirements. The strategy of
”which technology to sell” becomes applicable: the patentee only discloses the laggard
technology when applying for patent rights, and is willing to disclose the advanced
technology after receiving a high license payment. Moreover, it has been found that the
success of a technical rival reduces a scientist’s profitability from his own R&D.8 When
getting the license payment in the present, a patentee may sell some laggard technology
to a licensee and limit his competition in the future.9
By having multiple R&D programmes, the probability of v (and the new innovation)
being found should be larger than by having a single programme. For simplicity, I
assume that the success rates of R&D projects are independent. The probability that
only scientist i’s (i ∈ {A,B}) R&D is successful (or i is the only finder of v) is pi(1−p−i).
The probability that both A and B’s R&D are successful (or both A and B are finders
of v) is pApB. Thus, the social rate of finding v is pA + pB − pApB.10
7Since the R&D cost is fixed, any investment level above the fixed cost cannot enhance the successful
rate of the R&D using either technology.
8See Noel and Schankerman (2006).
9An example is the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in 1950, which includes technology
”aid” from the USSR to China (but China had to pay for it). In order to maintain their military
advantage and status of Big Brother in the Communism world, the USSR only provided China with
their technology developed before the 1930s.
10I exclude the possibility that large R&D expenditures lead to by-products and additional returns.
Here R&D is only conducted to find v, the social value v cannot be changed by R&D costs.
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4.3.2 Scientists’ Information
The social value of new innovation v is random. However, each scientist has some prior
knowledge on v before he invests in his R&D. Let τi ∈ {τ1, τ2} (i = A,B) be i’s private
information about the future. τ2 is the good news about the future and τ1 is the bad
one, i.e., for any i = A,B, E(v|τi = τ2) > E(v|τi = τ1).
A and B probably have disparate information about future. But τA and τB are positively
correlated.11 Without losing generality, A is assumed to be pessimistic about the future,
while B is optimistic: A observes the bad news τ1 more often than B. (τA, τB) is drawn
from the distribution satisfying Assumption 4.1:
A4.1 : Pr(τA = τ1, τB = τ1) = Pr(τB = τ1) = 1− qB,
Pr(τA = τ1, τB = τ2) = qB − qA, Pr(τA = τ2, τB = τ1) = 0 and
Pr(τA = τ2, τB = τ2) = Pr(τA = τ2) = qA, where 0 < qA < qB < 1.
For simplicity, nature never selects (τA = τ2, τB = τ1). Under A4.1, A holds complete in-
formation if τA = τ2, but his information is partial if τA = τ1. Similarly, B’s information
is complete if he observes τ1, but it is partial otherwise. Moreover, qB−qA = Pr(τA 6= τB)
measures the correlation between two scientists’ ex ante perspectives. They are less cor-
related with a larger qB − qA than with a smaller one.






, where qj,k = Pr(τ−h = τk|τh = τj).
A4.1 describes this general setting with an additional coordinate h ∈ {A,B} and only
excludes some cases where the patentee holds the partial information.12 I argue that
A4.1 is sufficiently generalized. Since h designs the contracts, he can induce −h to
truthfully reveal τ−h. Therefore, the general setting cannot quantitatively change the
results .
11Because scientists have the common idea of improvement, their expectations of the value should be
correlated.
12The general setting assumes that when τh = τj , h may not certainly know τ−h, for any j ∈ {1, 2}.
For the licensee’s knowledge of τh after observing τ−h, A4.1 includes every possibility: i) licensee knows
τ−h = τ1, but does not know τh, i.e., −h = B; ii) licensee knows τ−h = τ2, but does not know τh, i.e.,
−h = A; iii) licensee knows τ−h = τ1, then he certainly knows τh = τ1, i.e, −h = B; iv) licensee knows
τ−h = τ2, then he certainly knows τh = τ2, i.e, −h = A. Since τA and τB are positively correlated, there
is no fifth case where licensee knows τ−h = τj , then he certainly knows τh = τ−j , for any j ∈ {1, 2}.
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4.3.3 Value of New Innovation and Socially Optimal R&D Costs
Nature selects v ∈ (−V,+∞) according to a publicly known conditional cumulative
distribution F (v|τA, τB), where V is a strictly positive number.13 For any τA and τB,
the density function f(v|τA, τB) is strictly positive for all v ∈ (−V,+∞). Thus, v cannot
be used as ex post evidence for (τA, τB). A scientist immediately commercializes the new
innovation, if he succeeds in his R&D programme, and he will get the whole social value
of new innovation v, if he is its unique finder. If both scientists find v, they will share v
equally.14
A common-value situation is considered. The socially optimal R&D costs (or R&D
technology usage) are assumed as follows:
i) if τA = τB = τ2, the common valuation of the innovation E(v|τA, τB) is the highest,
then socially optimal investments are coA = c
o
B = c, i.e., both A and B use the advanced
technology;
ii) if τA = τ1 and τB = τ2, E(v|τA, τB) is modest, then the first-best outcome is coi = 0
and co−i = c, for any i = {A,B}, i.e, one scientist uses the advanced technology and the
other uses the laggard one;
iii) if τA = τB = τ1, E(v|τA, τB) is lowest, then social optimal outcome requires coA 6= c
and coB 6= c, i.e., neither A nor B adopts the advanced technology.15
Consider that τA and τB are observable to a risk-neutral social planner (she). Remember





SW = (pA + pB − pApB)E(v|τA, τB)− (cA + cB).
The solution to the above problem is cA = cB = c only when
(2p− p2)E(v|τA, τB)− 2c ≥ (p+ p− pp)E(v|τA, τB)− c




13It could be a purely bad influence.
14Since scientists are risk neutral, it is equivalent to assume that scientists apply for patent protection
over the new innovation in the future. Note that the strong protection also allows the patent winner to
get the whole social value v. If v is found by both scientists, they may have equal oppotunity to get the
new patent.
15This paper is centered on the fact that scientists may efficiently adjust their R&D investment
strategies according to their information.
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where (1− p)∆pE(v|τA, τB) is the marginal social benefit by using advanced technology
for a second time; it is ci = 0 and c−i = c, i = A or B only when
c
(1− p)∆p




where (1 − p)∆pE(v|τA, τB) is the marginal social benefit by using one advanced tech-
nology, given the laggard technology being used once; and it is characterized by cA 6= c
and cB 6= c only when E(v|τA, τB) is small enough. Thus, I assume that E(v|τA, τB)
satisfying Assumption 4.2:
A4.2 : E(v|τ1, τ1) = 0,











Here E(v|τ1, τ1) is normalized to 0. With τA = τB = τ1, it is the first best that only
patentee h conducts R&D (and uses the laggard technology). However, if at least one
scientist observes the good news τ2, A4.2 implies that allowing multiple R&D projects
is more efficient than a single one. As a matter of fact, anticommons (e.g., licensee’s
R&D being rejected) may not be a tragedy at all, if the improvement upon previous
knowledge is insignificant.
To be precise, anticommons refers to events where the previous knowledge is used less
than efficiently. In this paper, if R&D is under-invested (the total investment in R&D
being strictly less than that required for a socially optimal outcome), or if the number
of project is 1 when that required by efficiency is 2, anticommons occurs.
4.3.4 Licensing Proposal and Timing
The patentee h proposes licensing contracts to the licensee −h. −h either accepts one
contract or rejects any of them. If −h accepts one contract, both scientists’ R&D
programs are conducted. Otherwise, −h’s R&D is blocked and only h researches.
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4.3.4.1 Signaling and Interim Belief
After observing τh, the patentee h first invests ch(τh) ∈ {0, c} (or pre-commits to in-
vest ch(τh)). ch(τh) is observable, so it might be useful message about τh for the li-
censee.17 Let b(τ−h, ch) be −h’s interim belief about τh conditional on ch and his pri-
vate information τ−h. His estimation of the future (valuation of the new innovation) is
E−h(v|τ−h, b(τ−h, ch)). If b(τ−h, ch) = {τj}, j = 1, 2, this estimation is
E−h(v|τ−h, b(τ−h, ch)) = E(v|τ−h, τj).
It is also possible that −h does not update his belief according to the signal ch. I use
b(τ−h, ch) = {τ1, τ2} to denote this case when −h’s estimation of the future is
E−h(v|τ−h, {τ1, τ2}) = Pr(τh = τ1|τ−h)E(v|τ1, τ−h)
+ Pr(τh = τ2|τ−h)E(v|τ2, τ−h).
In equilibrium, h knows b(τ−h, ch) and −h knows h knowing that.
4.3.4.2 Licensing Menu
After signaling τh with ch, h proposes license contracts. A license contract specifies which
technology the licensee can use. It also specifies a fee that −h should pay. Intuitively,
a higher licensee’s estimation of future E−h(v|τ−h, b(τ−h, ch)) leads to a higher license
fee. I consider a license menu {(fj , c−h,j), j = 1, 2}, which allows h to incentive −h to
reveal his private information τ−h, where fj is the license fee and c−h,j ∈ {0, c} indicates
the technology that −h is authorized to adopt. The subscript j allows the strategy of
selling information-dependent technology to be considered.
4.3.4.3 Timing
The timing of this game is as follows:
In the present period:
stage 1, Nature selects τh, τ−h and v.
stage 2, h invests ch(τh) in his R&D and sets a license menu {(fj , c−h,j), j = 1, 2}.
17Note that τh is soft information. Any saying about τh might be a cheap talk without pre-investment.
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stage 3, −h decides whether to take one license contract in the menu and which one to
take. If he takes (fj , c−h,j), he pays license fee fj to h and invests c−h,j in his own R&D
(or uses the technology which requires c−h,j as fixed cost).
In the future period:
stage 4, a scientist who finds new innovation through his R&D, commercializes it. If he
is the only finder, he gets v ; if the other scientist also finds it, he gets 12v.
In equilibrium, the patentee’s strategy for signaling and licensing must be compatible
with each other. Thus, the equilibrium interim belief b(τ−h, ch) about the patentee’s
private information (conditional on the signaling ch) cannot be changed by the proposed
license menu.
4.3.5 Scientists’ Profits
If licensee −h rejects the menu, his profit is π−h = 0. Now suppose −h takes the contract
(fj , c−h,j) at stage 3. He becomes the only finder and secures the whole social value v
with probability p−h(1−ph). The probability that he shares v equally with patentee h is
php−h. Since v is unknown, −h relies on his estimation of future E−h(v|τ−h, b(τ−h, ch)).
Given τ−h, ch, c−h,j and fj , the licensee’s expected profit at stage 3 is
π−h(τ−h, ch, c−h,j , fj)
= (p−h(1− ph) +
1
2




ph)E−h(v|τ−h, b(τ−h, ch))− c−h,j − fj , (4.1)
where for any i ∈ {h,−h}, pi is R&D’s successful rate of scientist i (i = h,−h) and
satisfies
pi = p if ci = c or ci,j = c and pi = p if ci = 0 or ci,j = 0. (4.2)
c−h,j + fj (j = 1, 2) is −h’s total cost. Truthtelling is a licensee’s dominate strategy
when the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied:
(ICj): π−h(τj , ch, c−h,j , fj) ≥ π−h(τj , ch, c−h,−j , f−j). (4.3)
Moreover, −h’s R&D may be blocked by some license menu, when h sets fj as un-
affordable for −h. Equivalently, the following individual rationality constraint is not
satisfied:
(IRj): π−h(τj , ch, c−h,j , fj) ≥ 0. (4.4)
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Three blocking strategies of patentee h should be considered:
1. full blockade. h absolutely hinders −h’s R&D (i.e., neither (IR1) nor (IR2) holds).
In this case, h will be the only one who does research. But he can neither know −h’s
information, nor collect the license fee. Thus, h’s expected profit at stage 2 is his
estimation of future timing his R&D success rate minus his R&D cost:
πKh (τh, ch, c−h,1, f1, c−h,2, f2) = phE(v|τh)− ch, (4.5)
where function ph is given by formula (4.2) and superscript K indicates full blocking.
Since h only knows τh, E(v|τh) is his estimation of the future valuation of the new
innovation.
2. contingent blockade. −h’s research activity is blocked only when he receives the bad
news τ1 (i.e., (IC2) and (IR2) hold, but (IR1) does not).
18 In equilibrium, −h with good
news τ2 will not be blocked, if h does not create a full blockade. Note that τ−h = τ2 leads
to a higher −h’s estimation of future than τ−h = τ1. −h with higher estimation of future
can be charged for a higher license fee. When full blockade is off the table, patentee h
seizes a good chance of collecting license incomes. And a higher license fee with τ−h =
τ2 is better than a lower fee with τ−h = τ1. As the result, a contingent blockade will only
block −h’s R&D with τ−h = τ1 in equilibrium. After −h is licensed or not, h knows τ−h
and collects license fee f2 if τ−h = τ2. Hence that h’s expected profit at stage 2 is




+f2] + Pr(τ−h = τ1|τh)phE(v|τh, τ1)− ch, (4.6)
where functions ph and p−h are given by formula (4.2) and superscript k stands for this
contingent blocking. The patentee correctly revises his belief about τ−h after observing
the licensee action. Then phE(v|τh, τ1)− ch is h’s expected profit at stage 3 when −h is
blocked (i.e., τ−h = τ1). ph(1− 12p−h)E(v|τh, τ2) + f2 − ch is that when −h pays license
fee f2 and invests c−h,2 as his R&D cost (i.e., τ−h = τ2).
3. non blockade. −h takes the contract (fj , c−h,j) if his information τ−h = τj (i.e., (ICj)
and (IRj) hold for all j ∈ {1, 2}). Then h’s expected profit at stage 2 is
πh(τh, ch, c−h,1, f1, c−h,2, f2) = Pr(τ−h = τ1|τh)[ph(1−
1
2
p−h)E(v|τh, τ1) + f1]
+ Pr(τ−h = τ2|τh)[ph(1−
1
2
p−h)E(v|τh, τ2) + f2]− ch, (4.7)
18Holding of (IC1) is not necessary here, if π−h(τ1, ch, c−h,2, f2) is strictly negative. −h will not take
contract (f2, c−h,2) given τ−h = τ1, even when π−h(τ1, ch, c−h,2, f2) > π−h(τ1, ch, c−h,1, f1).
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where functions ph and p−h is given by formula (4.2) and ph(1− 12p−h) E(v|τh, τj) +fj−ch
is h’s expected profit at stage 3 given −h accepts (fj , c−h,j).
4.4 Equilibrium
In this section, I first identify the equilibrium when the pessimistic scientist A is the
patentee, i.e., h = A. Then I solve the equilibrium of the other case: h = B. N-
evertheless, it is convenient to introduce some general results here. For any patentee
h ∈ {A,B}, the following 2 lemmas hold.
Lemma 4.1 Under A4.2, if license menu {(fj , c−h,j), j = 1, 2} satisfies the incentive
compatibility constraints (IC1) and (IC2) and f1 < f2, then it satisfies c−h,1 = 0 and
c−h,2 = c.





ph)E−h(v|τ−h, b(τ−h, ch))− c−h,j − fj .
Suppose c−h,1 = c−h,2. Note that−h’s expected profit is decreasing with fj . For any ch ∈
{0, c}, the incentive compatibility constraint (ICj) cannot hold (i.e., π−h(τj , ch, c−h,−j , f−j) >
π−h(τj , ch, c−h,j , fj)) given fj > f−j . In other words, the licensee prefers to pay the lower
license fee provided that his contracted R&D cost is fixed.
Now suppose c−h,1 = c and c−h,2 = 0. (IC1) and (IC2) can be rewritten as








Note that the licensee −h’s estimation of the future should be higher when he receives
the good news τ2 than when his information is τ1, i.e., for any ch ∈ {0, c},
E−h(v|τ2, b(τ2, ch)) > E−h(v|τ1, b(τ1, ch)).
The reason behind the above formula is that when compared to the bad news, the li-
censee’s good news leads to 1) higher expectation of future, since A4.2 implies E−h(v|τ2, b) >
E−h(v|τ1, b) for any b ⊂ {τ1, τ2}; 2) higher probability that the patentee also receives
a good news, since the positive correlation between τA and τB implies Pr(b(τ2, ch) =
{τ2}) ≥ Pr(b(τ1, ch) = {τ1}), for any ch ∈ {0, c}. As the result, at least one of (IC1) and
(IC2) cannot hold.
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Lemma 4.2 Under A4.2, h invests ch = c in equilibrium whenever τh = τ2.
Proof. Under A4.2, τh = τ2 and h’s estimation of future is large enough that it is
more profitable to invest heavily in his R&D programme for each blocking strategy.
Specifically, A4.1 implies i) pv1−c > pv1, ii) pE(v|τ2)−c > pE(v|τ2), iii) p(1− 12p)v1−c >
p(1− 12p)v1 and iv) p(1−
1
2p)v2 − c > p(1−
1
2p)v2.
If h chooses a full blockade, investing c takes priority over investing 0 according to his
profit function (formula (4.5)) and the above inequality ii).
Consider the case of contingent blockade. Formula (4.6) together with inequality i), iii)
and iv) can prove that for any c−h,2 ∈ {0, c} and f2 ∈ R+, ch = c leads to a strictly
higher πkh(τ2, ch, c−h,1, f1, c−h,2, f2) than ch = 0.
Now suppose that the license menu satisfies (IC1), (IR1), (IC2) and (IR2), and there is
non blockade. Formula (4.7), inequality iii) and iv) as well as lemma 4.1 implies that h
achieves more profit by ch = c than ch = 0, for any f1, f2 ∈ R+.
Remember that holding of both (IC1) and (IC2) is only required by a license menu with
purpose of non blockade (see subsection 4.3.3). Summing up lemma 4.1 and 4.2, they
suggest that without any blockade, each scientist invests heavily in his R&D (or uses the
advanced technology) when he receives the good news from nature, i.e., in equilibrium
ci = c when τi = τ2, for any i = h or −h). Under A4.2, the socially optimal R&D
investments are i) ch = c−h = c, if τh = τ−h = τ2; ii) ci = 0 and c−i = c, i = h or
−h, if τh 6= τ−h; iii) neither h nor −h invests c in their R&Ds, if τh = τ−h = τ1 (see
subsection 3.2). As a result, total investment in R&Ds is at least as large as the socially
optimal level, if there is non blockade. Consequently, only when the patentee h creates
a full blockade or a contingent blockade, there are circumstances with under-investment
(i.e., total investment level being strictly less than efficient level). Furthermore, lemma
2 does not reject the possibility that h may invest c in his R&D when his information
is τ1. Thus, there may be cases with over-investment (i.e., total investment level being
strictly larger than efficient level).
4.4.1 Equilibrium with Pessimistic Patentee
Consider h = A and −h = B. The patentee A can encourage B to reveal τB through
licensing proposal. But the licensee B makes his belief b(τB, cA) about τA based on
the message cA. The positive correlation between these two scientists’ information also
impacts B’s belief. Specifically, I have the following lemma.
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Lemma 4.3 Given A4.1 and A4.2, B’s equilibrium interim belief about τA satisfies
(i) b(τB, 0) = {τ1} for any τB ∈ {τ1, τ2};
(ii) b(τ1, cA) = {τ1} for any cA ∈ {0, c};
(iii) b(τ2, c) ∈ {{τ1, τ2}, {τ2}}.
Proof. Lemma 4.2 states that A invests cA = c in equilibrium whenever τA = τ2. Thus,
B must believe τA = τ1 in equilibrium whenever he observes cA = 0, i.e., b(τB, 0) = {τ1}
for any τB ∈ {τ1, τ2}.
Note that A4.1 implies that B knows A receives the bad news τ1 if τB = τ1, i.e.,
Pr(τA = τ1|τB = τ1) = 1. Thus, B’s belief in this circumstance is b(τ1, cA) = {τ1} for
any cA ∈ {0, c}.
According to lemma 4.2, B knows that A always invests heavily with τA = τ2 in equi-
librium. Given τB = τ2 and cA = c, B cannot exclude the possibility of τA = τ2. Thus,
b(τ2, c) should not be {τ1}.
If nature selects τA = τ2, A uses the advanced technology (i.e., cA = c) and will succeed
in his R&D with probability p (see lemma 4.2). Remember that A is the pessimistic
scientist. τA = τ2 implies that B also receives the good news τ2, i.e., Pr((τB = τ2|τA =
τ2) = 1. Allowing B to research as if τB = τ1 cannot be in equilibrium. So A does not
offer a non blockade license menu to B. Instead, A may create a full blockade by setting
license fee f1 = f2 = ∞ (or large enough). In this case, his expected profit (formula
(4.5)) can be rewritten as
πKA = pE(v|τA = τ2)− c = pv2 − c, (4.8)
since E(v|τA = τ2) = E(v|τ2, τ2) = v2. Or A may create a contingent blockade: he sets f2
such that the individual rationality constraint (IR2) holds (i.e., πB(τ2, cA, cB,2, f2) ≥ 0)
and sets f1 =∞ (or large enough) such that the incentive compatibility constraint (IC2)





pB)v2 + f2 − c. (4.9)
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It is optimal for him to leaveB with 0 profit and make (IR2) binding (i.e., πB(τ2, cA, cB,2, f2) =
0). Thus, A sets the license price




p)EB(v|τ2, b(τ2, c))− cB,2, (4.10)
where πB(τ2, cA, cB,2, f2) is given in formula (4.1). Under A4.2, the expected social
welfare is maximized if B also conducts his R&D with cB,2 = c. However, the equilibrium
may not be efficient. Whether B’s R&D is fully blocked or conducted with the laggard
(i.e., cB,2 = 0) or advanced (i.e., cB,2 = c) technology depends on EB(v|τ2, b(τ2, c)).
Specifically, when selling B a permission for conducting R&D in the present period, A
has to face the possibility that he shares v with B in the future. This leads to a loss on A’s
expected profit. This loss must be exceeded by the license fee, if the license is issued. By
setting f2 as in formula (4.10), the license fee decreases with cB,2, if EB(v|τ2, b(τ2, c)) is
relatively small. Thus proposing cB,2 = c may not be optimal for A. Through combining
formula (4.8), (4.9) and (4.10), one can calculate that in equilibrium, B’s R&D is
i) fully blocked if (1− 12p)EB(v|τ2, b(τ2, c)) <
1
2pv2;









From lemma 4.3, it must be b(τ2, c) ∈ {{τ1, τ2}, {τ2}}. If b(τ2, c) = {τ2}, B’s estimation







From formula (4.11), B is allowed to invest cB,2 = c in his R&D. If b(τ2, c) = {τ1, τ2},
B’s estimation of future is








as defined in subsection 3.4. The equilibrium license menu depends on the ex ante
correlation between τA and τB. I will address this later in this subsection.
In equilibrium, b(τ2, c) = {τ2} or {τ1, τ2} depends on cA(τ1), the patentee’s R&D in-
vestment strategy when he receives the bad news. It is b(τ2, c) = {τ2} only when
given b(τ2, c) = {τ2}, A prefers cA(τ1) = 0 to the heavy investment c. Oterwise it is
b(τ2, c) = {τ1, τ2}. Suppose nature selects τA = τ1. According to lemma 4.3, the licensee
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B’s belief is b(τB, 0) = {τ1} for any τB ∈ {τ1, τ2}. Thus, A reveals his bad news by using
the laggard technology and investing cA = 0. If cA(τ1) = 0 is in equilibrium, the license
menu should create a contingent blockade. When offered with such a license menu, B
truthfully discloses his information through taking the license contract (f2, cB,2) only
if τB = τ2. If τA = τ1 and τB = τ2 are disclosed at stage 2 and 3 respectively, both
scientists update their beliefs. The expected social welfare, as defined in subsection 3.3,
is the sum of A and B’s expected profit at stage 3. Given τA = τ1, τB = τ2 and cA = 0,
















Remember that with τA = τ1 and τB = τ2, the social welfare is maximized by cA = 0
and cB,2 = c. A’s expected profit at stage 3 can equalize the maximum social welfare,




p)v1 − c. (4.12)
Moreover, A4.2 assumes E(v|τ1, τ1) = 0. Thus, blocking B’s research does not harm
the social welfare if τA = τB = τ1. Consequently, if A reveals his bad information by
investing cA(τ1) = 0, a contingent blockade at stage 2 provides A an expected profit
equal to the maximum expected social welfare conditional on τA = τ1. This expected




[(p+ p− pp)v1 − c], (4.13)
because of cB,1 ∈ {0, c}, f1 = ∞ (or large enough), cB,2 = c, qB−qA1−qA = Pr(τB = τ2|τA =
τ1) and f2 being given by formula (4.12). Any full or non blockade license menu cannot
do better.
However given b(τ2, c) = {τ2}, A may invest cA(τ1) = c and conceal his bad information
at stage 2. Consider the case where B naively believes τA = τ2 whenever τB = τ2 and
cA = c. When nature reports B the good news and then A heavily invests in his R&D,
B’s estimation of the future is EB(v|τ2, b(τ2, c)) = v2. To mimic τA = τ2, A also needs
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to set cB,2 = c and license fee f
′
2 satisfying formula (4.10), which is






p)v2 − c. (4.14)
This license fee f ′2 is only collectable by A when τB = τ2. But cA(τ1) = c, as the cost of












p)(v1 + v2)− c]− c.
Thus, cA(τ1) = 0 and b(τ2, c) = {τ2} are in equilibrium if and only if πkA in formula
(4.13) is larger than π′A, or
qB − qA ≤ s1 =
(1− qA)c
∆p(1− p)v1 + p(1− 12p)(v2 − v1)
. (4.15)
Proposition 4.1 summarizes the above analysis.
Proposition 4.1. Let s1 be given in formula (4.15). Given A4.1, A4.2, qB − qA ≤ s1
and A being the patentee, the equilibrium is characterized as follows:
1. A invests cA = c if and only if τA = τ2.
2. B believes τA = τ2 if cA = c and believes τA = τ1 if otherwise.
3. B researches only when τB = τ2; he invests cB = c when he researches.
Note that the equilibrium satisfies i) cA = cB,2 = c, if τA = τB = τ2; ii) cA = 0
and cB,2 = c, if τA = τ1 and τB = τ2; iii) cA = 0 and B does not conduct R&D, if
τA = τB = τ1. Thus, the socially optimal outcome is implemented in this case.
remark 4.1 Under the assumptions of proposition 4.1, the socially optimal outcome is
implemented.
If qB−qA ≤ s1, the correlation between A and B’s information about future is relatively
large (i.e., τA = τB occurs frequently enough). It is difficult for scientists to conceal
private information from each other. Not surprisingly, this game leads to a full disclosure
of information under these circumstances. Here a contingent blockade does not harm
the efficiency, because A4.1 and A4.2 imply that given τB = τ1, one only expects a zero
value generated in the future, i.e., E(v|τB = τ1) = E(v|τ1, τ1) = 0. There is no welfare
loss if B’s R&D is blocked only when he receives the bad news. Moreover, qB − qA ≤ s1






∆p(1− p)v1 + p(1− 12p)(v2 − v1)
.
Under A4.2, the fixed cost of advanced technology c is strictly larger than ∆p(1−p)v1. If
v2 is close enough to v1 (or both v2 and v1 are close enough to
c
∆p(1−p)), qB−qA ≤ 1 < s1
always holds. Consequently, the equilibrium always implements the efficient investment
level. Intuitively, v2 represents the best future and v1 stands for the modest one. If
the best future is not significantly better than the modest one, the license fee f ′2 =
p(1− 12p)v2 − c (formula (4.14)) is not sufficient enough for A to conceal bad news (i.e.,
cA(τ1) = c).
corollary 4.1 Given A being the patentee, patent rights always lead to the socially
optimal outcome, if v2 is close enough to v1.
In other words, if a second good news does not significantly enhance the common valu-
ation, the mechanism of patent rights may be efficient. Common-value models usually
fail in efficiency because of the social cost of informational disclosure.19 However, when
the scientists’ valuation of the future depends little on the others’ information, neither
the licensee nor the patentee is very interested in concealing information. The cost of
informational disclosure is no longer a problem.
Now suppose qB − qA > s1 (and s1 < 1). Given b(τ2, c) = {τ2}, it is more profitable for
A to invest cA(τ1) = c than cA(τ1) = 0 in this case. Now in equilibrium, cA = c cannot
be sufficient for B to believe τA = τ2, i.e., b(τ2, c) = {τ1, τ2}. Given cA = c, τB = τ2




From the above analysis (especially formula (4.11)), B’s R&D is fully blocked if
qB − qA > s2 =
(1− p)v2
(1− 12p)(v2 − v1)
> s1. (4.16)
It must be s2 > s1, because of A4.1. B’s R&D should be restricted with laggard
technology and cB,2 = 0 if and only if
max{s1, s3} < qB − qA ≤ s2 and s3 =
(1− p)v2 − c/∆p
(1− 12p)(v2 − v1)
< s2. (4.17)











f2 in formula (4.18) decreases with qB − qA. When qB − qA is relatively large, B’s
estimation is close to v1. Thus, f2 may be too little for A compared to what he thinks
19See Auriol and Laffont (1992) and Maskin and Tirole (1992).
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he deserves since he knows E(v|τA = τ2) = E(v|τ2, τ2) = v2. From formula (6), a
patentee’s expected profit decreases with the successful rate of a licensee’s R&D. To
compensate himself, A is willing to limit pB to 0 and block B from research, or limit
pB to p and set cB,2 = 0. Thus, full blockade or inefficient contingent blockade (i.e.,
cB,2 = 0) can be equilibrium. Only when qB − qA is relatively small, i.e.,
qB − qA ∈ (s1, s3] and s1 < s3,











At the same time, B can uses the advanced technology and invest c. Then this game
leads to an efficient outcome (i.e., cA = cB,2 = c).
Consider τA = τ1. Note that given qB − qA > s1, A will choose cA(τ1) = c over 0 if
b(τ2, c) = {τ2}. Here given b(τ2, c) = {τ1, τ2}, he may still invest cA(τ1) = 0. If he
does that in equilibrium, I have already proved that he sets a contingent blockade with
cB,2 = c and f2 = p(1− 12p)v1−c (formula (4.12)). He also takes the whole and maximizes
the expected social welfare. If A invests cA(τ1) = c, he has a tendency to conceal his
information τ1 from B. Clearly, B is not easily misled. If τB = τ1, B knows τA = τ1
according to lemma 4.3. However, if τB = τ2, B’s interim belief is b(τ2, c) = {τ1, τ2}.
Now A may conceal his bad news successfully by setting the license menu as if τA = τ2.
That is a contingent blockade with cB,2 = 0 and f2 as in formula (4.18) if max{s1, s3} <
qB − qA ≤ s2; or with cB,2 = c and f2 as in formula (4.19) if qB − qA ≤ s3 and s1 < s3.
The benefit of concealing the bad news is to trick B in to paying a high license fee. So
A will not fully block B’s R&D programme. Whether cA(τ1) = 0 or cA(τ1) = c being
equilibrium depends on A’s expected profit. Assume max{s1, s3} < qB − qA ≤ s2. By






v1), A’s expected profit
(formula (4.6)) is
π′A = Pr(τB = τ2|τA = τ1)[pA(1−
1
2
















Comparing formula (4.20) with (4.13), cA(τ1) = c and cB,2 = 0 are in equilibrium if and
only if
qB − qA > s4 =
(1− qB)c
p(1− 12p)qA(v2 − v1)
and s4 < s2. (4.21)
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v1)− c]− c. (4.22)
Comparing formula (4.22) with (4.13), cA(τ1) = c and cB,2 = c are in equilibrium if and
only if
qB − qA > s5 =
(1− qA)qBc
qB∆p(1− p)v1 + qAp(1− 12p)(v2 − v1)
and s5 < s3, (4.23)
where s5 > s1 because of qB > qA. Proposition 4.2 summarizes the results for qB− qA >
s1.
Proposition 4.2. Let s1, s2, s3, s4 and s5 be given by formula (4.15), (16), (17),
(21) and (23) respectively. Given A4.1, A4.2 and qB − qA > s1, the equilibrium is
characterized as follows:
1. licensee B’s interim belief is b(τ2, c) = {τ1, τ2}, thus cA = c cannot be sufficient for
B to believe τA = τ2.
2. if qB − qA ∈ (max{s3, s4}, s2] ∪ (s5, s3] 6= ∅, then patentee A always invests cA = c;
otherwise, he invests cA = c only when τA = τ2.
3. when cA = c, B cannot research if qB − qA > s2 or τB = τ1; B invests cB = 0 if
τB = τ2 and qB − qA ∈ (s3, s2]; he invests cB = c if τB = τ2, and qB − qA ∈ (s1, s3] 6= ∅.
4. when cA = 0, B researches only when τB = τ2 and he invests cB = c when he
researches.
Now patent rights may lead to inefficiency, because ex ante scientists’ perspectives about
the future are less correlated (i.e., qB− qA > s1). The problem is that licensee B cannot
trust the signal cA = c, because A may heavily invest in his R&D (i.e., cA = c) to
conceal his bad news. So B must question the motivation of the pessimistic patent
holder, who suddenly acts positively and uses the advanced technology. If A really
received the good news, he may punish B for being skeptical by blocking him from
research or denying his access to the advanced technology. Specifically, if qB − qA >
max{s1, s3}, R&D is conducted less than efficiency, i.e., total investments in R&D or
the number of conducted activities falls below the socially optimal level. This result
fits the prediction of anticommons: a patent owner may inefficiently reduce the usage
of previous knowledge. If A receives the bad news, using the advanced technology and
investing heavily, it is misleading to say that the new innovation will be most valuable.
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A chooses to lie when qB − qA ∈ (max{s3, s4}, s2] ∪ (s5, s3] 6= ∅. However, a socially
optimal outcome requires that A not set cA = c in this situation. This lie may harm the
social welfare by inducing over-investment outcomes (i.e., total investments are strictly
less than the social optimal level). It contradicts anticommons, but does not prove the
efficiency of patent rights.
Remark 4.2 Under the assumptions of proposition 4.2, R&D is used less efficiently, if
τA = τ2 and qB − qA > max{s1, s3}; R&Ds are over-invested, if τA = τ1 and qB − qA ∈
(max{s3, s4}, s2] ∪ (s5, s3] 6= ∅.





(see formula (4.17)), when v2 tends to
infinity. At the same time, s1 (see formula (4.15)) is arbitrarily close to 0, so max{s1, s3}
is s3. Then qB − qA > 1−p1− 1
2
p
is the sufficient condition that anticommons occurs when
the patentee A has the good news. Using the continuity of s3 as a function of v2, one
can easily deduce the following corollary.






, such that R&D is always used less efficiently in equilibrium if τA = τ2.
Here patent rights may lead to the anticommons if a second good news significantly
affects the common valuation largely. Under the same circumstances, patent rights
may also lead to over-investment. Observing A’s heavy investment, B cannot exclude
the most profitable future (i.e., the common valuation is v2), thus is willing to pay a
relatively high licensing fee. Consequently, cA(τ1) = c occurs more often as v2 grows.
Proposition 4.2 suggests that cA(τ1) = c appears in equilibrium only when qB − qA ∈
(max{s3, s4}, s2] ∪ (s5, s3] 6= ∅. From formula (4.15), (4.16), (4.17), (4.21) and (23),
one can easily calculate that for any 0 < qA < qB < 1, c > 0 and v1 is bounded
(as A4.2 ), (max{s3, s4}, s2] ∪ (s5, s3] contains [0, 1] when v2 is large enough. So for all
qB − qA > limv2→∞ s1 = 0, over-investment is a sure thing provided τA = τ1.
Corollary 4.3 Given A is the patentee, there exists some large enough v2 such that
R&D is always over-invested in equilibrium if τA = τ1.
After the passage of the U.S. Bayh–Dole Act of 1980, concerns arose about the potential
impact of anticommons. Those criticisms quieted when universities’ trend of increasing
investment in patentable researches became more clear.20 However, corollary 2 and 3
suggest that the impact of anticommons was concealed, but not insignificant, as it may
be hidden behind the co-existing over-investment. The results depend on some strong
common-value assumption: both scientists observing the good news τ2 results in a large
enough common valuation. Consider that scientists’ information is less correlated (e.g.,
20In fact, this trend began in the 1970s. The passage of Bayh–Dole Act in 1980 legitimized their
activities.
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qB − qA > 1−p1− 1
2
p
). Patent rights can never lead to an efficient outcome. On one hand,
anticommons happens with ex ante probability qA = Pr(τA = τB = τ2). If the patentee
observes good news, R&D is used less efficiently because the licensee cannot use the
advanced technology required for social optimality. On the other hand, over-investment
occurs with ex ante probability 1 − qA = Pr(τA = τ1). It is the patentee who invests
more efficiently in R&D when he observes the bad news. The analysis only focuses on a
single research project. In general, the ex ante co-existence of under-usage of protected
knowledge and over-investment may not be negligible. In fact, universities view revenues
as the most important objective of licensing activity.21 They may over-invest in their
own R&D with the hope of high license income, and in turn cause anticommons by
denying licensing requests with lower fees.
4.4.2 Equilibrium with Optimistic Patentee
Consider h = B and −h = A. As before, the patent holder B reveals his bad news
τ1 if he invests 0 in his R&D. The key question is whether the licensee A can trust on
cB = c as a sufficient message of τB = τ2. Suppose that A believes τB = τ2 whenever
B invests cB = c, that is b(τA, c) = {τ2} for any τA ∈ {τ1, τ2}. If τB = τ1, B knows
τA = τ1 because A4.1 implies Pr(τA = τ1|τB = τ2) = 1. Additionally, A4.2 implies
that cB(τ1) = c cannot be recovered in the future, i.e., E(v|τ1, τ1) = 0. If B invests
cB(τ1) = c, B should recover his investment from the license fees. Thus, B has to use
a non blockade license menu and collect the license fee f1. Consequently, there are two
sufficient conditions for b(τA, c) = {τ2}: i) cB(τ1) = c cannot be recovered by f1 given
b(τA, c) = {τ2}, or f1 < c; ii) B is more profitable by creating a contingent blockade or
full blockade than a non blockade given b(τA, c) = {τ2} and τB = τ2.
According to lemma 4.1, a non blockade license menu should be characterized by cA,1 =
0. Given cB = c, τA = τ1, b(τA, c) = {τ2} and cA,1 = 0, A’s expected profit (formula
(4.1)) is
πA(τ1, cB, cA,1, f1) = pA(1−
1
2
pB)EA(v|τA, b(τA, cB))− cA,1 − f1
= p(1− 1
2
p)v1 − f1. (4.24)
It is optimal for B to leave A with 0 profit, or the license fee is f1 = p(1 − 12p)v1. If
p(1 − 12p)v1 < c, investing cB(τ1) = c results in a negative expected profit of B. Thus,
holding of p(1− 12p)v1 < c is one sufficient condition for A to believe τB = τ2 provided
with cB = c.
21See for instance, Jensen and Thursby (2001).
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Now suppose that B receives the good news. B invests cB = c according to lemma 4.2.
Similar to the above subsection, B does not fully block A’s R&D in equilibrium, given
b(τA, c) = {τ2}. By adopting the full blockade, B only gets (formula (4.5))




(pv2 − c) +
qB − qA
qB
(pv1 − c), (4.25)
where qB−qAqB = Pr(τA = τ1|τB = τ2),
qA
qB
= Pr(τA = τ2|τB = τ2). Using a contingent
blockade license menu, B allows A to research and extracts his whole expected profit
by f2 if τA = τ2. And A’s R&D is forbidden if τA = τ1. By the same logic used in
subsection 4.1 (particularly formula (4.10) and (4.12)), B should gain the maximum
expected social welfare if τA = τB = τ2: B sets cA,2 = c and f2 = p(1− 12p)v2 − c. And
he can get the same profit as using the full blockade if τA = τ1. Hence that B’s expected




((2p− p2)v2 − 2c) +
qB − qA
qB
(pv1 − c), (4.26)
where (2p − p2)v2 − 2c is the maximum expected social welfare when τA = τB = τ2.
Clearly, πkB in formula (4.26) is strictly larger than π
K
B in formula (25). Hence that full
blockade cannot appear in any equilibrium. Consider B offers a non blockade license
menu to A, provided with τB = τ2 and cB = c. In this case, B should motivate A
to reveal his good news τ2 to collect a higher license fee f2 than f1. (IC1) and (IC2)
(formula (4.3)) should be satisfied by the license menu. As stated in lemma 4.1, the
license menu satisfies cA,1 = 0 and cA,2 = c. (IC1) and (IC2) imply
p(1− 1
2
p)v2 − f1 ≤ p(1−
1
2
p)v2 − c− f2 or




Moreover, non blockade requires that (IR1) (formula (4)) should also hold, i.e., f1 ≤




p)v1 and f2 = (1−
1
2
p)(pv1 + ∆pv2)− c.




((p+ p− pp)v1 − c) +
qA
qB
((2p− p2)v2 − 2c− p(1−
1
2
p)(v2 − v1)), (4.27)
where (p + p − pp)v1 − c is the maximum expected social welfare if τA = τ1, τB = τ2
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and p(1− 12p)(v2 − v1) is the minimum rent for A to disclose his good news τ2. If πB in
formula (4.26) is strictly less than πkB in formula (4.25), or
qB − qA < s6 = qA
(1− 12p)(v2 − v1)
(1− p) v1
, (4.28)
B creates a contingent blockade in equilibrium if τB = τ2. The non blockade strategy
is adopted if otherwise. From the above analysis, qB − qA < s6 is another sufficient
condition for b(τA, c) = {τ2}.
In summary, if p(1− 12p)v1 < c or qB− qA < s6 holds, B invests c only when he observes
the good news given b(τA, c) = {τ2}. If p(1− 12p)v1 < c but qB − qA ≥ s6, A invests c if
τA = τB = τ2 and 0 if τA = τ1 6= τB. This game generates the socially optimal outcome.
If p(1− 12p)v1 < c and qB − qA < s6, A’s R&D is blocked whenever τA = τ1.
Proposition 4.3. Let s6 be given in formula (4.27). Given A4.1, A4.2, B being the
patentee and holding of at least one of p(1− 12p)v1 < c and qB− qA < s6, the equilibrium
is characterized as follows:
1. B invests cB = c only when τB = τ2.
2. A believes τB = τ2 whenever cB = c; he believes τB = τ1 when cB = 0.
3. if qB − qA < s6, B blocks A from research whenever τA = τ1; if qB − qA ≥ s6, B
blocks A from research only when τA = τB = τ1.
4. A is allowed to invest cA = c whenever τA = τ2.
Note that the social optimal outcome is characterized by cB = c and cA = 0, if τA = τ1
and τB = τ2. But when qB − qA < s6, the optimistic patentee blocks the other scien-
tist from research according to proposition 4.3. The equilibrium leads to an inefficient
outcome where the previous knowledge is not fully utilized and anticommons takes
place. Here B reveals τB truthfully and knows τA at the end of stage 3. According to
proposition 4.1, full disclosure leads to a socially optimal outcome, when the pessimistic
scientist A owns the previous knowledge. Now A is the licensee, who may observe τ1
given τB = τ2. So he may honestly disagree with a high estimation of future value.
However, any licensee may intentionally under-estimate the value of the new innovation
to avoid a high license fee. To encourage a truth telling to A, B may offer a rent to A






When qB − qA is relatively small (qB − qA < s6) and thus, qAqB is large, this rent is large.
Then B chooses an alternative approach to induce truthtelling: he threatens to disagree
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with any low estimation of licensee and block whoever under-estimates it. This threat
is credible since he has the veto power over A’s R&D. When A really receives some bad
news from nature, A is blocked.
Corollary 4.4 Given B is the patentee, there exists some large a enough v2 such that
R&D is used less efficiently if τA = τ1 and τB = τ2.
If a second good news significantly enhances the common valuation, the above rent that
increases with (v2 − v1) is not affordable for the patentee B. Then anticommons may
take place. Nevertheless, if v2 is close enough to v1, the rent is relatively small for
patentee B. Then the socially optimal outcome is implemented.
Corollary 4.5 Given B is the patentee, if v2 is close enough to v1 and qB − qA < s6
holds, patent rights lead to the socially optimal outcome.
Contrary to corollary 4.1, corollary 4.5 is not sufficient to suggest that the patent is
efficient under the control of the optimistic patentee if a second good news has little
influence on the common valuation. The correlation also matters. Specifically, the
following analysis focuses on the case of p(1− 12p)v1 ≥ c and qB − qA ≥ s6.










Given A4.1, A4.2, p(1− 12p)v1 ≥ c, qB−qA ≥ s6 and B being the patentee, the equilibrium
is characterized as follows:
1. B invests cB = c only when τB = τ2 if qB − qA < max{s7, s8}; B always invests
cB = c for any τB ∈ {τ1, τ2} if otherwise.
2. A believes τB = τ2 only when τA = τ2; he believes τB = τ1 whenever cB = 0; or his
belief is b(τA, c) = {τ1, τ2} when τA = τ1.
3. if qB − qA < s8, B blocks A from research whenever τA = τ1; if qB − qA ≥ s8, B
blocks A from research only when τA = τB = τ1.
4. A is allowed to invest cA = c whenever τA = τ2; A is allowed to invest cA = 0 if
qB − qA ≥ s8 and τA = τ1.
Proof. Provided with p(1 − 12p)v1 ≥ c and qB − qA ≥ s6, A’s belief b(τ1, c) = ∅ is in
equilibrium. Taking this belief to formula (4.23), one can easily equalize the license fee
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Only if f1 ≥ c or equivalently qB − qA ≥ s7, B may invest cB = c when he observes
τB = τ1. Since
qB−qA
1−qA < 1 must hold, qB − qA ≥ s7 is only possible when p(1−
1
2p)v1 ≥
c. Moreover, B also does not invest heavily given τB = τ1, if he contingently blocks
A’s R&D given τB = τ2. Using the same logic when deducing s6, cB(τ1) = c may
be in equilibrium only when qB − qA ≥ s8. Since s6 < s8, qB − qA ≥ s8 is only
possible if qB − qA ≥ s6. Thus, the equilibrium is the same as that in proposition 3 if
qB − qA < max{s7, s8}, when A can trust on cB = c as sufficient message of τB = τ2. If
qB − qA ≥ max{s7, s8}, B always uses a non blockade license menu and invests cB = c
for any τB ∈ {τ1, τ2}.
Remark 4.3 Under the assumptions of proposition 4.4, if qB − qA ≥ max{s7, s8} and
τB = τ1, R&D is over-invested; if qB− qA < s8 and τB = τ2, R&D is used less efficiently;
if s8 < s7 and qB − qA ∈ [s8, s7), the socially optimal outcome is implemented.
Proposition 4.4 and remark 4.3 suggest that only if correlation between τA and τB is
very small (i.e., qB − qA is very large), the patent hold B may successfully conceal his
bad news through investing heavily. This over-investment outcome is different to that
of A being patent holder. According to proposition 4.2, A reveals his bad news by a
light investment, if qB − qA is large. When A conceals his bad information, he attempts
to misguide the licensee who receives the good news. Knowing τB = τ2 and qB − qA
being large, B is unlikely to believe that A also gets a positive signal from nature (i.e.,
τA = τ2). Consequently, it is too difficult for A to conceal τA = τ1 from B under this
circumstance. In the next scenario, B attempts to conceal the bad news. When τA = τ1
and qB − qA are very large, A has propensity to believe τB = τ2 and that a relatively
large licensing fee can be recovered in the future now. This result, together with that of
proposition 4.2, clearly implies that over-investment may occur quite often. Moreover,
remark 4.2 suggests that anticommons occurs if scientists’ information is less correlated
(i.e., qB − qA > max{s1, s3}). On the contrary, here (and in corollary 4) anticommons
may also occur when scientists’ information about future is relative highly correlated
(i.e., s6 ≤ qB − qA < s8). Thus, anticommons is a serious issue when the patentee and
potential licensee are in a common-value situation.
Note that s6 increases with (v2 − v1) (see formula (4.28)). The assumptions of propo-
sition 4.4 cannot hold (i.e., qB − qA ∈ (0, 1) cannot exceed s6), if v2 is large enough.
Consequently, a large v2 is not the only variable causing inefficiency in patent rights.
Moreover, remark 4.3 also implies that the first-best result cannot be ensured , when v2
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is close enough to v1More subtly, let v2 get arbitrarily close to v1. Then s8 is close to,
but always larger than
qA(qB − qA)(1− 12p)
(1− qA) (1− p)
.




p) > (1− qA) (1− p) . (4.29)
According to remark 4.3, if formula (4.29) holds and τB = τ2, the equilibrium leads
to anticommons. Now consider that A is highly pessimistic and the fixed cost of the
advanced technology is relatively low, i.e., qA and c are small enough. Under this
circumstance, neither s7 nor s8 can be large enough provided v2 is close enough to v1.
Additionally, if B is highly optimistic (i.e., qB is large enough), qB − qA ≥ max{s7, s8}
holds. Then the over-investment may appear if τB = τ1.
Corollary 4.6 Given B is the patentee, v2 being close enough to v1 cannot ensure the
socially optimal outcome being implemented by patent rights.
Corollary 4.1 and 4.5 may give one the impression that as long as a second good news
cannot enhance the common valuation significantly, the mechanism of patent rights is
efficient. However, corollary 4.6 indicates that it cannot provide the efficiency of the
mechanism. Conditions around the correlation between scientists’ information are also
needed. If the correlation is too small, i.e., qB − qA is large enough, scientists’ ex
ante valuations about the future is significantly disparate. As suggested by Heller and
Eisenberg (1998) (also see Barton (1995) and Gallini (2002)), it may cause anticommons:
when the patent holder expects a higher value than the licensee does, he may ask for a
license fee higher than that affordable for the licensee. Moreover, the above deduction
implies that given some small correlation between scientist’ information, R&Ds could
also be over-invested. This is due to the possible informational asymmetry between
patentee and licensee. When the patentee correctly figures out the licensee’s information
using the correlation and his own information, the licensee may not be able to do the
same thing. Then the patentee, using his informational advantage, falsely signals his bad
news as good. The licensee believes the signal because of the small correlation and his
own bad news. As the result, a ”winner’s curse” of the licensee may arise in equilibrium:
he pays a higher license fee than he can recover from future earnings.
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4.5 Conclusion
There is much controversy over the efficiency of patent rights. On one hand, the pro-
ponents of anticommons suggest that patentees of previous knowledge may block their
competitors’ research for new findings when they execute their veto power granted by
their patent rights. The implication is that new findings and investments in R&D could
be reduced by patent protection. On the other hand, some empirical studies suggest
that policies favoring patenting have not caused apparent anticommons; the number
of new findings and investments in R&D has not dropped dramatically. One possi-
ble explanation for this apparent controdiction is the co-existence of anticommons and
over-investment in R&D. It is the patentee and licensee’s common valuation of the
future finding that pulls the trigger. When the patentee’s valuation largely relies on li-
censee’s information, he may consider a license menu involving some blockade to induce
truthtelling from the licensee. When the licensee’s valuation largely depends on paten-
tee’s information, the patentee may over-invest in his R&D to signal a high valuation.
By doing that, he may trick the licensee into paying a high license fee. Furthermore,
the correlation between scientists’ perspectives may also cause inefficiency. When the
correlation is relatively small, scientists’ ex ante valuations about the future is signif-
icantly disparate. Anticommons arises because the patentee places a higher value on
future earnings than the licensee does, and then asks for higher fee than the licensee can
afford. Over-investment may also occur, if the patentee has more complete information
than the licensee. The licensee then pays a higher fee than he can recover.
Although this paper suggests patent rights are inefficient, it does not imply that soci-
ety will be better off by adopting the old-fashion approach of knowledge dissemination:
open science. In the mechanism of open science, R&D is funded by governments and
knowledge is publicly owned. Scientists are usually paid by a fixed salary and motivated
by the status (the psychological benefit), which will eventually be cashed out (see Au-
riol and Renault (2008)). Generally, with more investments in their research, scientists’
studies become more successful and they gain a higher status more easily. They may
corporately (or independently) report only the good news and ask for more funding.
Then over-investment in R&D, as predicted by ”tragedy of commons”, may arise. How-
ever, patent rights may lead to a socially optimal outcome, depending on the extent
of a scientist valuation, impact of the other’s perspective, and the correlation between
their perspectives. In this sense, patent rights may be more efficient than open science
as mechanism for dissemination of scientific findings.
Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1 Sub-game between Policyholder and Health Plan
Policyholders are equally assigned to providers in the same platform can be explained as
that the platforms are prone to reveal only the number of each type providers contracted
but no more. Assume that a patient’s utility that a provider could bring is v = vL +
(vH − vL)IH . IH is index function: IH = 1, if the patient is treated by a H provider
or, IH = 0, if he or she is treated by a L provider. Thus all policyholders are willing to
meet H providers to get a high utility.
Consider the plans disclose the quality of each provider, then all policyholders will firstly
attempt to get access to H providers. Since we exclude capacity limitation, plans will
only contract with H providers. However, because there are some L type providers
located much closer to the plans than some H providers, hence much cheaper for the
plans to contract with than some H providers. Thus the plans should optimally choose
to reveal nL and nH without specifying each provider’s type.
In front of the above plans’ strategy, the policyholders’ best response is to match a
provider that they believe is H. Formally, assume that the probability that a provider,
who is believed as H by a policyholder, is actually H is z and the probability that a
provider, who is believed as H by a policyholder, is actually L is 1 − z, where z ≥ 12 .
Let vL = λ and vH = 1 +λ, the expected utility gain from participating the health plan
of a policyholder will be
z(λ+ 1)nH + (1− z)λnL
(1− z)nL + znH
(nL + nH),
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where z(λ+1)n
H+(1−z)λnL
(1−z)nL+znH is the expected quality externality from interacting with one
physician of the health plan. When z = 12 , the policyholders have no more information
about providers’ quality other than that disclosed by the health plan. Consequently
they are randomly assigned to providers. Then we have
z(λ+ 1)nH + (1− z)λnL
(1− z)nL + znH
(nL + nH) = (λ+ 1)nH + λnL.
Moreover, as long as z < 1, our results can not be changed quantitatively.
A.2 Quality and Welfare Comparison under Fixed Salary
Scheme (Proof of Proposition 2.3 and 2.4)























if t ∈ (t, 1+λ3 θ̂) 6= ∅
2t
λθ̂
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if t ∈ (t, 1+λ3 θ̂) 6= ∅
2t
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λ if t ∈ (
1+λ
2 θ̂,∞)
≤ 1 + λ
λ
Social welfare is utilitarian, i.e.,
SW = (λnA + nAqA)
∫ θ̂
0






[(1− q)(x̃L2A + (1− x̃LB)2) + q(x̃H2A + (1− x̃HB )2)
In order to compare the welfare under two different constraints, we need to do it one by
one according to the variations of the transportation cost t. To make it simple, we use
the following separate form SW = SWL + SWH − cE(θ), where SW j net social gain
from interacting between policyholders and j type doctors. More precisely,
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.
Since, under fixed salary scheme and A1, x̃L,SA = x̃
L,M
A and 1 − x̃
L,S
B = 1 − x̃
H,M
B (see
proposition 2.1 and 2.2), we have SWL,S = SWL,M .
With multi-homing, SWH is
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Lemma A.2. For all t ∈ [1+λ3 θ̂,
1+λ
2 θ̂], SW
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Since t ∈ [1+λ3 θ̂,
1+λ
2 θ̂], we have
(1+λ)θ̂










2 , thus, SW
H,M ≥ SWH,S1 .
Lemma A.3. For all t ∈ (t, 1+λ3 θ̂) 6= ∅, SW
H,M ≥ SWH,S2 .
Proof.



































− 1 + λ
6t





























H,M ≥ SWH,S1 , thus to prove this
lemma, it is sufficient to show that
d(SWH,M−SWH,S2 )
dt < 0.
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Similar to Lemma A.2, we get
d(SWH,M−SWH,S2 )
dt < 0.
A.3 An Example of Distribution for Proposition 2.5




θ, if 0 < θ <
8
9
andF (θ) = a+ (θ − b)c, if 8
9
≤ θ ≤ 1,
where a, b, c satisfy that (1) a+(89 −b)
c = 13 , (2) a+(1−b)
c = 1 and (3) c(89 −b)
c−1 = 38 .
Because the system of (1), (2) and (3) is not over-identified, such a distribution function
exists. We will prove that
F (θ̂)2[θ̂ − E(θ|θ < θ̂)] > [1− F (θ̂)]2[E(θ|θ ≥ θ̂)− θ̂],
or
E(θ|θ ≥ θ̂)− θ̂











9 is the equilibrium risk
segmentation θ̂, the only value in (0, 1] such that 1− 2F (θ) = f(θ)θ.
First, for all θ ∈ (0, 89), 1− 2F (θ)− f(θ)θ = 1−
9
8θ > 0.
Second, we need to prove that for all θ ∈ (89 , 1], 1 − 2F (θ) < f(θ)θ. For all θ ∈ (
8
9 , 1],
F (θ) = a+(θ−b)c. Since (1−b)c− (89−b)
c = 23 >
1
9 , we must have c > 1. Subsequently,
because c(89 − b)
c−1 = 38 > 0, we have b <
8
9 . Thus for all θ ∈ (
8
9 , 1], d(1− 2F (θ))/dθ < 0
and d(f(θ)θ)/dθ = c(θ − b)c−2(c− b) > 0.
Thus, θ̂ = 89 .
Now let us prove that E(θ|θ≥θ̂)−θ̂
θ̂−E(θ|θ≤θ̂)
< [ F (θ̂)
1−F (θ̂)
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denote a type j provider’s expect-
ed payment from each activity (treatment) in plan A and B respectively. Then we have












Apparently, for every (Rji , x̃
j




i). Thus for any plan,
maximizing its profit with respect to (Rji , x̃
i
i) is equivalent to doing that with respect to
(R̂ji , x̃
j


























θf(θ)dθ − tx̃HA ≥ 0





θf(θ)dθ − tx̃HA ≥ R̂HB
∫ 1
θ̃
θf(θ)dθ − t(1− x̃HA ),











πB = PB(1− F (θ̃))− (1− q)(1− x̃LB)2
−
[









θf(θ)dθ − t(1− x̃HB ) ≥ 0





θf(θ)dθ − t(1− x̃HB ) ≥ R̂HA
∫ θ̃
0
θf(θ)dθ − tx̃HB .
he first order conditions1 for PA and PB are
∂πA
∂PA




















1Assume that these are two concave problems.
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B respectively). Rearrange the first-
order conditions for PA and PB, then equilibrium risk segmentation θ̃ is given by




B − ξ4R̂HA )) (A.1)
The first order conditions for x̃LA and (1− x̃LB) are
∂πA
∂x̃LA
= (PA − (c−ξ2R̂HB )θ̃)
θ̃2f(θ̃)λ(1− q)
∆P
− 2t(1− q)x̃LA = 0, (A.2)
∂πB
∂(1− x̃LB)
= (PB − (c−ξ4R̂HA )θ̃)
θ̃2f(θ̃)λ(1− q)
∆P
− 2t(1− q)(1− x̃LB) = 0. (A.3)








The first order conditions for x̃HA and 1− x̃HB are
∂πA
∂x̃LA
= (PA − (c−ξ2R̂HB )θ̃)
θ̃2f(θ̃)(1 + λ)q
∆P
− 2tqx̃LA = 0,
∂πB
∂(1− x̃LB)
= (PB − (c−ξ4R̂HA )θ̃)
θ̃2f(θ̃)(1 + λ)q
∆P
− 2tq(1− x̃LB) = 0.
Now let us prove that x̃HA = 1−
1+λ





should consist of an equilibrium H provider configuration.
Lemma A.4. When t ∈ (t , 1+λ2 θ̂), single-homing equilibrium risk segmentation θ̃(t)
satisfies t < 1+λ2 θ̃(t) and IC
H
i must be binding.














2t θ̃(t) ≤ 1 and plans’ IC
H
i are automat-
ically satisfied. However, in this case,
πA = PAF (θ̃)− (1− q)t(x̃LA)





πB = PB(1− F (θ̃))− (1− q)t(1− x̃LB)





which means that θ̃(t) = θ̂ as proved in Proposition 2.6. However, t < 1+λ2 θ̂ generates
the contradiction. So t < 1+λ2 θ̃(t) and IC
H
i must be binding.
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binding, θ̃(t) is the equilibrium risk segmentation, then x̃HA = 1 −
1+λ
2t θ̃(t)(1 − F (θ̃(t)))
and 1− x̃HB =
1+λ
2t θ̃(t)(1− F (θ̃(t))) consist of an equilibrium H provider configuration.
Proof. The equilibrium risk segmentation θ̃ = (PB−PA)/((1− q)λ(1− x̃LB− x̃LA) + q(1 +
λ)(1− x̃HB − x̃HA )), then plan A’s profit is
πA = (PB − θ̃((1− q)λ(1− x̃LB − x̃LA) + q(1 + λ)(1− x̃HB − x̃HA )))F (θ̃)
−(1− q)t(x̃LA)





The first order condition for x̃HA is
∂πA
∂x̃HA
= q(1 + λ)θ̃F (θ̃)− 2qtx̃HA ,
which is larger than 0, if ICHA is binding. Otherwise, it equals to 0. Thus we have
∂πA
∂x̃HA
> 0 for all x̃HA ≤
1+λ




2t θ̃(t)(1 − F (θ̃(t))), x̃
H
A ≤
1− 1+λ2t θ̃(t)(1− F (θ̃(t))). From Lemma A.1, we know that t <
1+λ




θ̃(t)(1−F (θ̃(t))) < F (θ̃(t)) < 1 + λ
2t
θ̃(t)F (θ̃(t))
As the result, the best response of plan A given plan B choosing 1− x̃HB =
1+λ
2t θ̃(t)(1−
F (θ̃(t))) is 1 − 1+λ2t θ̃(t)(1 − F (θ̃(t))). Using the same logic to plan B, we can conclude
that the best response of plan B given plan A choosing x̃HA = 1−
1+λ
2t θ̃(t)(1− F (θ̃(t)))
is 1− x̃HB =
1+λ
2t θ̃(t)(1− F (θ̃(t))).
Finally, we solve the system, when ICHi and IR
H
i (i = A,B) are all binding. The first






















θf(θ)dθ − 2tξ4 − tξ3 (A.5)
Appendix for Chapter 2 100








θf(θ)dθ + (ξ2 + ξ1)
∫ θ̃
0
θf(θ)dθ = 0 (A.6)
∂πB
∂R̂HB
= − q(1− x̃HB )
∫ 1
θ̃
θf(θ)dθ + (ξ4 + ξ3)
∫ 1
θ̃
θf(θ)dθ = 0. (A.7)
Combing (A.2), (A.3), (A.4), (A.5) together with R̂HA
∫ θ̃





F (θ̃))) and R̂HB
∫ 1




2 θ̃(1 − F (θ̃)) (since IR
H
i are binding), the
following two equations hold:
(1 + λ)qF (θ̃)θ̃ = qt(1− 1 + λ
2t
θ̃(t)(1−F (θ̃))) + 2tξ2 + tξ1 (A.8)
(1 + λ)q(1− F (θ̃))θ̃ = q1 + λ
2
θ̃(1− F (θ̃)) + 2tξ4 + tξ3. (A.9)
From (A.6) and (A.7), we have










which (together with (A.8) and (A.9)) implies that ξ2 = 2q(
1+λ
2t θ̃ − 1) > 0 and ξ4 = 0.
Formula (17) can be rewritten as




Lemma A.6. Risk segmentation θ̃(t) defined by formula (A.10) satisfies that θ̃(t) <
θ̂ = 1−2F (θ̂)
f(θ̂)
.
Proof. We have 1 − 2F (θ̃) > f(θ̃)θ̃ from (A.10) since ξ2 = 2q(1+λ2t θ̃ − 1) > 0. Remind




Note that the equilibrium L provider configuration is x̃LA =
λ












2t θ̂ < 1, or in
words, L providers are not fully covered by health plans in equilibrium.
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A.5 Efficiency of Single-homing under Fee-for-Service (Proof
of Proposition 2.8)
Here we continue to separate the utilitarian social welfare function:
SW k(t, θ̃) = SWH,k(t, θ̃) + SWL,k(t, θ̃)− cE(θ)
where θ̃ is the equilibrium risk segmentation and k = M,S indicates multi-homing and
single-homing respectively. Because in the multi-homing outcome θ̃ = θ̂ for all t, taking
the value of provider configuration from proposition 2.6, we have













θ̂2[F (θ̂)2 + (1− F (θ̂))2]}













θ̂2[F (θ̂)2 + (1− F (θ̂))2]}.
In the single-homing outcome given by proposition 2.7,















(1− 1 + λ
2t

















θ̃2[F (θ̃)2 + (1− F (θ̃))2]}.
Note that when t = 1+λ2 θ̂, SW
S = SWM , because the multi-homing outcome is equiv-
alent to the single-homing one when there is measure 0 provider multi-homing (only
the H provider locates at 1+λ
2
2t θ̂F (θ̂) multihomes). To prove for some t less than
1+λ
2 θ̂,

































































































































− (1− F (θ̂))2.
Thus condition a holds if and only if
E(θ|θ ≤ θ̂) ≤ θ̂
2
.

















+(1 + λ)(2− 3
2
F (θ̂))− 1](1− 2F (θ̂)).
As a result, condition b holds if and only if
θ̂ >





[(1 + λ)(2− 32F (θ̂))− 1](1− 2F (θ̂))
.






















θ̂F (θ̂)(1− F (θ̂))}.
So condition c holds if and only if
θ̂ ≥ (1− F (θ̂))F (θ̂)
(1− 2F (θ̂))2
E(θ|θ ≥ θ̂).
Now let us prove that
(1− F (θ̂))F (θ̂)
(1− 2F (θ̂))2
E(θ|θ ≥ θ̂) >





[(1 + λ)(2− 32F (θ̂))− 1](1− 2F (θ̂))
.





, to prove the above inequality
holds, it is equivalent to prove that for all λ ≥ 0, we have
(1 + λ)(1− 2F (θ̂)) < (1 + λ)(2− 3
2
F (θ̂))− 1.
This inequality holds apparently.
Thus, when F (θ) satisfies θ̂ ≥ max{2E(θ|θ ≤ θ̂), (1−F (θ̂))F (θ̂)
(1−2F (θ̂))2
E(θ|θ ≥ θ̂)}, under A1 and
FFS scheme, single-homing may lead to more social wefare than multi-homing for some
t less than 1+λ2 θ̂.




θ, if 0 < θ <
8
9
and F (θ) = a+ (θ − b)c, if 8
9
≤ θ ≤ 1,
where a, b, c satisfy that (1) a+ (89 − b)
c = 14 , (2) a+ (1− b)
c = 1, (3) c(89 − b)
c−1 = 932 .
Thus θ̂ = 89 and F (θ̂) =
1
4 . Moreover, we have E(θ|θ ≤ θ̂) =
4
9 and E(θ|θ ≥ θ̂) < 1. So
θ̂ = 2E(θ|θ ≤ θ̂) and since
θ̂
(1− 2F (θ̂))2




> 1 > E(θ|θ ≥ θ̂),
we have θ̂ > (1−F (θ̂))F (θ̂)
(1−2F (θ̂))2
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                             Résumé 
 
De nombreux épisodes de l'histoire de la théorie économique ont suggéré l'effet 
positif des innovations sur la croissance économique et de qualité sur le bien-être des 
êtres humains. Les régulateurs ont tenté en permanence de concevoir des politiques 
publiques visant à encourager l'innovation et améliorer la prestation de qualité. Cette 
thèse se compose 3 chapitres indépendantes concernant les politiques publiques 
incentivizing innovations et prestations de qualité. 
 
Dans le premier chapitre, nous modélisons la concurrence des plans de santé à deux 
faces avec externalité de qualité. Nous examinons ce qui se passe lorsque les 
fournisseurs de haute qualité sont autorisés à fréquenter les plans de santé multiples 
(multi-homing) et la comparer à une seule prise d'origine. Multi-homing des 
fournisseurs de haute qualité donne le plus la qualité des plans, mais seule-homing 
peut générer les meilleurs résultats pour le bien-être des assurés et de protection 
sociale. 
 
Le deuxième chapitre compare deux approches réglementaires de qualité des aliments: 
échantillonnage et d'essai de produits (inspections sur les produits) et de contrôle 
vérifiables contrôle du processus de production (Certifications de processus). On peut 
se demander si la certification du processus est mieux utilisé comme substitut ou 
complément à l'inspection du produit. Ce chapitre analyse officiellement cette 
question dans le cadre Cournot et suggère que la combinaison de ces deux approches 
peut pas améliorer l'efficacité. 
 
Le troisième chapitre est inspiré par l'hypothèse anticommuns de Heller et Eisenberg 
(1998), ce qui implique que les activités de recherche et développement (R & D) 
pourraient être entravées par la protection des brevets. Cependant, des études récentes 
suggèrent que cet effet est surestimée. Ce chapitre examine une situation courante 
valeur: les scientifiques de l'évaluation repose sur des uns et des autres points de vue. 
Il donne un résultat surinvestissement qui peut masquer la présence d'anti-communs, 
en particulier lorsque l'évaluation commune dépend largement des informations 
privées des deux scientifiques. 
